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This paper is a study of Britain's most significant 
conciliatory effort during the American Revolution. The 
thesis presents a discussion of the North Conciliatory 
Plan of 1778 and the obstacles which confronted Britain's 
peace emissaries--the Carlisle Commission--during 
negotiations in America. 
In aiding in the completion of this paper, I am 
indebted to numerous individuals. The librarians of the 
Virginia State Library in Richmond were of great assistance 
in locating primary material within the library. Through 
use of the Norfolk Public Library's inter-library loan, 
I was saved much time and expense. I am also indebted to 
Miss Joanne Smith for typing some of the rough draft. But 
most of all I thank my parents for their patience during 
the months of labor on this paper. 
··. 
UN!VEI..~-;;' · { ~. • • ' . ; •• •• •' l ~ ~~ ,,. ·.". • ' ' , 
INTRODUCTION: PRECEDENTS AND ALTERNATIVES 
The British Carlisle Commission of 1778 was not an 
innovation. Even prior to the opening of hostilities at 
Lexington, Lord Chatham had advocated reconciliation. 1 On 
January 20 and February 1, 1775, he made appeals to 
Parliament. The first petition demanded the removal of 
British troops from Boston to demonstrate good faith. 
Parliament refused this request. His February 1 proposal, 
among other points, advocated approval of the Continental 
Congress and no taxation without colonial consent. 
Parliament, however, was unwilling to lose prestige by 
bowing to colonial pressure. 2 
The failure of Chatham's propositions did not deter 
Lord Frederick·North, the Lord Treasurer and head of the 
1For information on Lord Chatham, infra, Al• 16, 61-63. 
2oscar Theodore Barck and Hugh Talmage Lefler, 
Colonial America (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1958), 
p. 566; Richara w. Van Alstyne, Empire and Inde endence 
The International History of the American Revo ution New 
York: John Wiley ana Sons,-rll"C7';" 1965), P• 62. 
Tory a1n1atl:y, fraa o[ferln1 bla own plan la 1775. ff• 
1aaued hla flropoaal ln hope• of qutetln1 the Chatham led 
Ops>091tloo.3 Parll ... nt app10Y'ed >torth•a February 20, 
1775 endeavor. Yet th• colooiea rejected peace alnce hla 
plan failed to reach th• con ot th• yrobl•. Th• nvolu• 
tioa.arl•• would not acknowledge any lrlctab right of 
tax.at1oo or recogniu their .. 1ntanance of an ansy ln the 
c:oloni• 1. AD end to taxation and 1 t&ndlq anue 1 wn 
alreAdy tvo o! the d-=anda of tho coloeliala.4 
v1 
Coe• boatillti•• began, tho Br1t.1ab Dinl1try v.alted 
a yur before of fer1ng a further conc1llatory policy. To 
act•• King C.orge Ill'• apeclal .Uaaarlea,the crovn 
appointed Adalral Uch&rd Howe and hla brother, c.neral 
Willlaa Howe, in Aprll, 1776. ln addition to U..lr concll• 
1atory power•, they took co=n1Dd of the f loot md tho ansy 
1n ADerica. They vaved th• "'olive branch ln ooe hand and 
th• sword in th• other. • 5 
Th• Kew Co:::a.111100 ot: 1776 agreed to treat Mparately 
vtth any town, colony, or lnd1vldual. A p&rdOft vould bo 
3ror lnfor:::.ation ca ttA t;>;>oa1tion and th• Torlea, 
intra, P'P• l4•l9 and 61-62. 
4aardt C\d Lefl•r, Colcm.tal k:oerlca, P• Sb&. 
Sclaude H. V&n Tyne, n..o ~ ~ lf'k!•ie:"..c!e-n.:o, A:M'rlcan 
Ph••• (Boa too: hough tea H1fffin La:yany, l1j.t4i J, lf, Ict·oli. 
vii 
offered to any person who condemned the rebellion and 
sanctioned the British cause. But insistence by the Howe 
brothers that the Loyalists overthrow the American revolu-
tionary leaders stiffened colonial opposition. 6 Furthermore, 
their June 20 and July 14 conciliatory offers came too late, 
reaching Congress after it had declared independence. 
Instead of independence, the Howe Commission also required 
restoration of former "legal" governments and disbanding 
of all troops under the "illegal" regimes. Only then would 
British taxation end. 7 
In mid-1776, the British "hard" line peace offer 
reflected their command of the military situation. They had 
not lost a major battle. Complete French intervention had 
not yet materialized. The vast quantity of materiel was 
just beginning to reach .America. By 1778, however, the 
English ministry, still under the direction of Lord North, 
realized the ineffectiveness of its recent military efforts. 
Thus the Carlisle Commission of 1778 offered more amiable 
terms to America. The Howe Commission had first required 
the colonials to yield to certain British demands; in 1778, 
6carl Van Doren, Secret History of the American 
Revolution (New York: Viking Press, 194!')-;--p'p. 10-11; 
Weldon A. Brown, Empire or Independence A Study in the 
Failure of Reconciliatioll; 1774-1783 (Un!versity-;-LOUI'siana: 
Louisiana-state University Preis-;-!'941), pp. 82-83. 
7Barck and Lefler, Colonial America, pp. 600-601. 
the offer of conciliation was made without prior stipu-
lations. The war situation had changed completely, and 
viii 
a Franco-American alliance was more and more a possibility. 
The might of the British Empire had failed to subdue its 
weaker possession. 
The initiation of the British peace effort of 1778, 
also reflected a change of attitude within the British 
ministry and political pressures in England. The ministry, 
led by Lord North, finally realized that a policy of force 
would not inevitably produce victory. The British seemed 
willing to lose international pre-eminence by granting 
almost all colonial demands. If this peace plan failed, 
then either destruction of America or colonial independence 
would follow. Each alternative was full of danger for the 
British economic system. To the ministry, the conciliatory 
of fer was the least costly and the only logical means of 
ending the war without destroying America or granting 
independence. 
The reason for the 1778 conciliatory effort, however, . 
was not based solely on the Battle of Saratoga, October, 
1777. The fear of total French involvement also did much 
to bring Britain's lethargic ministry out of its stupor. 
On the surface French and British relations had seemed 
amiable following the Peace of Paris in 1763. In ectuality 
each was suspicious of the other. The French diplomats and 
courtiers eagerly supported any cause which lessened the 
authority of their nemesis.8 
ix 
From the firing of the first shots at Lexington, the 
French ministry had looked favorably upon the American 
cause. The work of Pierre Augustin de Beaumarchais, a 
playwright and intimate in the French court, was noticeable 
immediately. Throughout the fall and winter of 1775, he 
attempted to persuade Charles Gravier, the Count de 
Vergennes, into supporting the sending of materiel to 
America. French Foreign Minister Vergennes favored the 
American cause but at first dreaded the possibility of 
9 war with England. Beaumarchais was even less successful 
with Turgot, the Controller General of Finances. In a 
sound argument Turgot claimed that the French financial 
system was too weak to allow it to aid America. 10 
Finally in December, 1775, Vergennes admitted to Louis 
XVI his endorsement of the American cause. 11 This acknowl-
8claude H. Van Tyne, "French Aid before the Alliance 
of 1778," The American Historical Review, XXXI, 1 (October, 
1925)' 29.-
9Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic Histo~ of !h! American 
People (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, ~64), P• 29; 
James Reck Perkins, France in the American R~volution 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1911), pp; 79 and 542. 
lOsamuel Flag Bemis, The Diplomacy of the American 
Revolution (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana Universitv Press, 
1961), PP• 24·25. -
11Perkins, France in the Revolution, pp. 52-54. 
x 
edgement led to the shipment of supplies and funds to the 
colonies in 1776.12 Among reasons for aid, Vergennes 
included revenge against England for the humiliating Treaty 
of Paris. He also believed the con:miercial assets of an 
13 independent America would be numerous. 
With the Paris arrival of Benjamin Franklin in 
December, 1776, talks leading to a military alliance began 
in earnest. Vergennes again at first failed to re~pond 
enthusiasti~ally toward an dlliance. In January and March, 
1777, colonial "militia diplomats" continued to prod the 
French ministry into favoring a military-connnercial agree-
ment. Vergennes was willing to provide secret aid. If 
there were assurances that the colonials would remain true 
to the cause for liberty, even if independence were offered 
by Britain, then an alliance would be beneficial. The 
French minister never received such a guarantee. 14 
By the summer of 1777, the concentration of French, 
Spanish, and British naval power in the West Indies further 
12on May· 12, 1776, Turgot resigned leaving Vergennes 
the dominant influence in the government. Bemis, Diplomacy 
of the American Revolution, PP• 27-28. 
13c1aude H. Van Tyne, "Influences which Determined the 
French Govermnent to Make the Treaty with America, 1778," 
The American Historical Review, XXI, 3 (April, 1916), 
"S!9"-3o. 
14Edward s. Corwin, French Policx and the American 
Alliance of 1778 (Hamden, Connecticut: Archoil'Books, 1962), 
PP• 95 an'd'""9-r:--
xi 
aided in forrm.ilating a change in British policy.15 By 
July, the French navy seemed to be on equal terms with the 
British. Vergennes reasoned that if England maintained 
control of North America she might menace the French West 
Indies.
16 
The basis of the French-colonial policy, there-
fore, was not at first contingent upon an American victory. 
Weeks before the battle of Saratoga, Vergennes had admitted 
17 the need for an alliance. 
This increasing French interest in the New World 
balance of power aroused the British ministry from its 
lethargy. In late October, for the first time, the ministry 
advocated the interception of French vessels bound for 
t\m.erica. Lord Weymouth, Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs, and the British ambassador to France, Lord Stormont, 
acknowledged also the likelihood of a Franco-American 
. 18 
Alliance. 
Word of the British defeat at Saratoga, October 17, 
1777, thus generated consternation in France as well as in 
England. The possibility of Britain's offering America 
independence now worried Vergennes. Franklin eagerly played 
15van Alstyne, Empire and Independence, p. 132. 
16corwin, French Policy, PP• 101-02. 
17van Alstyne, Empire ~ Independence, p. 133. 
18van Alstyne, Empire ~ Independence, PP• 133-34; 
Bemis, Diplomacy of the American Revolution, p. 78. 
xii 
on such fears. Franklin held discussions with British 
agents which increased the foreign minister's fears. 19 The 
colonial nmilitia diplomatsn in France realized the dilemma 
plaguing Vergennes and France. To allow a British and 
American reunification was to court the destruction of 
France and her possessions in the West Indies. To unite 
with America would surely initiate war with England. 
Vergennes wondered which was the lesser of two evils. 
Either way France faced a dilemma. Vergennes, however, 
finally insisted that it was more logical to engage one 
enemy, England, rather than two, America and England. 20 
With continued accumulation of rumors concerning a 
Franco-American alliance, Lord North and the miuistry 
became more apprehensive. The solution to Britain's 
dilemma was, hopefully, a conciliatory effort. Not only 
did Lord North initiate the proposition in order to quell 
the Whig Opposition at home but also to thwart the American 
success at Saratoga. More important, the conciliatory 
endeavor was a reply to Britain's ancient nemesis, France. 
19corwin, French Policx, P• 121; Van Tyne, "Influences," 
P• 538. 
20Ruth F. Bartlett (ed.), The Record of American 
Diplomacy Documents and Readings-rii the History of .American 
Forei~ Relations (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1964), 
pp. 2 -21; Van Tyne, 0 Influences,n P• 541. 
CHAPTER I 
THE DECEMBER TO FEBRUARY PREPARATIONS 
LEADING TO THE NORTH CONCILIATORY PLAN OF 1778 
After nearly three years of fruitless warfare, the 
chances of conciliation between England and her wayward 
colonies became realistic. General Burgoyne's defeat at 
Saratoga in October, 1777, made conciliation an often 
debated subject. Not only had the colonials gained a 
resounding military victory, but the possibility of an 
alliance with France or some other friendly European nation 
gained momentum as 1777 drew to a close. 
The British ministry understood what might occur once 
America and France became allies. A Franco-American 
military alliance would compel England to wage war on two 
fronts. The ability of England to maintain her control of 
the sea lanes would be put to a severe test. Even if 
England should be victorious in any forthcoming hostilities, 
the weakening of her authority on land and sea would provide 
openings for other European states to claim a share of 
British commercial and trading rights throughout the world. 
An enfeebled Britain would thus be subject to harassment 
2 
by all those countries which had coveted Britain's dominance 
of the seas. 
The task for the North ministry, therefore, was to 
discover a means of thwarting a French treaty with the 
colonies. To counteract any such move by the French, the 
English government needed a sound and adequate peace plan 
acceptable to leaders in the American Congress. Perhaps 
only then would the colonials reject the Gallic inducements 
in order to return to the security of common language, 
religion, and ancestry. 
In order to achieve this reunion, Lord North's 
ministry considered changing its objectives. As Chancellor 
of the Exchequer and First Lord of the Treasury, political 
disappointments and military disasters had confronted Lord 
North. 1 Edmund Burke and Charles James Fox irritated North 
by pointing out to the Lord Treasurer his failings. The 
Opposition, the group of gentlemen in Parliament who were 
critical of the North administration and its policies, 
lsir Lewis Namier and John Brooke, The Histor~ of 
Parliament: The House of Commons, 1754-179'0""'TNew Yor :~ 
Oxford Univerirty Presi; 1964), p.~.~ 
raised its voice in anger over the continuous inability of 
the government to achieve a full or even partial military 
triumph. 2 
With such objections confronting the ministry in 
3 
1777, an immediate change in British policy seemed necessary. 
For almost three years English forces engaged a weaker but 
persistent opponent. North's adversaries urged some 
definite, positive strategy to eradicate the current 
situation. Under the joint command of Lord Richard and 
General William Howe, British forces were less than success-
ful. Then the significant defeat of Burgoyne climaxed the 
decline of British fortunes. With the distinct possibility 
of open, French-American cooperation, the North cabinet 
seized upon any opportunity to obtain even a partial victory 
with the colonies.3 
The military situation in December, 1777, therefore, 
compelled certain governmental officials, such as Frederick 
North and Under-secretary William Eden, to inquire into the 
possibility of a peaceful settlement of the current hostil-
ities. Once ·news arrived of Burgoyne's defeat, William Eden, 
2ttenry, Lord Brougham, Historical Sketches of Statesmen 
~ Flourished .!!! the Time E£ George III (London: Richard 
Griffin and Company, 1&5'ST, I, 52. 
3J. L. Le B. Hammond, Charles James Fox, A Political 
Studx (London: Methuen and Company, 1903),-p: 2I2. 
a close friend of North and a person constantly striving 
for a just and equitable peace, sketched his plan for a 
peace negotiation. Following the shock of Saratoga, the 
young under-secretary in the Northern Department presented 
his proposal for conciliation to Lord North. 4 
In a December 7 dispatch to Lord North, Eden out-
lined two major proposals. To be a success, he believed 
conciliation must include the colonial right to revoke all 
existing acts of Parliament considered to be a restraint 
upon the colonies. Secondly, he suggested appointment of 
con:missioners to lay the foundations for America's restora-
5 tion within the Empire. Such persons, according to Eden, 
4 
should "be nominated by His Majesty under the Great Seal of 
England" and would "have full powers to meet • • • with such 
Person or Persons" having authority to expedite matters. 6 
This plan was the basis of further developments 
during the forthcoming weeks. Eden acknowledged problems 
in any peace maneuver and conceded the need of a detailed 
4van Alstyne, Empire .!Ef! Independence, p. 143. 
5charles R. Ritcheson, British Politics and the 
American Revolution (Norman, Oklahoma: University or:--
Oklahoma Press, 1954), p. 259. 
6william Eden to Lord North, December 7, 1777, B. F. 
Stevens, Facsimiles of Manuscripts in European Archives 
Relating to America !773-1783 with Descriptions, Editorial 
Notes, Collations, References,-arui Translations (London: 
Printed by Malby and Sons, June-ns9o), IV, No. 355. Here-
after cited as Stevens, Facsimiles. 
study before the cabinet's formal presentation of any final 
conciliation proposal.7 
~ieanwhile, preliminary discussions between British 
and American envoys in France had developed. Burgoyne's 
defeat led Eden to seek American diplomats' opinions 
concerning a negotiated settlement with England. Under-
secretary Eden sent his agent, Paul Wentworth, a New 
Hampshire Loyalist, to France on December 6, 1777.8 At the 
time of Wentworth's sojourn in Paris, Dr. Edward Bancroft, 
formerly of Westfield, Massachusetts, was also in the 
confidence of Benjamin Franklin and Silas Deane. 9 
Along with Wentworth and Bancroft were Thomas 
Walpole and David Hartley. Walpole, a merchant and banker 
in England, had strong commercial ties in Ame7ica. As a 
follower of the Rockingham Whigs in Parliament, Walpole 
7van Alstyne, Empire .!:!:!!2. Independence, p. 144. 
5 
8s. F. Bemis, "British Secret Service and the French-
.American Alliance, 11 The American Historical Review, XXIX, 3 
(April, 1924), 484-483:" To compensate for his time in the 
British service, Wentworth desired a modest position within 
English society·. He hoped that the rebellion would fail so 
that his New Hampshire estates would not be confiscated. Van 
Doren, Secret History, P• 60. 
9Bemis, "British Secret Service," P• 489. Edward 
Bancroft. before the war, was confidential secretary of Silas 
Deane. He played the role of double agent during the 
discussions in France while remaining in the pay of the 
British ministry. Bemis, Diplomacy of the American Revolution) 
PP• 65-66. 
expressed to Franklin a firm desire for a conciliation. 10 
Unknown to Franklin, however, Walpole believed the key to 
peace lay in a change in government at home. 11 Franklin 
received other notes encouraging a peace settlement from 
12 David Hartley, a political opponent of Lord North. A 
member of Parliament, Hartley gained therein additional 
f 
. 13 support or condemnations of the North ministry. 
6 
Sympathetic to the American situation, Hartley on several 
occasions expressed hope that a settlement would eventually 
be forthcoming. Although his correspondence never developed 
into valuable negotiations, Franklin did hint that if such 
distinguished and honest men as David Hartley had the powers 
14 to discuss a treaty of peace, hostilities might cease. 
During the time of the Walpole and Hartley corre-
10van Alstyne, Empire and Independence, pp. 95 and 116. 
11&ichard W. Van Alstyne, "Thomas Walpole's Letters to 
the Duke of Grafton on .American Affairs 1776-1778," The 
Huntington Library Quarterly, XXX, 1 (November, 1966r;-32. 
12Even though Hartley adhered to the policies of the 
Rockingham Whigs, he upheld Chatham's colonial beliefs. 
Chatham, also a· Whig, denounced all advocates of American 
independence. Van Alstyne, Empire and Independence, p. 63. 
13George Herbert Guttridge, David Ha1:tley, M. P. and 
Advocate of Conciliation 1774-1783 (Berkeley, CaliYornia:--
UniversitY-0£ California Pre'Ss, October, 1926), pp. 280-281. 
14Benjamin Franklin to David Hartley, February 26, 
1778, Albert Henry Smyth (ed.),~ Writings of Benjamin 
Franklin (New York: The l'XlacNillan Company, 1906), VII, No. 855. 
spondence with Franklin, Under-secretary Eden's agent, Paul 
Wentwoxth, arrived .in Paris carrying a letter from Eden 
expressing the latter's respect for Franklin and the ever 
present wish for an end to the fighting. To establish 
favorable conditions for his plan, forwarded to Lord North 
December 7, Eden needed to know the true sentiments of the 
.Americans in Paris. An end to the conflict was Eden's 
fervent hope. If Franklin's views were discovered, a 
conciliation policy, such as the one formulated by Eden, 
would have a guideline to follow. 
7 
Under instructions as Mr. Eden's private commissioner, 
Wentworth was to obtain information concerning America's 
relationships with France, Spain, and any other European 
states interested in the current struggle. If possible, 
Wentworth was to report especially the thoughts of Arthur 
Lee, Silas Deane, and Benjamin Franklin with regar.d to a 
peace settlement. 15 As a private emissary with no official 
authority, Mr. Wentworth could only hope to prove to the 
Americans that England had much more to offer than France. 
He had to demonstrate to the envoys that England wished to 
16 . 
begin legitimate discussions. 
15Bemis, "British Secret Service," pp. 484-485. 
16van i\lstyne, Empire and Independence, p. 145. 
Following an uneventful voyage, Wentworth met with 
Silas Deane in Paris on December 17. Solely responsible 
for the proposals conveyed to Deane, Wentworth assured 
him that peace could be won if the two countries returned 
to the status of 1763. All laws since 1763 deemed harmful 
to the colonies would be considered void and would be 
repealed by Parliament. Deane, however, rejected this 
proposal and declared that he personally wanted nothing 
less than an independent America. 17 After this reversal, 
Wentworth learned of Franklin's similar interest in an 
8 
independent America. Having no authorized power to alter 
his offer, Wentworth thus achieved very little. Throughout 
December, Eden received no valuable information from his 
emissary. In fact, Wentworth failed to realize any progress 
18 during these early stages of discussions. 
Meanwhile, Paris rumors that the French government 
would soon declare itself in favor of complete recognition 
of American independence and in favor of a treaty of 
commerce gained credence. Even prior to Wentworth's arrival 
in France, the Earl of Shelburne, on December 5, inquired 
in Commons if such transactions between America and France 
17Bemis, "British Secret Service," p. 486. 
18van Alstyne, Empire and Independence, p. 144. 
were not being conducted. No official in the govermnent 
could truthfully answer such a query. Later with Wentworth 
in Paris as an observer, the British were still unable to 
ascertain the course of Franco-American discussions. 19 
9 
Neither Wentworth nor Bancroft uncovered F~anklin's 
strategy. Franklin, the shrewd agent that he was, had long 
delighted in playing one power against the other. To 
increase indecision and confusion within the French court, 
Franklin circulated exaggerated accounts concerning 
America's desire for peace with England. He had earlier 
hinted that since General William Howe had captured 
Philadelphia on September 26, 1777, the colonials might be 
even more willing to relinquish their independent-minded 
attitude and sue for peace. He believed that in exciting tie 
French with such propaganda they might be more inclined 
toward serious negotiations for an alliance. On the other 
hand, Franklin's hints of an innninent alliance with France 
after Saratoga sought to capitalize on the uncertainty of 
the British ministry. This scheming tended to lessen the 
effectiveness of the English emissaries in Paris. During 
the December talks, Wentworth and Bancroft were never 
19Lord North, /J; ~ .2£. the History of Great-Britain 
During the Administration of Lord North, To the Second 
Session--o! the Fifteenth Parliament (London:-printed for 
G. Wilkie; Ii82), PP• 297 and 299. 
10 
positive as to the intentions or sincerity of the American 
commissioners, especially Franklin. Count de Vergennes, 
the French Foreign Minister, also became wary of the American 
agents. 20 
Franklin's shrewd mind enabled him to manipulate 
Count de Vergennes. Vergennes dreaded the possible effect 
of Saratoga on the minds of the British ministr;. America's 
victory might generate enthusiasm within England for a peace 
settlement with the colonies. 21 Once Franklin entered into 
discussions with Wentworth, Vergennes appealed to Louis 
XVI's fear of a united British empire. While England and 
the colonies remained separated, France could seek revenge 
22 and would gain benefits from .American commerce. 
On December 17, 1777, therefore, as Wentworth met 
with Deane, Count de Vergennes also promised to commence 
' 23 
treaty discussions with the Americans. With no evidence 
of an independent-minded spirit within the British ministry 
and with Vergennes' overture, Franklin in late December 
20Barck ·and Lefler, Colonial America, p. 627; Van 
Doren, Secret Histoz:, p. 61; Van Alstyne, Empire and 
Independence, p. 13 • 
2lsamuel Eliot Morison, The Oxford History of the 
American People (New York: Oxford University Press-;-1965"), 
p. 254. 
22Bailey, Diplomatic History, P• 32. 
23Bemis, Diplomacy .2f. the American Revolution, p. 60. 
24 worked harder for French assistance in America. Always 
a realist, however, he was not content to end his manipu-
lations with the English. Peace feelers were welcome, and 
his Paris activities continued to increase British uncer-
tainties concerning reconciliation. 
11 
Once the French had decided to support the colonials 
completely, Franco-American contacts began in earnest. 
Thereafter, rumors of an intended alliance became more 
widespread. Additional evidence of meetings between 
representatives of the two countries came from George 
Lupton, an associate of Eden, in Paris. Writing to Eden on 
December 31, Lupton reiterated the viewpoint that the 
25 American envoys had begun to seal the alliance. Never 
providing the British with vital information, Wentworth, 
Lupton, and Hartley failed to separate fact from rumor. 
This did nothing to enhance the prestige of the English 
ministry. Indecision plagued nearly every facet of King 
George's government, and irresolution furnished little 
assistance in the formulation of sound, conciliatory 
proposals. 
Parliament exhibited a similar lack of initiative 
24Morison, Oxi:rd History, p. 254. 
25stevens, Facsimiles, V, No. 486. 
12 
by recessing for six weeks. While rumors continued that a 
Franco-American agreement was impending Parliament decided 
to take an extended Christmas holiday.26 Thus, it appeared 
that the British Parliament remained unconcerned about the 
probability of a menacing Gallic treaty with England's 
former colonies. 
Yet a few Englishmen did recognize the need for a 
complete revision of policy and began to work toward that 
end. David Hartley, Charles James Fox, Edmund Burke, and 
William Eden were eager to discuss the means by which a 
change of current policy might be achieved. North also 
typified such reasoning and began to adjust his thinking. 
Throughout the Christmas recess, Lord Fr.ederick 
North toiled over a plan which he believed to be a positive 
alternative to any European endeavors toward a colonial 
. 27 
agreement. In devising his proposal, Lord North refused 
to concede to liberal members of his sovernment. Mr. John 
Wilkes, a member of Parliament, advocated the revocation 
28 of the Declaratory Act of 1766. North condemned this 
maneuver in a highly sarcastic manner. If Wilkes was 
26Morison, Oxford History, P• 254. 
27Namier and Bm>ke, History of Parliament, III, 204. 
28wilkes supported neither the Rockingham Whigs nor 
the North ministry, taking sides according to the issue 
rather than the faction. Ibid., P• 640. 
willing to repeal such an act which had bound the colonies 
to England, then why not repeal all the laws since 1662--
the navigation act, the hat acts, and the post office 
acts. 29 
Unwilling to yield so much, North wished to retain 
the little remaining English bargaining power and thereby 
avoid acknowledging to the world her diminishing authority 
over the American colonies. Fortunately for Lord North, 
num.P-rous influential individuals proved to be highly 
favorable toward at least a partial reconciliation, even 
if they disapproved of North personally or of current 
governmental policies. 
13 
As observed previously, William Eden had demonstrated 
his aspiration for an equitable settlement by presenting a 
plan for conciliation on December 7, 1777.30 Eden's 
proposals recormnended repeal of the Tea Act, the 
Massachusetts Charter Act, and all acts since 1763, excepting 
those enacted during the present conflict. 31 This plan for 
a termination of hostilities received praise not only from 
North but from .an equally prominent individual, the Duke of 
29Brown, Empire and Independence, p. 173. 
30supra, p. 11. 
31w1lliam Eden memoranda, January, 1778, Stevens, 
Facsimiles, IV, No. 346. 
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Marlborough. In writing to Eden on January 8, 1778, 
Malborough ms.intained that the colonies could hope for 
nothing more than what Eden had offered. The Duke realized 
that the colonials would not be willing to adhere to such a 
policy at that moment because of Saratoga and the Franco-
American negotiations. Nevertheless, to Marlborough, it 
seemed that the opening of any negotiations with the colonies 
might "produce peace in the end by its operations on the 
different feelings and minds of the Rebels.n32 
Every Parliamentarian did not sympathize with the 
Duke of Marlborough's qualified faith in Eden's ideas on 
conciliation. Within Parliament, several political factions 
offered various suggestions as to how to deal wi.th the 
colonies and intensified their verbal barrages as the war 
continued. The Old Whig faction, dominated by Lord 
Rockingham, Lord Richmond, Edmund Burke, and Charles James 
Fox, desired to oust the North ministry and to establish a 
ministry with a liberal colonial policy. The Old Whig 
group was just one faction of the opposition which opposed 
the North led Tory administration. Another faction of the 
opposition led by Lords Chatham and Shelburne, also 
disliked the thought of endorsing the Old Whig group which 
desired to acknowledge an independent status for America. 
32Ibid., No. 350. 
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Such failure of factions in the Opposition to unite enabled 
the Tories to remain in control of the government.33 
Besides, certain disagreement was apparent among 
the Whigs. Lord Rockingham advocated an immediate end to 
the war and warned of the consequences of continued subju-
gation of the colonies. 34 Charles James Fox was even more 
outspoken in his pacifism. It would be best, he believed, 
to grant the colonies their independence rather than to 
continue the policy of conquest. In fact, he doubted that 
his country could ever defeat and control the colonials. 
Thomas Pownall, an advocate of the Stamp Act of 1765, and 
Henry s. Conway, a Parliamentarian, sided with Fox on the 
subject of freedom and independence of America. 35 Like Fox, 
they believed an offensive war against America was impractical. 
But neither Conway nor Pownall considered themselves members 
. 36 
of any faction within Parliament. 
Yet the opposition also contained a distinguished, 
33Ritcheson, British Politics, PP• 129 and 244-45. 
34George Bancroft, Historx of the United States, from 
the Discove~ of the Continent (NeW-York: D. Appleton anc:r--
Company, 18 )-;-v-;--2'82; Lord F1ahon, History of England from 
the Peace of Utrecht to the Peace of Versailles, 1713-1~ 
(London: Jonn Murray,-:Albermarle Street, 1853), VI, 21r:--
35Bancroft, History .2.f. United States, V, 282-83. 
36van Alstyne, Empire ~ Independence, p. 206; 
Ritcheson, British Politics, P• 127. 
well-known figure completely opposed to the sentiments of 
Fox. Williru.n Pitt, like Charles, Lord Mahon, criticized 
Fox and his followers for their willingness to release 
16 
this vital segment of the empire. As Chatham's son-in-law, 
Lord Mahon voiced his dislike of the ministry as well as 
his disdain for those who supported independence of the 
colonies. Pitt, an aging but still influential member of 
Parliament, considered that Britain must retain her colonies 
even if war ensued with Frnnce. Mahon, unlike Pitt, feared 
the consequences of hostile ~elations with the French. 
}lahon wanted peace, but not at the cost of war with France. 
He favored an ~'\merica dependent upon the mother country for 
protection and security. 37 
Vigorously seeking constructive ideas for a plan 
acceptable to all participants, North gained valuable 
information from two different sources. William Fraser, a 
colleague of Eden's in the Northern Department, explained 
that England must remain attentive to any colonial desire 
to return to the 1763 situation. All colonial laws since 
then could be either repealed or modified. If this seemed 
too lenient, hs believed only designated acts should be 
rescinded. Regarding the tax issue, each colony would 
contribute a portion of the total wealth contained within 
37Mahon, History of England, VI, 211-12 •• 
its boundaries. This proportion of each colony's wealth 
would be used to defray some expenses of sustenance and 
protection by the mother country. The Committee on the 
State of the Nation initiated a similar plan involving 
taxation in January, 1778. North's approved conciliation 
proposition contained material from both sources. 38 
17 
While discussions on the rebellious colonies continued 
throughout England, meetings between American and British 
envoys occurred in Paris during January. Acting under the 
instructions of Eden, Wentworth and Bancroft remained 
unaffected by their lack of success. They stubbornly 
refused to end their efforts with the American envoys. 39 
On January 18, 1778, Dr. Bancroft learned that the 
French Foreign Minister, Vergennes, had received a rough 
draft on the proposed Franco-American treaty. In this 
alliance America would not be required to grant the French 
government any exclusive privileges. Writing to Wentworth 
in Paris, Bancroft also mentioned French preparations for 
war. Unofficial sources reported tl1e sailing of the fleet 
from Toulon and. the movement of troops to the Normandy 
38william Fraser, A Way for Peaceful Settlement with 
America, January, 1778, and Committee on the State of the 
Nation, Resolution on Taxation of American Colonies, January, 
1778, Stevens Facsimiles, IV, Nos. 344 and 349. 
39Bemis, "British Secret Service, n p. 489. 
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coast. 40 Although never authenticated by the British 
agents in Paris, this material proved of value in the 
further development of British policy. The agents' failure 
to discover the exact destination of Count d'Estaing•s 
fleet proved of extreme importance during the ensuing 
weeks. 41 
With relations between England and France becoming 
more strained with each passing day, Lord Stormont, the 
British ambassador to the French court, reported to the 
home ministry in late January that a rupture between the 
two countries would occur within a :matter of days.~ Lord 
Stormont's declaration of an impending crisis failed to 
quicken the home ministry's validation of its representatives' 
finding on the French fleet or the proposed treaty. In fac~ 
the British never discovered the exact substance of the 
American-Gallic treaty, signed February 6, 1778, until the 
middle of March. 43 
40Dr. Edward Bancroft to Paul Wentworth, January 18 
and 23, 1778, Stevens, Facsimiles, V, No. 492. 
41The Toulon fleet was to have eventual responsi-
bility of breaking British seapower in the western Atlantic. 
Van Alstyne, Empire and Independence, p. 143. 
42The letter was contained in Stormont's corre-
spondence of January 28 and following. Ibid., pp. 143 and 
146. 
43Barck and Lefler, Colonial America, p. 653. 
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During this period.of uncertainty and indecision with 
England, American colonial leaders were as much in the 
dark about the outcome of the French-American treaty 
discussions as were the British. Much of the news from 
England was contained in letters to friends in the colonies. 
One such correspondent dismissed the significance of the 
Gallic and colonial negotiations by explaining that the 
English were discussing plans for a settlement with 
rebellious states. The author of the preceding statement 
was Mr. George Johnstone, a future member of the Carlisle 
Connnission to America. In his February 5 letter to Robert 
Morris, a delegate to the Continental Congress from 
Pennsylvania, Mr. Johnstone claimed that once a peace 
proposition had been presented to Parliament a reunion 
of the two countries, in all likelihood, would become a 
reality. America must do nothing to endanger the prospects 
of peace. In order to achieve a successful conclusion to 
the bloodshed, Johnstone realized that .America must not 
join forces with any foreign power but must wait until 
the mother country presented a formal statement of policy.4 
On February 17, 1778, Mr. Johnstone's observations 
44Francis Wharton (ed.),~ Revolutionarx Diplomatic 
Correspondence of the United States (Washington: Government 
Printing Office-;-18"8"9"), II, 487-88. 
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became a reality. After weeks of laboring over the 
numerous segments of the proposition, North was ready to 
present it to the Parliament. It was to be received by 
England and the colonies with a mixture of contempt and 
praise. After weeks of vacillation, the British govern-
ment finally achieved a degree of unity due to the Lord 
Treasurer's proposal for a conciliation. It was an· attempt 
in the right direction, but failure continued to plague 
the North ministry. 
CHAPTER II 
CONCILIATORY PROPOSAL 
AND COMMISSIONERS: FEBRUARY TO APRIL 1778 
After weeks of intensive planning during December, 
1777 and January, 1778, Lord North prepared to lay before 
Parliament a conciliatory proposal which he believed was 
Britain's most significant bargaining measure. Failing 
to obtain valuable data within France during the winter of 
1777-1778, North had relied primarily upon his own judge-
ment and that of certain members of the ministry in 
formulating a plan. Yet in order to counteract the French 
treaty, which was rumored to be in the offing, the Lord 
Treasurer also had considered it essential to prepare a 
bill which had prior colonial approval. 
Furthermore, Lord North insisted that reliable data 
from America would expedite discussions with his own critics. 
A lack of creditable information from America hindered the 
development of a peace plan, since the only reliable 
22 
reports on the conduct of the war came from the Howe 
brothers. The British had even less success in discovering 
the true sentiments of colonials on the revolutionary cause. 
Very little data, therefore, was even available to aid North 
in evolving a workable conciliatory policy. 
Some news from America originated with individuals 
faithful to Britain. They related that a majority of the 
colonials favored the British cause. One such writer, 
George Collier of Halifax, Nova Scotia, maintained that 
large numbers of New Englanders condemned the southern 
colonies for their support of the war and were ready to 
aid England by all the means at their disposal. 1 
Not only was there a lack of knowledge of American 
sentiment, but because of inefficiency within the ministry, 
the English never obtained much inf onnation from their 
agents in France. The failure of the goverrunent to grant 
Paul Wentworth, George Bancroft, and David Hartley 
authority and, in turn, the lack of significant data 
gained by them did nothing to assist Mr. North in his 
endeavor. Even-awareness of French and colonial discussions 
involving a probable alliance did not prompt England to 
terminate its lethargic attitudes on the colonial war and 
lvan Alstyne, Empire and Independence, p. 147. 
on the Franco-American meetings in Paris. 
King George III realize~ that a signed agreement 
between America and France was inevitable and admonished 
North for his delay in providing the Connnons with a peace 
plan. 2 The Lord Treasurer, however, had his reasons for 
delaying the issue. North continued to be unwilling to 
present his proposal to Parliament until he discovered 
the feelings of certain key individuals within England. 
George Germain, Secretary for Colonial Affairs, had to be 
persuaded in order to increase support for the bill within 
Commons. Germain believed repeal of the Declaratory Act 
would best induce the colonies to return to the fold. 
Failure to repeal the Declaratory Act--that act which 
"galled" the colonials most--would make any reconciliation 
effort ineffective. 3 Germain, Lord Sackville, likewise 
presumed that a repeal of all previous restraining acts 
would either hurry France into a treaty with the .Americans 
or make the colonials less inclined toward negotiations 
2King George to North, February 9, 1778, w. Bodham 
Donne (ed.), The Correspondence££ King George the Third 
with Lord Nor~(London: John Murray, Albermarle Street, 
18b7);-rf, No. 450. 
3The Declaratory Act of 1788 claimed Parliament's 
right to legislate to the colonies on all matters. Barck 
and Lefler, Colonial America, p. 528; King George to Lord 
North, n.d., Fortescue, Correspondence of George III, IV, 
No. 2188. 
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with the French. 4 This was a situation upon which England 
could not gamble. Sackville expressed resentment because 
no one in the ministry conferred with him during the 
earlier stages of the proposal's development. He accepted 
the final measure only because of political expediency. 5 
Statements made by George Grenville in Commons 
expressed a further lack of enthusiasm for a revocation of 
6 the repressive acts. Grenville claimed that loss of 
prestige would be the outcome of relinquishing the right 
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of taxation, of yielding to America's continued pretensions 
of her charters, and of declaring America to be free. 
Grenville, like Chatham, refused to adhere to a policy 
which advocated independence for the American people. 
If there were to be any discussions with the colonists, 
Grenville maintained in a statement of February 11, 1778, 
Chatham was the proper person to treat with the colonial 
leaders. 7 
Lack of enthusiasm for his conciliatory plan, 
4:Mahon, History of England, VI, liv-lv. 
5Namier and Brooke, History .E.f Parliament, III, 395. 
6Grenville traditionally voted independently. He 
did not approve all steps that the North ministry had taken 
and urged the British to recover its sovereignty over 
America. Ibid., II, 544-45. 
7Bancroft, History .2£. United States, V, 246-47 and 261. 
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however, did not dissuade Lord North. By February 11, 
1778, with more than eight weeks of discussions and planning 
behind him, Lord North had his measure for conciliation 
ready for Parliament. 8 Presenting it to the House of 
Commons on February 17, 1778, North conceded in a two 
hour speech that England had three alternatives. A 
continuation of the bloody struggle to retain the colonies 
was one possibility. Under the second choice, the British 
government could withdraw all military and naval forces 
from America and acknowledge the latter's independent 
status. Support for this alternative came later from 
Charles James Fox and William Burke, but only a few of the 
Opposition adhered to such a course of action. The third 
policy hinged upon Parliament's acceptance of a peace plan 
and appointment of a peace commission. This final 
alternative--the only solution to an intolerable dilemma--
was Lord North's choice. He maintained "that it is better 
to offer a concession to the colonies now, which may end 
the contest within the year, than to continue the war for 
81ord John Russell (ed.), Memorials and 
Correspondence of Charles James Fox (London: Kichard 
Bentley, 1853),-Y, 174. ~ 
three or four years longer."9 
Following these introductory remarks, Lord North 
brought to the floor of Commons the bill eventually known 
as the North Conciliatory Plan of 1778. Parliament 
acknowledged William Eden and Solicitor-General Alexander 
Wedderburn, along with Lord North, as the creators of the 
bill.lo The first section of the plan included a draft 
of a bill to enable England to appoint commissioners to 
deal with all disorders remaining in the colonies. The 
final portion of the proposal pertained to the right of 
taxation by the British. It stated in part "that the King 
26 
9Frederick North, The Speeches of the Right Hon. 
Lord North, in the Britisl.1House of ~onunons, on Tuesday the 
I7tli of February, 1778, with drauifi'ts .2f ~Dills, pacirIC 
ancr-conciliatory, moved !Or""~ his lordship, and ordered 
to be brought .!!!· !2 WhICFi areannexed, .!! coty of the 
same noble lord's conciliatory prorositions o the !mlh 
of February, 1775, and .fill extractrom the ce!ebritecrMr. 
Burke's pro,hetic oration in Harch-;-TI7nBaltimore: .H. K. 
Goddard, 17 8), Charles Evans, Americail'Bibliography; 
~ Chronological Dictionary of All Books, Pamphlets, ~ 
Periodical Publications Printecr-Ehe United States of 
America from the Genesis of PrintI'iig !,!! 1639 ~ to and 
Includin~ the Year 1820 (Cfiicago: Private printing--ror-the 
author 1 O'!=I93Vf,'" ~2, 1 and 4. Hereafter cited as 
Evans Bibliography. Spelling and punctuation changes 
have been made in the original sources for clarity. Only 
in Appendix A has the spelling not been altered. 
lOAlexander Wedderburn, an outspoken advocate of 
colonial domination by Britain, believed an independent 
America·, could be avoided. Van Doren, Secret History, 
p. 8; For mention of the Massachusetts Government Act 
see Barck and Lefler, Colonial America (New York: ThP. 
NacHillan Company, 1958), PP• 553-54; Van Alstyne, Empire 
,!!!5! Independence, p. 148. 
and Parliament of Great Britain would not impose any 
duty, Tax, or assesment, for the Purpose of raifing a 
Revenue" within the colonies. Included within this final 
section was a request for the rescinding of the 
:Massachusetts Government Act of 1774.11 
After this initial presentation, North commenced 
a detailed discussion of the proposal. He explained that 
the only revenue fr~m the colonie~ under his plan, would 
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be from regulation of commerce between America and England. 
The funds from this source were then to be returned to the 
coloniE:s for use by the people to pay internal expenses. 
North confided to the gathering that the lunericans in 
return for such a magnanimous offer, would put aside all 
thoughts of independence. With no further fear of taxation, 
valid flJnerican arguments for independence, he believed, 
would no longer exist. The colonials would have no reason 
12 to continue the struggle. 
llTimothy Pitkin, A Political and Civil History .££. 
the United States of America, from the Year 1763 to the 
C!Ose of the Administration of"""PresidentwasiiTtiiton, in 
l1arch, 1797T including .! Summary View of the Political 
and Civrr-5tate of the North f..merIC'aii Colonies, Prior to 
that Period (NeW1raven, Lonnecticut: Hezekiah Howe and 
Dii'r'rie and Peck, 1828), II, 38; Draft of the Bill to 
enable His Majesty to appoint Commissioners, February, 1778 
and Bill for Declaring Intentions of Great Britain concerning 
the Right of Taxation over the American Colonies, February, 
1778, Stevens, Facsimiles, IV, Nos. 359 and 360. 
12North, Szeech, February 17, 1778, Evans 
Bibliography, 159 2, 6 and 8. 
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Besides t:onvincing Parliament of the merits of his 
plan, North acknowledged the problem of persuading 
Americans to accept such a policy. To reassure the coloni~l 
leaders that England's plan for an equitable settlement 
was no hoax would be a formidable task. The burden of 
persuasion, therefore, would rest upon the shoulders of 
the aforementioned commission. Under Lord North's proposal 
the commissioners were to utilize their authority to the 
fullest.
13 
Limitations, however, were placed upon the 
commissioners' authority. Because of the significance of 
certai~ negotiations, matters involving independence and 
the removal of anned forces were to be forwarded to 
Parliament. In discussions on lesser topics--taxation, 
payment of the war debt, and the Loyalist problem--the 
connnissioners were granted complete authority. North, 
however, insisted on the point that the British envoys 
bargain only with those Americans who held prominent 
14 
positions in the government. In other words, the envoys 
were not to "make any public appeal to the inhabitants of 
America at large" until they were satisfied that Congress 
13North, S~eech, February 17, 1778, Evans 
Bibliography, 15 42, 5. 
14Ibid., 5 and 6. 
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and nthe Connnander-in-Chief of the American forces" refused 
to proceed into treaty negotiations.15 
Within the framework of the conciliatory proposal, 
there was a hint of possible failure along normal 
diplomatic channels. To mention the possibility of an 
appeal to the people demonstrated lack of faith by the 
ministry. Such an appeal to the colonials, furthermore, 
admitted the ministry's recognition of the importance of 
public opinion in helping to shape American policy. A 
declaration to the inhabitants would, hopefully, put 
pressure on Congress and increase support for a recon-
ciliation. But, first, quiet and direct diplomacy must 
be used. 
The authority granted to the connnissioners was 
quite adequate. In keeping with points made in the bill 
before Parliament, the British emissaries could grant 
pardons to all who opposed the British and could act as 
intermediaries for any future conferences. 16 Possessing 
authority to propose a cessation of all hostilities, the 
English commission hoped to gain the respect of the 
15North's bills, February, 1778, Stevens, 
Facsimiles, IV, No. 440. 
16s1r George Otto Trevelyan, ~ American 
Revolution (London: Longmans, Green, and Company, 1912), 
IV, 356. 
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American leaders. If a treaty occurred following a respite 
in the conflict, it might even affect only a small section 
of America. If either one or several of the colonies 
accepted an end to hostilities and supported England, then 
such colonies would receive commercial benefits and 
protection within the Empire. The official recognition 
of such colonies was left to the discretion of the British 
17 envoys. 
During Parliamentary discussion, Lord North insisted 
that the culmination of all hostilities with America was 
the first point to be sought by the emissaries. The French 
threat had instilled in North the desire for a rapid 
termination of the war. But to enhance the return to 
normalcy, North advocated that the colonies pay their 
revolutionary war debt to England. Colonial agreement 
to pay the war costs, Lord North believed would assure an 
end to hostilities. His appeal was designed to attract 
English political backing. His continued insistence that 
the Americans pay their debts gained support for his 
proposal from those members of Parliament who believed 
the British government had already yielded too much to the 
colonists. North offered several plans for payment of 
17North, S~eech, February 17, 1778, 
Bibliog~aphy, 159 2, 12-14. 
Evans 
colonial war debts. Each state might discharge its 
obligation by means of lotteries. A more practical idea 
involved er.ection of a public treasury in America. North 
explained that such a treasury might be more acceptable 
to both sides. The treasury would receive its funds from 
an assessment of each colony, with each state or colony 
being allowed to obtain the revenue by its own methods. 18 
Lord North's proposal clearly yielded to more 
colonial demands than any previous offers. An end to 
taxation·was promised. The commissioners could suspend 
all acts of Parliament since 1763 which affected the 
colonists. The British envoys could grant pardons and 
restore colonial charters. The proposal, however, strayed 
from its placating attitude on two points. It deman:led 
that the colonials pay the total revolutionary war debt. 
In this instance, the ministry's plan reverted to the pre-
revolutionary policy that America was subject to every 
British whim. Furthermore, although the proposal's 
conciliatory points were numerous, they lacked what the 
colonials wanted most--an independent status. 
These then were the main points of the proposal 
which North submitted to Connnons on February 17. During 
18North, S~eech, February 17, 1778, Evans 
Bibliography, 159 2, 12 and 16. 
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its subsequent debates, Commons weighed each segment 
separately and then considered the parts within the frame-
work of the complete plan. All North could do was prod 
some of the members and speculate as to tl1e final aecision. 
His ministry was in a quandry, and he needed all available 
assistance to prevent its collapse. To increase support 
for his ministry, North clearly realized the necessity of 
a successful mission to .America. He thus continued to 
avoid discussions harmful to the ministry, knowing that 
leading adversaries were always eager to expose his 
faults. 
19 
Other political adversaries struck immediately. 
Horace Walpole, for example, castigated the Lord Treasurer 
in his journal for bringi_ng disgrace upon the ministry. 
The British nation, he wrote, now must 11 stoop to beg peace 
of America 1!.t any ~· ,,2o In a letter to Sir Horace Hann, 
a British resident at ti1e Court of Florence, Walpole 
19supra, pp. 14-16 and 24; ~egniald Lucas, ~ North, 
Second Earl of Guilford, K. G. 1732-1792 (London: Arthur L. 
iiumphreys, 1'913), II, Ia.- - - -
20Henry Steele Commager and Richard B. Morris (eds.), 
The Spirit of 'Seventy-Six, The Sto(y of the American 
iteVolution as Told Dl ParticI'j?ints Indianapolis, Indiana: 
The Bobbs-herrITrcompany, Inc., 1958), II, 692. Walpole, 
who left Commons in 1708, spent his remaining years writing 
his journals and expressing his feelings about British 
home ancl foreign affairs. NairJ.er and Brooke, History of 
Parliament, III, 597. 
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expressed an even more definite viewpoint. The proposal, 
Walpole believed, solicited peace with the Americans with-
out even making an attempt at a discussion of terms. Lord 
North's stand seemed to acknowledge Congress as a legitimate 
governing body and to concede the impossibility of an 
English conquest. Walpole concluded his denunciation by 
maintaining that the disastrous bill condemned taxation 
while allowing for the virtual freedom of the colonies. 21 
Unlike Walpole, William Fraser, a colleague of 
William Eden in the Northern Department, was less vehement 
in his judgment of the plan. He did not let the hope of 
peace blind his judgment when discussing his own viewpoints. 
He advocated that England return to its 1763 policy and 
not attempt to coerce its colonies. Yet he still remained 
pessimistic about the outcome of future discussions, warning 
the administration to expect .American, pro-independence 
forces to oppose eve-pj suggestion which the connnissioners 
offered. Patience, he believed, would best indicate the 
English desire for reconciliation. 22 
21Horace Walpole to Sir Horace Mann, February 18, 
1778, Letters of Horace Walpole, Earl of Oxford, to Sir 
Horace Mann (London: Richard Bentley, New Burlington Street, 
1844), III, No. 279. Hereafter cited as Letters of Walpole. 
North Callahan, Roykl Raiders, The Tories of the American 
Revolution (New Yor : The Boobs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1963), 
p. 30. 
22van Alstyne, Empire ~ Independence, p. 150. 
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During late February, the discussions became even 
more heated. Some members of Commons held that Lord North 
was guilty of being too lenient with those responsible 
for so much grief and suffering. The rumor spread that 
the Lord Treasurer might even be willing to listen to the 
advocates of ind~pendence. The Tory, Horace Walpole, 
claimed that North had completely submitted to the 
Opposition with the presentation of the conciliatory 
effort. 23 
Some members of Commons also speculated upon the 
loss of. constitutional principles under which England had 
traditionally prospered. 24 The Opposition, under the 
leadership of Charles James Fox, believed it harmful to 
condemn the pacification measure since the group, itself, 
had for many months recommended such a maneuver.25 Like-
wise, Tories in Cormnons were at first reluctant to accept 
the conciliatory plan since it included too much of the 
Opposition's beliefs. Some Tories believed that this 
reversal in policy by the North ministry amounted to a 
gross deception· by their own minister. 26 Yet a Tory 
23Horace Walpole to Sir Horace Mann, February 18, 
1778, Letters .2f. WalEole, III, No. 279. 
24Trevelyan, American Revolution, IV, 357. 
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25commager and Morris, SEirit .2f. 'Seventy-Xix, II, 692. 
26Mahon, History of England, VI, 217. 
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refusal of the proposal would obviously allow the Opposition 
to gain favor at court. In an effort to off set this 
possibility, therefore, the Tories prepared eventually to 
support the conciliatory measure. 27 
The Opposition was indeed eager to grasp the leader-
ship role within Commons while the Tory group remained in 
a daze. Charles James Fox, for instance, sought as much 
of an advantage for the Rockinghamites, a group within 
the Opposition, as the situation allowed. He had learned 
from Thomas and Horace Walpole on February 17, 1778, of 
the signing of a French-American treaty. In a maneuver 
that stunned the members, Fox inquired of Lord North in 
Parliament on the same day whether the administration 
knew of such an agreement within the last ten days. The 
Lord Treasurer arose and replied that he had heard of such 
a treaty but that he preferred not to give any definite 
answer at that moment. This evasive response confirmed 
for many in Parliament the existence of the treaty. 28 
Lord North's response was unqualified testimony 
of the failure ·of his ministry. The inability of the 
ministry to obtain creditable information on the signing 
27Russell, Memorials and Correspondence ~ Fox, 
I, 173. 
693. 
28commager and Morris, Spirit of •seventy-§!!, II, 
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of the Franco-American alliance, which had occurred on 
February 6, 1778, exposed the ministry's lethargic attitude. 
The prestige and authority of North and those associated 
with him declined to an even lower level than at any 
previous time during his tenure. 29 
The ministry's apparent setback, however, did not 
force an abandonment of the plan by Parliament. Now that 
it was evident that the Americans and the French were in 
complete agreement, the reconciliation measure actually 
became more acceptable. But one significant issue remained 
in Connnons--discussion on the Massachusetts Government Act 
of 1774. This act had originally been adopted to increase 
the authority of the Massachusetts governor. Under the act 
he could appoint and remove judges and other administrative 
officials without approval of the Hassachusetts Council and 
could dismiss all town meetings, except for election of 
local officials. In Commons Mr. Thomas Powys asked for 
the act's repeal believing such a move would increase 
American support for reconciliation. Instead, the 
Massachusetts Government Act legislation was put aside and 
30 
passed as a separate bill. 
29Perkins, France in the Revolution, PP• 238-39. 
JOAs the war progressed, Mr. Powys became hostile 
toward Lord North. The failure of the North ministry to 
achieve any degree of success enabled Powys to support the 
Rockingham Whigs. Namier and Brooke, History .2£, Parliament, 
III, 320; Barck and Lefler, Colonial America, P• 554. 
37 
With only this change, the conciliatory plan proceeded 
to the Lords for approval after Commons had ratified it 
without dissent on March 5. 31 In the House of Lords the 
main condemnations originated with Lord Hillsborough and 
32 Chatham's brother-in-law, Lord Temple. These gentlemen 
believed in Chatham's policies and deemed it an honor to 
uphold them, Lord Chatham and friends demanded a repeal 
of all acts of Parliament since 1763 involving the American 
colonies. With a legitimate cease fire, the army was to 
return to the mother country. Chatham agreed to consult, 
with the colonists on every issue but one. As an empire 
builder, William Pitt, castigated a colony's wish for 
self-government. 33 
Like Chatham and his disciples, Lord Shelburne 
advocated a change in the British ministry as necessary 
before acceptance of a conciliatory plan by the colonies. 
His main objective was to force the resignation of the 
North ministry and to establish a regime without the 
stigma of failure upon it. Shelburne ridiculed Lords 
Richmond and Rockingham for favoring 311 independent 
34 America as the only means to end the hostilities. But 
31Letters of Walpole, III, No. 280. 
32Mahon, History .2f. ~ngland, VI, 217-18. 
33van Alstyne, Empire ~ Independence, p. 142. 
34van Alstyne, Empire and Independence, pp. 149-aO. 
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his oratory was for naught, and due to the illness of Pitt, 
much Opposition initiative dissolved. Thus inadvertently 
aided, the Duke of Richmond and Lord Rockingham succeeded 
in prodding the bill through the House of Lords. 35 
Passing in Parliament with relative ease, North's concil-
iatory plan received a large majority of supporters in 
Parliament, a fact which testified to the general wish for 
an end to the war.36 
Necessity was the reason North's measure passed in 
both houses of Parliament. These gentlemen believed that 
something had to be done immediately. Even if the 
commission failed, as many feared, it was better to try 
this than to do nothing. The use of anned force had 
settled nothing. Compromise and conciliation had to be 
given their chance. Failing to unite discontented members 
of Parliament, the Opposition had little chance of defeating 
the bill. Instead, the Opposition allowed the measure to 
achieve a successful journey through the legislature and 
turned its wrath upon Lord Frederick North. 37 
Even as the proposal awaited the Seal of George III, 
35Mahon, History .Cl! England, VI, 217-18. 
36nancroft, History .2£. United States, V, 248. 
37Brown, Empire .2!'. Independence, pp. 219 and 221. 
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Horace Walpole continued his criticism. He reiterated 
that passage of this plan placed America on an equal footing 
with the mother country. This act provided full justice to 
the colonials while exposing the faults of the adminis-
tration. In a final statement Walpole sunnned up the 
sentiments of many of his supporters. Al.1 immediate dread 
of a French war and the impossibility of raisiug revenue 
to maintain the British forces in the colonies had led 
the court to support such a submissive project. 38 
This barrage of sceptical and critical accusations 
did not deter the dispatching of the bills to the colonies 
on February 20, 1778. While the British prepared the 
Andromeda for its voyage to the colonies with the concil-
iatory measure, the French vessel, Sensible, received 
provisions for its trip to America at Toulon. Officials 
in each country anxiously anticipated news of the arrival 
of its vessel. Since each ship carried the offerings of 
its respective government, early arrival of the Andromeda 
in New York might perhaps enhance the success of peace 
39 negotiations. Not until March 11, 1778--nineteen days 
38walpole to Mason, February 18, 1778 and March 4, 
1778, w. s. Lewis, Grover Cronin, Jr., and Charles Bennett 
(ed.), Horace Walpole's Correspondence~ William Mason, 
(New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1955), XXVIII, 
357-58, 363, and 365. Hereafter cited as Walpole's. 
Correspondence. 
39van Doren, Secret History, PP• 65 and 87. 
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after the Andromeda sailed--did George III sign the concil-
iatory bill into law. 40 
Once the peace offer was on the high seas, only one 
final detail remained. The last section of North's measure 
provided for the appointment of a diplomatic commission 
to discuss the plan for peace with the colonials. Since 
individuals chosen would have the extremely complicated 
and arduous task of obtaining a just settlement for both 
parties, selection of men gifted in diplomacy was desirable 
but difficult. 
Before the Andromeda left England, the ministry had 
chosen two persons to serve on the connnission. Appointment 
of the Commander-in-Chief of the British armed forces, Sir 
William Howe, and his brother, British fleet commander, 
Lord Richard Howe, gave the ministry two members in America 
at the outset. Under orders of the ministry, the Howe 
brothers prepared for arrival of other commission members 
by arranging for the distribution of Lord North's plan 
within the colonies. Having been in the colonies for two 
years, Lord North hoped the brothers would supply the remain-
ing commissioners with useful information on colonial 
attitudes. Lord Cavendish believed the brothers to be 
4~ahon, History !2.£. England, VI, 218. 
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honest, intelligent, and competent commanders. 41 Yet, he 
doubted that their personal feelings would enable them to 
finish "the business" in the colonies. Having failed to 
defeat the colonials, the Howe Brothers had grown 
despondent and weary of war. 42 Both regretted having to 
wage war in America, and both condemned die colonial 
policies of George III. Sir William Howe preferred peace 
by negotiation rather than by armed force.43 A joint 
mission of war and conciliation was nothing new to the Howe 
brothers. Two years before, in 1776, the brothers had 
tried prosecuting the war and negotiating a peace at the 
same time. 44 
Circumstances, however, necessitated early resignation 
of the Howe brothers from the commission. They had served 
in America for almost two years and desired to return home. 
Failing to achieve a culmination of hostilities as yet, 
41Lord Cavendish was an intimate friend and supporter 
of Rockingham, Cavendish acted as the moderating force for 
the Rockingham Whigs in Commons. Namier and Brooke, 
Histo!:' of Parliament, II: 204; Van Doren, Secret History, 
P• 52 • .. 
42The Parliamentary Histo~ cf England ~ the 
Earliest Period to the Year 180 (rondon: Printed-,,Y T. c. 
Hansard, 1814), XVIII, I1.)9'.-i:iereafter cited as Hansard, 
Parliamentary History. 
43Brown, Empire ~ Independence, PP• 79-81. 
44supra, PP• vi-viii; William B. W1!lcox, Portrait of 
a General: Sir Hanry Clinton in the War o~ Indpendence 
tNew York: A!rre A. Knopf, 1°964..,-;-p:-2"2'27 
their experiences confirmed to them that the American 
people would again ridicule any attempted settlement by 
the British. With a Franco-American agreement at hand, a 
conciliatory effort now seemed even more absurd to them. 
Writing to North on February 18, 1778, Lady Howe, wife 
of Admiral Richard Howe, claimed that the new peace 
mission would eradicate the achievements of the Howes and 
further humiliate the British leaders.45 
Unknown to Lady Howe, the ministry had accepted 
General William Howe's resignation on February 4, 1778, 
42 
The ministry also expected Lord Richard Howe to return 
home with his brother. In a February 4 dispatch to General 
Howe, George Germain ordered Sir Henry Clinton to succeed 
General Howe as Commander-in-Chief. Due to William Howe's 
resignation, Clinton was to serve on the British commission 
to America. 46 
The ministry appointed General Clinton as Commander-
in-Chief for several reasons. Having resided in the 
colonies since 1775, Clinton could provide the remaining 
commissioners with information on important colonials. 
45sir John Barrow, ~ Life of Richard, Earl Howe, 
K. G., Admiral of the Fleet, and General o:t Marines (London: 
John Murray, AloeriiiSrle street,1838), pp:- 1o2-o3. 
46the King to Lord North, February 18, 1778, 
Fortescue, Correspondence of George III, IV, No. 2195; 
Willcox, Portrait .2E_ !! General, PP• 'Z'mr and 222. 
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His dislike of ruthless tactics, moreover, made him more 
acceptable to the .Americans. He supported the purpose of 
the conciliatory mission and advocated an end to the 
conflict. To the ministry Clinton seemed the only general 
in the colonies with an untainted reputation. Sir Guy 
Carleton was still remembered by the ministry for the 
failure of his New York invasion of 1776. General John 
Burgoyne, moreover, was still being held by the colonials. 
Clinton's only other immediate opposition was General 
Charles Cornwallis on leave in England at the time. Since 
Cornwallis had been out maneuvered by Washington at Trenton 
January 3, 1777, the ministry was unwilling to grant 
Cornwallis full commana.47 
With arrival of the ministry's dispatch of February 
4, Clinton assumed command on April 24, 1778. On May 8, 
he arrived in Philadelphia and took direct charge of the 
British army. On May 25, 1778, Sir William Howe sailed 
for England, leaving his brother who had decided to remain 
in the colonies until September. Unwilling to negotiate 
with Congresst however, Lord Richard Howe proved of little 
47William B. Willcox (ed.), The American Rebellion, 
.§..!.£ Henry Clinton's Narrative ££ His Campaign, 1775-1782, 
~ !!!! Appendix of Original Documents (New Haven, 
Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1954), pp. xlvi-xlvii, 
xvi, and xxvii; Willcox, Protrait of a General, PP• 113 
and 207. 
assistance during the conciliatory negotiations. In 
Harch, he received his replacement, Admiral James Gambier. 
Unable to cormnand effectively at home, Gambier had been 
sent to America to become fleet commander and port admiral 
of New York. 48 
44 
Even before the remaining cormnissioners had left 
England, the resigning of the Howes verified the suspicions 
of some American leaders. The English high command had 
become disheartened at the possibility of failure of 
conciliatory talks. The loss of the brothers' support 
lessened the bargaining power of the envoys from England, 
for they knew, as well as any Britisher, the sentiments 
of the colonials. 
In selecting the remaining personnel, William Eden 
believed that emissaries should possess certain qualif 1-
cations. All should be members of Parliament. The 
commission should include a lawyer, a member of the 
moderate Opposition, and an individual from Scotland. If 
no one else proved better suited for the position, Eden 
agreed to join the commission himself. John Hatsell, clerk 
of the House of Commons, also mentioned prerequisites for 
cor.IIllission members. They must be men of character "in 
48Barrow, Life of Richard, Earl Howe, PP• 102-03 
and 116; Willcox, P"Ortrait of !!: Genera1-;p; 229. 
whom the People of both Countries may conf ide--Men that 
have taken no decided part against the Americans." His 
list of proposed members included John Cavendish, William 
Johnstone, George Grenville, and kichard Jackson. 49 
45 
On February 22, 1778, Frederick Howard, Earl of 
Carlisle, accepted his place upon the commission. 50 Even 
though he was not quite thirty years of age and possessed 
little political experience, his unblemished character and 
ambitious nature impressed Eden. Eden believed that Lord 
Carlisle's practical manner would also prove useful.51 
Carlisle was also a close friend of Charles James Fox, an 
advocate of an independent America. His friendship with 
Fox would hopefully make h~m acceptable to the colonials. 52 
Eden also wasted little time contacting another 
prospect, Richard Jackson. Even though Eden and Jackson 
differed on the authority granted the envoys, Eden regarded 
49william Eden Minutes concerning choice of 
commissioners, February 23, 1778 and John Hatsell Minutes 
concerning choice of commissioners, February 23, 1778, 
Stevens, Facsimiles, IV, Nos. 374 and 375. William Eden's 
Memoranda, February 17 to Narch 31, 1778, Historical 
Manuscripts Commission, The Nanuscripts of the Earl of 
Carlisle, Preserved ~ Castle Howard, Fi!teenth Report, 
Appendix, Part VI (London: Her Iviajesty•s Stationery Office, 
1897), p. 322. Hereafter cited as Carlisle MSS. 
50rbid., p. 322. 
51Brown, Empire £!': Independence, pp. 235 and 248-49. 
52willcox, Portrait of .! General, P• 221. 
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Jackson's membership an asset to the mission •. Jackson, 
the solicitor to the Board of Trade, asserted that the emis-
saries• authorities should be specific; Mr. Eden favored a 
concept of broad powers. 53 
William Eden, who always claimed that he did not 
covet a place on the peace mission, agreed nevertheless 
on March 5 to serve as the final member. 54 Being one of 
the architects of the conciliatory plan, the ministry 
believed William Eden, only in his mid-thirties, would 
benefit the commission with his more thorough knowledge of 
the proposition. 55 As an under-secretary of state and 
then Lord of Trade, Eden outwardly had supported the war 
effort. 56 But he was as ambitious as Carlisle, and he 
continuously sought avenues of advancement within the 
ministry. 57 The peace commission was another such 
opportunity. 
Throughout March, connnission members expressed 
53Ritcheson, British Politics, P• 263. 
54william Eden Memoranda, February 17 to March 31, 
1778, Carlisle MSS, P• 322. 
55Namier and Brooke, History of Parliament, III, 
375-76. 
56nrown, Empire .2E Jndependence, P• 246. 
57william Eden to Morton Eden (brother), March 6, 
1778, Stevens, Facsimiles, IV, No. 390. 
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confidence in each other and in the North Conciliatory Act 
of 1778 in order to bolster the waning spirit of the 
British. William Eden considered Carlisle a man "well 
disposed and very practicable. '1 Eden claimed that Jackson 
was a "man of uncommon abilities • • • of great Fortitude, 
and well beloved in the colonies." Frederick Howard 
expressed his feelings for the mission by proclaiming that 
such an endeavor was the best means of ending the terrible 
conflict. He sincerely hoped that his youthfulness was not 
a hindrance to his fellow negotiators. 58 
During the remaining days of preparation, encourage-
ment from numerous friends of the envoys continued. With 
Eden on the commission, for instance, Sir Joseph Yorke 
predicted that ~Jnerica would certainly receive the members 
with "open arms. 059 This was perhaps an objective state-
ment, for during his service in Commons, Joseph Yorke had 
remained aloof from all discussions of the peace offer. 60 
Yet Mr. Yorke's objectivity perhaps led to an early 
58carlisle to Rev. Ekin, October, 1778, Carlisle 
£12§., P• 377. . 
59Bishop Landraff to William Eden, March 8, 1178 
and Sir Joseph Yorke to William Eden, March 13, 1778, 
Stevens, Facsimiles, IV, Nos. 397 and 401. 
60Yorke condoned no single faction within Commons; 
he had no support for Rockingham and cared little for North. 
Namier and Brooke, History £!. Parliament, III, 680. 
but false over optimism. In reality, the peace endeavor 
seemed doomed from the beginning. On the evening of Harch 
29, for example, Eden's conversation with Jackson tended 
to establish the impression that the latter desired to 
release himself from the Carlisle Conun.ission. Jackson 
also claimed that "it was idle and ruinous to go to war 
with France ••• , that we should proceed immediately to 
give Independence to the Colonies.TT Writing to North on 
:t-iarch 30, Eden related the episode of the previous night. 
:Mr. Jackson's connnents had convinced Eden that the fonner 
48 
intended to decline the forthcoming task. Jackson, besides, 
had maintained that he needed a month in order to discharge 
his obligations~ 61 
Carlisle, like Eden, therefore, was relieved to 
ascertain Jackson's true feelings on the American situation 
prior to th2 connnissioners' departure. Such a person, 
Carlisle believed, "would have driven us made with doubts 
before we had got to Portsmouth.TT Mr. Jackson's short 
tenure upon the Carlisle Commission thus came to an abrupt 
62 end prior to actual negotiations. 
6lwilliam Eden to Alexander Wedderburn, March 30, 
1778, Stevens, Facsimiles, IV, Nos. 411 and 412. 
62carlisle to Kev. Ekins, October, 1778, Carlisle 
~' P• 378. 
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Two weeks before the envoys were to leave for the 
colonies, therefore, a third member to the Peace Commission 
had to be found. North claimed that the most likely 
successor to Jackson WQS Geor.ge Johnstone, the former 
governor of West Florida. As governor for several years 
after 1763, he had had the opportunity to discover attitudes 
of key individuals in the colonies. 63 He proved to be the 
only civilian commissioner with firsthand experience in 
dealing with the colonials. The ministry also believed 
that his continuous advocacy of American rights would be 
an asset. 64 
Johnstone, Eden, and Carlisle commonly endorsed 
reconciliation as the only possible means of thwarting 
military defeat. But their genuine enthusiasm for a 
termination of the strife failed to overcome their lack 
of experience in the field of diplomacy. They were 
largely chosen because no one else desired the difficult 
task. No English diplomat seemed willing to jeopardize 
his reputation by presenting the colonials a plan which 
failed to acknowledge America's demand for independence. 
63King George to Lord North, March 3, 1778, 
Fortescue, Correspondence of George III, IV, No. 2201. 
64s. E. Morison (ed.), Sources and Documents 
illustratinf the American Revolution li"6'4-1788 and the 
Formation o the Federal Constitution--rGXford, ~ngland: 
Clarendon Press, 1929), pp. 186-87. 
50 
The offers to end taxation, to repeal all acts passed since 
1763, to pardon those who renounced independence, and to 
renew connnercial ties were drafted too late to achieve any 
diplomatic settlement. Only n desperate war-weary 
ministry was willing to of fer reconciliation to America 
in 1778. 
CHAPTER III 
THE RESPONSE IN ENGLAND AND FRANCE, FROM MARCH 
TO MAY, TO BRITAIN'S CONCILIATORY EFFORTS 
Even though Lord North's Conciliatory Plan had 
gained acceptance of Parliament, criticisms of the 
proposal continued during the spring of 1778. The British 
commissioners expected condemnations from the French and 
the colonial diplomats--Benjamin Franklin, Silas Deane, 
and Arthur Lee. During the commissioners' preparations 
for their voyage to .America on April 16, a lack of cohesion 
within the ministry became apparent. Lord Carlisle, 
William Eden, and George Johnstone were soon to realize 
that the ministry was also untrustworthy. Even before the 
commissioners had embarked for the colonies, their chance 
for success had decreased with the disunity so prevalent 
within the British ministry. 
This lack of cohesion and trust within the.ministry 
came to the fore again during March. Ordered by George III, 
George Germain, Secretary of State for Colonial Affairs, 
sent instructions to Sir Henry Clinton in America on 
52 
March Bt These directives to the newly appointed commander 
of British armies in America ordered continuation of 
attacks within the colonies~ William Eden on March 5 
asked to see the instructions to Clinton, realizing that 
strong military forces in America had important bearing 
on the fate of any peace overtures.1 Eden thus was glad 
that the orders upheld the policy of maintaining the 
offensive against the colonials~2 
The monarch's instructions to Clinton, on March 
21, 1778, proved Eden's hopes false. Clinton was to abandon 
Philadelphia and "to proceed with the whole to New York .. "3 
If New York became threatened or if the Carlisle Commission 
failed, the British garrison was to sail to Halifax, Nova 
Scotia and to remain until a new strategy developedc 4 
The reason for this change in policy was due to the 
1Alan s. Brown, "The British Peace Offer of 1778: 
A Study in Ministerial Confusion," Papers of the Michigan 
Academy .2! Science, Arts, and Letters, XL U9m, 254. 
2George Germain to General Henry Clinton, March 8, 
1778, Stevens, Facsimiles, XI, No. 1062. 
3Proprietors of Estates of North Carolina to King 
George, March 16, 1778, ~., No. 1066. 
4william B. Willcox, "British Strategy in America, 
1778," The Journal££, Modern History, XIX, 2 (June, 1947), 
105. 
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official announcement of the Franco-American treaties on 
March 13. The British considered it necessary to concentrate 
their forces in order to thwart the French menace. Five 
thousand English troops were to be sent to the West Indies 
to attack French held St. Lucia. 5 Three thousand more were 
to be stationed at St. Augustine and Pensacola in the 
Floridas. 6 
Lord North knew of this policy change but failed 
to inform the commissioners. In a letter written March 13, 
the monarch reiterated to the Lord Treasurer that it was a 
"joke to think of keeping Pennsylvania." To maintain 
military security, the commission members were not trusted 
with this information. The failure to confide with the 
envoys demonstrated the lack of cooperation and trust 
within the government. 7 
Lord North received much of the blame for this 
inability to establish and maintain cohesion within the 
government. The over-all mistakes of the ministry lessened 
North's efficiency in handling his diplomatic responsi-
bilities.a The Opposition, led by Charles Fox, for 
5willcox~ American Rebellion, P• 86. 
6willcox, "British Strategy," P• 105. 
7King George to Lord North, March 13, 1778, Fortescue, 
Correspondence Bf. George III, IV, No. 2243. 
8Brown, "British Peace Offer," P• 259. 
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example, blamed North personally for the British failings 
in foreign policy. Mr. Fox claimed that the Lord Treasurer 
was reluctant to provide the Peace Commission with the 
power to grant independence. Fox ridiculed the ministry 
for believing that American domination of the maritime 
world was inevitable. America's potential resided in 
cultivation of her vast territory. Agriculture, so Fox 
claimed, was the prime consideration of the .Americans, 
with commerce and manufacturing a distant second. 
Rockingham, Richmond, and Fox maintained that the reconcil-
iation plan was totally inadequate. 9 
Like the Opposition spokesmen, Israel Mauduit 
proclaimed that the only way England was to regain Amari.ca' s 
support was to grant the colonials their freedom. Mauduit 
wrote his handbill after learning of the Franco-American 
Treaty of Alliance. In this handbill dated March, 1778, 
Mauduit maintained that a free .America might prevent an 
Anglo-French clash. If England continued to enforce her 
will over the colonials, the latter might have to turn to 
France for aid. He ascertained that any remaining hope of 
conquest by England was past. "America stands on high 
9J. Wright (ed.), The Speeches~ the Right 
Honourable Charles James Fox, in the House of Commons 
{London: Longman, Hurst, Reis,oriiie; and Brawn, 1815), 
I, 123-125. 
ground; France and England must now court her. n The 
colonies will never return "while we are striving with 
them, so that the only chance we have of recovering some, 
is to give up them a11 .. n10 
In this handbill Maurluit clearly reiterated British 
fears of a European conflict. The Duke of Richmond 
attempted in Parliament at the same time to prevent this 
possible turn of events. Realizing that the French threat 
was of more substance than any American menace, Richmond 
on March 22 moved that Britain r.emove her forces from the 
colonies as a preliminary to peace and eventual inde-
pendence .11 
The Opposition, however, attracted little support 
55 
on this motion. The majority of the ministry were reluctant 
to provide the colonies with their freedom. The ministry 
deemed it more valuable to coax the colonials into the 
realization that the French were more of a threat to their 
lOisrael Mauduit was a pensioned writer for the 
British goverrunent. On this occasion, however, he was 
expressing his own sentiments, much to the chagrin of the 
English ministry. Israel Mauduit, ~ Hand bill advocating 
American Independence, inspiTed ~ the EngIISil Ministry and 
written and published at London in Harch, 1778; Paul 
Leicester Ford (ed.), "{Brooklyn,~ew York:-i:iIStorical 
Printing Club, 1890), PP• 14-19. 
11aeorge Thomas, Earl of Albermarle, Memoirs .Q.f The 
Marquis of Rockingham~ His Co:ntemporaries; With Original 
Letters and Documents now First Published (London: Richard 
Bentley,-i:852), II, 34Y:-
safety than the British.12 Under the terms of the concil-
iatory pl'"Oposal, the British envoys to America were 
instructed to present the French as a designing people, 
interested only in French advancement. 13 
Constant and heated debate between the Opposition 
and the ministry did nothing to aid the difficult tasks 
of the Carlisle Commission. Meetings of Fox, Eden, and 
the Earl of Shelburne dl!ring March, therefore, discussed 
th it f i . 14 D i h d e necess y o a new m nistry. ur ng Marc 1 Lor 
North himself in a letter to George III also claimed that 
the situation required "new men and able men.n He 
considered himself '1highly criminal" if he permitted his 
interests to stand in the way of any means of rescuing 
15 11his King and country from the present impending ruin.n 
56 
The possibility of North's resignation provided an 
opportunity for William Pitt, Lord Chatham, to beco~e Lord 
Treasurer.16 King George opposed a Chatham dominated 
12navid Ramsay, A Risto~ of the American Revolution 
(London: Printed for Jolin StocCiali,9l/93), II, 69 and 75. 
l 3van Doren, Secret History, P• 94. 
l4nates of the meetings were March 15, 17, and 18. 
Russell, 'Memorials and Correspondence of Fox, I, 180-81, 184 
and 186. 
l5Lord North to King George, March 17, 1778, Fortescue, 
Correspondence of George .!!!.' IV, No. 2228. 
l6w. Baring Pemberton, Lord North (London: Longmans, 
Green and Company, 1938), P• 2~ 
ministry, believing him too independent-minded to be 
manipula~ed. But King George favored the inclusion of 
Pitt an<l his followers as North's colleagues in the 
ministry. Unlike Fox, who accepted a post within the min-
istry, Chatham nevertheless refused to assume a minor 
position. Such qualified reessurance of support by George 
III prompted North to remain in off ice and reaffirmed his 
leadership. 17 
With the ministerial situation thus settled for the 
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moment, Britain's reconciliation plan began to receive 
criticism from American envoys in ~ranee. Writing to the 
American Committee on Foreign Affairs on February 28, 1778, 
the colonial envoys maintained that the sole purpose of the 
peace offer was to divide and subjugate America. They urged 
that any British offer, if received at all, should be 
condemned and dismissed by America. 18 
England's endeavor to locate a middle ground for 
negotiations with Benjamin Franklin, Silas Deane, and 
Arthur Lee verified America's demand for a comprehensive 
proposal. David Hartley, a political opponent of North, 
corresponded unsuccessfully with Franklin throughout 
17 Mahon, History of England, VI, 224-25; Pemberton, 
~ North, p. 281. 
18wharton, Revolutionary Correspondence, II, 507-08. 
February and March, failing to ascertain the cost of 
reconciliation. ~ranklin's responses remained pessimistic 
or noncommital. 19 As early as February 12, 1778, for 
example, Franklin maintained that "when your Nation is 
hiring all the Cut-Throats it can collect of all Countries 
and Colours, to dest:roy us, 1.t is hard to persuade us not 
to ask or accept of aid from any Power.n20 
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Mr. Hartley was not alone in his desire to di.$uade 
such American efforts for freedom. Even though Franklin 
continued rebuking British overtures, the French Anglophiles 
were not discouraged. These pro-British propagandists 
claimed that once America gained its liberty the colonies 
would eventually dominate the Western Hemisphere. These 
Frenchmen upheld England's views on freedom of speech) 
religion, petition, press, and assembly. The only 
advantage of an independent America, so the Anglophiles 
believed, was increased trade and commerce. Louis XVI 
was irritated by these men for supporting British 
19George Herbert Guttridge, "David Hartleys- M. P.: 
an Advocate of Conciliation 1774-1783," University of 
California Publiat:ions in Hi~tory, XIV, 3 (October,""1926), 
280-81. ~ 
20Franklin to David Hartley, February 12, 1778, 
Albert Henry Smyth (ed.), The Writings££ Benjamin Franklin 
(New York: The Macmillan Company, 1906), VII, 101-02. 
policy.21 
Nothing that Hartley or the Anglophiles stated, 
however, diverted either the French government or the 
.American envoys from joining together in favor of an 
alliance. On March 5, 1778, the British ambassador to 
France, Lord Stormont, related to Lord Weymouth, Secretary 
of State for the Southern Department, that the Treaty of 
Alliance was a reality. Yet Weymouth refused to heed such 
assertions at first. 22 
On March 12, the French ambassador to England, 
Noailles, presented copies of the Treaties of Alliance and 
Commerce to Lord Weymouth. These treaties clearly widened 
the breach already existing between England and France. 
The alliance which England had feared discouraged the 
possibility of a successful English offer of peace. 
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21Among the different factions within the Anglophiles 
were the philosophes. Led by Voltaire, they advocated 
destruction of privileged minority, civil liberty, and 
religious toleration. Another faction, the frondeur of 
legal aristocracy, was interested in more power for their 
own class. This group, however, had also supported popular 
causes like ~educed taxation. Frances Acomb, Anglophobia 
in France 1763-1789, An Essay in the Historx of Constitutionalism 
and NaturaTISm (Durham, North CarOirna: nuke University Press, 
I'9"50), pp. 3, 12-13, 15, and 76-77. 
22navid Murray, Lord Stormont, was a shrewd Englishmen 
in diplomatic affairs. During Count Vergennes' Secret 
dealings with the American envoys in 1776-77, Stormont was 
to prove "a thorn in the fleshn to Vergennes because of the 
ambassador's inquires into the legality of such negotiations. 
Perkins, France in the Revolution, PP• 49 and 541. Hansard, 
Parliamentary HiSEorY> XX, 29. 
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British agents in the colonies were to find it extremely 
difficult to present a plan more beneficial to the colonies 
than the French agreements. With the official presentation 
of the Franco-American agreement, diplomatic:relations were 
severed. As Lord Stonnont left Paris on March 16, Ambassador 
Noailles paid his final resp~cts to the British court. 23 
Although knowledge of the French-American compact 
did not d~ter Hartley fr.om remaining in Passy during April, 
the treaties jeopardized his chance for successf11l discus-
sions. Hartley's sojourn in France during April did lead 
to a discussion with Count Vergenn~s, but Ver.gennes claimed 
that France was conunitted to aid America regardless of 
England's position. France would gladly take up anns to 
defend her ally. Even if England agreed to end hostilities 
and grant America independence, France would remain a 
faithful ally of the Americans.24 
During Hartley's sojourn in Passy, the British 
ministry dispatched William Pulteney to France to ascertain 
if discussions with Franklin were still useless. 25 He 
23corwin, French Policy, PP• 166-68. 
287. 
24Guttridge, nnavid Hartley, M. P.," XIV, 282, and 
25Pulteney, a pamphleteer and a Whig in Parliament, 
was a brother of George Johnstone, despite the discrepancies 
in the last name. Van Doren, Secret History, P• 70; 
Bancroft, History of United States, V, 192. 
received an even more discouraging greeting from Franklin 
than had Hartley. 26 Franklin stipulated that the British 
conciliatory measure was totally unacceptable to his 
countrymen. Any proposition which implied, as did the 
North plan, a dependent, colonial status was completely 
unsatisfactory. 27 Their second meeting, March 29, was 
also futile. On March 30, Franklin wrote to Vergennes 
that since Parliament obviously believed in its power to 
28 coerce America, peace was unattainable. 
The various factions of the Opposition indirectly 
countenanced these claims by Franklin in continuing their 
condemnations of the North proposal. Such discord within 
the English ministry intensified confidence in Europe and 
England for the American cause. Chatham's endeavor to 
undermine North's proposal actually enhanced the work of 
the "militia diplomats" in France. The Earl of Chatham 
remained hostile to all deliberations which mentioned 
independence. 29 Another faction of the Opposition, led 
by the Duke of Richmond, Charles Lennox, favored the 
26smyth, Writings .2.£ Franklin, VII, 124. 
27Pitkin, Political !B5! Civil History, II, 47-48. 
28smyth, Writings .2.!: Franklin, VII, 43-46. 
29Bancroft, History .2£ United States, V, 253. 
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American viewpoint. On April 7, when Richmond recommended 
before Parliament full liberties for the colonies, Chatham 
ridiculed him for such an assertion.30 Richmond then 
prepared to lay before Parliament another proposal. His 
next bill, supported by David Hartley in Paris, urged only 
the removal of British troops from America. The bill, too, 
generated little support.31 
One faction of the Opposition, led by Richmond and 
Charles James Fox, therefore, had advocated independence 
for the colonies during the debates on the North plan in 
Parliament. Their views, however, did not coincide with 
either Chatham's faction of the Opposition or the Tories 
in Parliament. With a majority in Parliament unwilling to 
condone independence, Richmond's efforts in that direction 
became useless. Chatham's speech on April 7 before the 
House of Lords finally terminated discussion for inde-
pendence. The revered Mr. Pitt rebuked all who upheld 
American freedom at the cost of British honor. He scorned 
the idea of a French invasion of England. To fight rather 
than to retire and lose all of one's honor was Pitt's credo. 
30Paul Allen, A History of the American Revolution; 
Comprehending all the Principal""Events Both .!!! the Field 
and in the Cabiiiit (Baltimore: William Wooddy, Jr. printer, 
Ilf2'2), II, 170. 
31Bancroft, History .2£ United States, V, 253. 
Richmond countered that it was best to avoid a war in 
which America's allies were France and Spain. Due to his 
feebleness and ill health, Chatham was unable to respond. 
He died soon after, a somewhat disillusioned advocate of 
32 a closely regulated British colonial system. 
These parliamentary meetings and Paris discussions 
did nothing to thwart Carlisle, Eden, and Johnstone in 
their final preparations. During this period of debate, 
Carlisle at first remained home with a fever. This pre-
vented his gathering information which would have proven 
invaluable in the weeks to come. But his greatest 
unanswered question had been raised by the shift, unknown: 
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to him, in military strategy. The ministry, as previously 
noted, had ordered General Clinton to evacuate Philadelphia. 33 
The commissioners wondered why they were to sail to New 
York rather than to British controlled Philadelphia. In 
early April Carlisle inquired of George Germain, who 
knew of the evacuation of Philadelphia, why the negotiators 
were not to be sent there. His only answer was that the 
Pennsylvania city, which was nearer York, might "not by 
. 34 
your arrival be in our hands." 
32Bancroft, History £.£United States, V, 254. 
33supra, pp. 52-53. 
34carlisle, MSS, p. 379. Congress met then at York, -Pennsylvania. 
Even if Carlisle had discovered the ministry's 
secret, he probably could not have persuaded North and 
Germain to allow Clinton to remain in Philadelphia. The 
French menace in the Carribean had forced the ministry to 
lessen its forces in America. The ministry seemed willing 
to save the British West Indies at the expense of its 
conciliatory commission. Eden, however, believed a strong 
show of force by the British forces in America would 
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hasten negotiations for peace and thus alleviate the 
necessity for troops in the Carribean. Eden believed if 
British forces retained Philadelphia then the conunission 
could threaten destruction of the city in case their offers 
were not accepted. By evacUllting the city and not informing 
the commissioners, the ministry was acknowledging the 
futility of the mission. These events continued to under-
mine what little hope existed for any successful conclusion 
35 to the mission--even before its departure. 
While Carlisle thus remained incapacitated, William 
Eden appealed to the Treasury for t 6,225 to offset the 
expenses of the mission. Included within the list were 
funds for obtaining wines, clothes, furniture, carriages, 
and servants. He asked for another t 400 per quarter as 
an allowance for the envoys. On April 10, John Robinson, 
35van Doren, Secret HistoEt, p. 90; William Eden 
Minute written on news of evacua on of Philadelphia, June 
5, 1778, Stevens, Facsimiles, IV, No. 496. 
Secretary of the Treasuxy, supplied Eden with t 2,000 
of the t 6,000 he demanded. 
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Eden resumed his preparations by obtaining valuable 
information designed to distinguish between American 
supporters and adversaries. · Rev. John Vardill furnished 
character sketches of several prominent gentlemen in 
America. 36 Rev. Vardill, formerly of New York, spied upon 
Americans in London on the promise from Eden that he would 
be "regius professor of divinity" at King's College as soon 
as the American rebellion subsided. 37 He considered 
Governor Tryon of New York a man of integrity and a loyal 
British subject. Tryon's vainess, however, allowed him 
to be duped by nevery flattering Imposter." Joseph Gallowa:v 
a Loyalist, was too useful to be neglected, even though his 
hot temper was a disadvantage. John Jay was difficult to 
convince on any subject unless he held similar views. One 
of the more violent advocates for independence was Governor 
William Livingston of New Jersey. 38 The minister closed 
his remarks on a dubious note; there was not much hope of 
success, he believed, unless England received the support 
36w1111am Eden Proposal on Salary and Allowances to 
Commissioners, April, 1778 and William Eden to Morton Eden, 
April 9, 1778, Ibid., Nos. 421 and 432. 
37Bancroft, History; .2£. United States, V, 61. 
38Rev. John Vardill to William Eden, April 11, 1778, 
Stevens, Facsimiles, IV, No. 438. 
of Benjamin Franklin.39 
In a similar vein Paul Wentworth, the British 
agent, presented his list of the traits of several other 
Americans to William Eden. He claimed that John and 
Samuel Adams were advocates £or complete independence. 
Samuel was a polished negotiator, while John was cautious 
and diligent. Both Patrick Henry and Gouverneur Horris 
were shrewd and enterprising politicians according to 
Wentworth. 4o 
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On April 12, George III formally instructed his 
emissaries, in a secret dispatch, to lay before the 
Americans a copy of the Commission. King George considered 
that this item verified the sincerity of the English for 
a reconciliation. The commissioners were to announce an 
end to taxation and a suspension of all acts since 1763.41 
The most unusual portion of this proclamation involved the 
mission's dealings with Congress. All discussions would 
39Howard Swiggett, The Extraordina~ Nr. Morris 
(New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., l 2);' p. 56. 
40Paul ·wentworth, Minutes, 1778, Stevens, 
Facsimiles, V, No. 487. 
4lareat Britain. Collection of papers, that have 
been published at different times, reiations to the ~ 
proceedings of his majesty's commissioners,~.,~., 
etc. (New YorkT"James Rivington, 1778), George III 
'IiiStructions to Commissioners, April 12, 1778, Evans 
Bibliography, 15825, 20. 
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be before representatives of Congress, and it would be 
acknowledged as a legal, political entity by the British. 42 
The monarch stipulated that the agents were not to make 
any public appeal to the inhabitants of America unless 
they failed in talks with Congress. 43 
These instructions from George III granted the 
same basic concessions promised the colonies in the North 
plan. The purpose of the royal statement was to furnish 
the agents with certain key items which George III deemed 
of singular importance. His proclamation increased the 
respectability and authority of the Carlisle Connnission. 
According to the royal directive, no British forces were 
to remain in America unless the colonies agreed. No 
change was to occur within any colonial charter without 
the consent of the colonial assemblies. England and 
America were to handle the debt problem jointly. Colonial 
officials were to be chosen, if at all possible, from the 
colonies. The ministry would allow Congress to exist as 
long as it did not encroach upon the jurisdiction of 
Parliament.44 If Congress aided the colonies in a 11 better 
42Ritcheson, British Politics, p. 268. 
43 George III Instructions to Connnissioners, April 
12, 1778, Carlisle !1.§.§., pp. 323-24. 
44Great Britain, Collection, George III Instructions 
to Commissiofiers, April 12, 1778, Evans Bibliography, 15825, 
20; Ritcheson, British Politics, p. 269. 
Management of the general Concern and Interests" of all, 
then it was practical and acceptable. 45 If America agreed 
to disband its legislature, however, the.colonies still 
might be represented within the House of Conmions.46 
King George's instructions also stated that 
Parliament had been granted the right to abolish direct 
taxation of the colonies. The British assembly, however, 
regarded it as only right that the colonials contribute 
to the "Public Charge." The royal statement stipulated 
that these funds would come from truces on connnerce. The 
revenue would eventually be returned to the local colonial 
governments and used for internal improvements. The 
Americans were to use British coinage in making their 
payments to England. Parliament nevertheless rejected the 
idea of colonial coinage of money. 47 
King George concluded his instructions with the 
following statement: 
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If there should be a reasonable Prospect of bringing 
the Treaty to a happy Conclusion, you commissioners 
are not to lose so desirable an End, by breaking off 
45aeorge III Instructions to Commissioners, April 
12, 1778, Carlisle£!§§., p. 331. 
46Ritcheson, British Politics, P• 269. 
47aeorge III Declaration to Commissioners, April 
12, 1778, Carlisle MSS, pp. 326 and 332; Morison, Sources 
and Documents, p. 2'02:° 
the Negotiation on the Adverse Party absolutely 
insisting on some point which your own Judgement and 
Discretion, you should be disposed, not to give up or 
yield to, provided the same be short of open and 
avowed Independence (except such Independence as 
relates only to the Purpose of a Treaty). But in 
such a Case you will suspend coming to any final 
Resolution till YZH shall have received our further 
Orders thereupon. 
The proclamation clearly required the commissioners to 
forward the issue of independence to Parliament. The 
envoys lacked authority to discuss this difference between 
England and the colonies. 49 
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During the spring of 1778, therefore, numerous 
people in England and France had expressed opinions as to 
the usefulness of the North Conciliatory Plan. Information 
supplied by Paul Wentworth and John Vardill proved valuable 
to the mission. Much of the time, however, the mission was 
confronted with criticism from Lord Chatham, the Duke of 
Richmond, and Charles James Fox and with disunity-and 
distrust in the ministry. Such lack of unified purpose in 
the ministry had provided the colonials with substantial 
ammunition for attacks upon the Peace Commission, attacks 
which came as America prepared to receive the conciliatory 
offer. 
48ceorge III Instructions to Commissioners, April 
12, 1778, Carlisle MSS, p. 333; Morison, Sources and 
Documents, p. 203. Author's brackets. 
49Ritcheson, British Politics, p. 270. The complete 
instructions of King George III will be found in Appendix A. 
CHAPTER IV 
Al--iERICA PREPA.'IU:S FOR THE RECEPTION OF THE 
CARLISLE COMMISSION, MARCH TO JUNE 1778 
With the arrival of the Franco-American treaties 
and copies of the North proposal in April, American 
Loyalists faced anti-British forces in the greatest 
1 
confrontation yet. Loyalist and anti-British propagan-
dists had constantly ridiculed each others beliefs. As 
early as June, 1776, for example, anti-British colonials 
had demanded that Congress designate persons who supported 
the British cause as traitors. In November, 1777, 
Congress, following colonial advice, advocated the 
2 confiscation of Loyalist property. Such hostility and 
lThe pro-British Americans called themselves 
Loyalists because of their support for England. The 
Loyalists• enemies called them Tories, after their English 
counterparts·-Lord North and his colleagues, Callahan, 
Royal Raiders, p. 35. The term, Loyalist, however, will 
be used herein to differentiate pro-British Americans 
from the Tory group in England. 
2Barck and Lefler, Colonial America, pp. 676-77. 
contempt, therefore, had existed between the American 
factions for years prior to the spring of 1778. 
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The revolutionary propagandist, Thomas Paine, summed 
up completely the colonials' sentiments toward their 
Loyalist foes. Paine, in his pamphlets, criticized all 
individuals who hindered the colonial drive for independence. 
He claimed for .Americans the ability to surmount "a greater 
variety and combination of difficulties" than any other 
people during a comparable crisis. Any Loyalist attempt 
to block America's continued progress toward self-govern-
ment retarded the individual's right of personal freedom. 
Furthermore, without America's presence and toil there 
would be "no such thing as freedom left throughout the 
whole universe."3 
The dispatches from France and England added to the 
propagandists' material. With documented material from 
France and England the American propagandists' arguments 
became more authoritative. Loyalists and anti-British 
colonials, who had readied their forces for weeks, struck 
fast and hard. Denunciations and critic isms from both·. 
sides followed the arrival of the French and English 
3The Political Writings of Thomas Paine, Secretary; 
!£ the Committee of Foreign Afriirs !'!! die American 
RevOIUtion (Charlestown, Massachusetts: Printed and 
Published by George Davidson, 1842), I, 149. Hereafter 
cited as Political Writings ~ Paine. 
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documents. 
The arrival of the British vessel Andromeda in New 
York City on April 14 increased the Loyalists expectations. 
The Andromeda had left England on February 20 with copies 
of Lord North's Conciliatory Plan. Loyalist Governor 
William Tryon of New York was to publish the copies of 
the North plan and distribute them throughout the colonies. 
The Loyalists now believed they had specific points to 
propose to Congress. However, the arrival of Simeon Deane, 
Silas Deane•s brother, aboard the Sensible with the Franco-
American Treaties of Alliance and Commerce and Amity 
diminished the Loyalists' enthusiasm. The French vessel 
Sensible, having arrived off the .American continent on 
April 13, had to sail further up the coast to Falmouth for 
fear of capture by the British naval vessels. Two weeks 
after Governor Tryon had received copies of the North 
plan, Simeon Deane, traveling overland, reached New York 
City on May 2 on his way to York, Pennsylvania.4 
Under orders from the British ministry, Governor 
Tryon sent copies of North's proposal to General Washington 
and to the governors of the colonies. 5 In a propaganda 
4Nathan R. Einhorn, "The Reception of The British 
Peace Offer of 1778," Pennsylvania History, XVI, 3 (July, 
1949), 192. 
5Pitkin, Political ~ Civil History, II, 41. 
article of April 15, Tryon claimed that the war troubled 
King George III. Tryon believed that the colonials who 
had caused the war must realize that America's only hope 
was to reclaim allegiance to England. To continue the 
conflict and to ignore Britain's offer for reconciliation 
would only lead to more suffering and destruction.6 In a 
letter to Governor Trumbull of Connecticut on April 17, 
William Tryon requested that the former recommend that his 
people read the material sent from England. 7 
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Six days later, Tryon received a harsh rebuttal 
from Governor Trumbull. The latter claimed that peace 
must be negotiated between the supreme authorities in a 
dispute and not by unauthorized persons. 8 Congress was the 
only body in the colonies with such power. This latest 
peace attempt by the British, according to Trumbull, bore 
"marks of an insidious design to disunite the people, and 
6The New York Gazette and the Weekly Nercury, April 
27, 1778-;- - - - -
7 H. Niles (ed.), Principles and Acts of the Revolution 
in America: .£?.!:, !!! Attempt to Collect and Preserve some of 
tEie Skeeches, Orations, and-Proceedings, with sketcnes-arur 
Reiiiar s .2!! ~ and Things;-ana Other Fuait!Ve .2! Neglected' 
Pieces, Belonging to the ReVOiutionary Period in the United 
States; which, Hapj?Ily, Terminated in the EstaOiisnment of 
their Liberties: with a View to Represent the Feelings tnat 
Prevailed in the Wfiiiies Tra Tried Men SouIS;n to Exci tea 
Love of FreedOiil," and Leacrtlle Peotleto Vigilance, as the -
Condition on WEiicllTt--rs-Granted Baltimore: Printecr-and 
Published oy Williall10gden Niles, 1822), p. 210. 
8:!',h! Boston Gazette .!ill! Country Journal, May 4, 1778. 
to lull us into a state of quietude, and negligence of the 
9 necessary preparations for the approaching campaign." 
Like Trumbull, the American military commander in 
Rhode Island, Major John Sullivan, received copies of 
Lord North's plan to be distributed to the inhabitants. 
He explained that if the proposal had been offered prior 
to the war or even prior to America's alliance with France 
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10 
it would have been accepted with "sentiments of gratitude." 
The late arrival of the conciliatory proposal plus the 
cruelties inflicted by Britain clearly limited the chances 
of a settlement. 
John Henry, Jr., Samuel Chase, and Charles Carroll 
expressed similar resentments. On April 20, Maryland 
congressional delegate Chase wrote to Maryland Governor 
Thomas Johnson, Jr. concerning General Howe's transmittal 
of several copies of "a Draught of a Bill to declare the 
Intentions of Parliament" to officials in the colonies. 
One opinion prevailed as to the purpose of these pamphlets 
from William. Howe. Chase believed that the majority of 
delegates to the Continental Congress considered the 
9Niles, Principles and ~ of Revolution, P• 211. 
lOJared Sparks (ed.), Correseondence -2£ the American 
Revolution; being Letters of Eminent Men to George Washington, 
from the Time ££. his TakinSCommand ~ the Army ~ the !f!!2. 
orllis PresICrenc~---rBoston: Little, Brown, and Company, 
185"!); II, 114-l • 
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intention of the English to "amuse us with a Prospect of 
Peace and to relax our Preparations." These gentlemen and 
their countrymen, however, had "too much good sense to be 
deceived." Governor Johnson received further information 
on April 20 from John Henry, Jr., congressional delegate 
from Maryland. The latter suggested to the governor of 
Maryland that the North plan be read in the Maryland 
assembly. Hr. Henry feared that once the British offers 
became law the effect would be equal to ten thousand fresh 
British troops. 11 Along with delegates Chase and Henry, 
Charles Carroll of Maryland warned Johnson about publishing 
12 such inflannnatory prose. 
Further consternation involving the English propo-
sitions was discernible from General Washington's corre-
spondence. As soon as he received copies of the North 
Conciliatory Plan in April, he forwarded the copies to the 
Congress at York, Pennsylvania on April 18. In his accom-
panying letter to Henry Laurens, the connnander claimed that 
the measures were 
llEdnrund c. Burnett (ed.), Letters of Members of 
the Continental Congress (Washington,D. c.:-Published-Oy 
The Carnegie Institution of Washington, 1926), III, 178-80. 
12Philip G. Davidson, TTWhig Propagandists of the 
American Revolution,tt The .American Historical Review, 
XXXIX, 3 (April, 1934), 448. 
founded in principles of the most wicked, diabolical 
baseness, meant to poison the minds of the people and 
detach the wavering, at least, from our cause. I 
would submit it, ••• in all parts, and to expose, 
in the most striking maneuver, the injustice, 
delusion and fraud it contains. 
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In a private letter to John Banister, delegate from Virginia, 
Washington regretfully admitted that the copy of the North 
plan he had received from General Howe was authentically 
British. 13 Henry Laurens, President of the Second 
Continental Congress, disagreed with Washington, believing 
rather that the proposal had originated among Loyalists in 
Philadelphia. The South Carolinian Laurens claimed that 
a legitimate peace offer from England would have included 
14 
the offer of independence. 
Laurens and Washington commonly feared, however, 
that the measures were designed to enlarge divisions within 
the populace. The British offers were published in an 
endeavor to "ensnare the people by specious allurements of 
Peace." The one means of thwarting this effect lay in 
maintaining the respectability of the army. A strong army 
13washington to Henry Laurens, April 18, 1778 and 
April 20, 1778 and Washington to John Banister, April 21, 
1778, John c. Fitzpatrick (ed.), The Writings of Georfe 
Washington from the Original Manuscrift Sources 1745-789 
(Washington: United States Printing O fice, 1933')";l{I, 
276-78, 281, 284, and 290. 
14Henry Laurens to James Duane, April 20, 1778, 
Burnett, Letters of Members, III, 169-71 and footnote 171. 
would provide a better bargaining position. To inspire 
P.mericans with confidence and to quell the English efforts 
for peace, the colonial army needed to be established on 
a sounder basis, Washington nevertheless explained to 
Banister that it would be equally fatal for America if 
Congress showed no interest whatever in the propositions. 
The .American connnander concluded that the North measure 
perhaps at least offered a respite from hostilities and 
an opportunity to reorganize the armyo 15 
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Like Washington, several of the Virginia delegates--
F. H. Lee, John Banister, and T. Adams--believed that the 
goal of the British was to incapacitate the colonies from 
within. 16 In a similar vein, Charles Carroll urged the 
colonists to guard against "their [Britain's] insidious 
offers on the one hand • • • and resist their warlike 
efforts on the other." Carroll believed that the peace 
measures, which Governor Tryon had forwarded by way of 
17 Philadelphia, indeed were dangerously authentic. 
On April 20, a congressional committee of three 
15washington to John Banister, April 21, 1778, 
Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, XI, 284, 287-89, and 
292. 
16virginia delegates to Patrick Henry, April 21, 
1778, Burnett, Letters of Members, III, 180-81. 
17charles Carroll to Thomas Johnson, Jr., April 23, 
1778, Burnett, Letters of Members, III, 184. Author's 
brackets. 
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officially received the North plan. 18 Gouverneur Morris of 
New York, William H. Drayton of South Carolina, and Francis 
Dana of Massachusetts were to prepare an appropriate answer 
to the English offer. 19 The committee assembled and con-
cluded that the propositions were insincere and unacceptable. 
They reported to Congress that acceptance of the North 
proposal would indirectly approve the right of English 
taxation. Parliament, although disclaiming the right of 
taxing the colonies further, was not above reversing its 
policy at any time, according to these delegates. The 
committee also criticized the section of the plan which 
appointed a peace commission. From the document and 
instructions the committee concluded that Parliament 
completely controlled those on the mission. The congres• 
sional committee, therefore, advocated caution in dealing 
with the British envoys and fully agreed that the emissaries, 
as instructed, should not discuss their task with non-
congressional individuals. 20 Morris, Drayton, and Dana 
reasoned that the bill was nonly an insidious design to 
18Einhorn, "Reception of the British Peace Offer," 
p. 192. 
19Pitkin, Political and Civil History) II, 41; 
Burnett, Letters of Members-;-III, lvil, liv, and lx. 
20worthington Chauncey Ford (ed.), Journals~ the 
Continental Congress 1774-1789 (Washington: Government 
Printing office, 19oar;-x,~. 
operate on the hopes and fears of the people, and to 
create among them divisions and disaffection to the common 
cause."21 
Having obtained agreement among themselves, the 
congressional committee presented its findings to Congress 
on April 22. 
Upon the whole matter, the committee beg leave to 
report it as their opinion, that, as the .Americans, 
UnitEd in this arduous contest upon principles of 
common interest, for the defence of common rights and 
privileges; which union hath been cemented by common 
calamities, and by mutual good offices and affection; 
so the great cause for which they contend, and in 
which all mankind are interested, must derive its 
success from the continuance of that union; wherefore 
any men, or body of men, who should presume to make 
any separate or partial convention or agreement with 
commissioners under the Crown of Great Britain, or 
any of them, ought to be considered and treated as 
open and avowed enemies of these United States. 
And further, the committee beg leave to report it 
as their opinion that these United States cannot, 
with propriety, hold any conference or treaty with 
any commissioners on the part of Great Britain, unless 
they shall, as a preliminary thereto, either withdraw 
their fleets and armies, or else, in positive and 
express terms~ acknowledge the independence of the 
said states.4~ 
Congres~ on April 22, readily sanctioned the report 
of its connnittee and requested that the states raise their 
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21Jared Sparks, The Life of Gouverneur Morris, with 
Selections ~ .h!! Corresponctence and Miscellaneous Papers; 
Detailing Events in the American Revolution, and in the 
Political History-Of the United States (tioston: Gray and 
Bowen, 1832), I, l'S4.---
22Ford, Journals of Congress, X, 379. 
quota of troops and have their militia available.23 This 
action required a considerable amount of resoluteness on 
the part of Congress. Having spent a harsh winter at 
Valley Forge, the army lacked equipment and men. Since 
Simeon Deane did not a'lTive in New York until Nay 2, 
definite news of the French treaties was non-existent. 
The unwillingness of the delegates to accept anything 
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less than liberty or a removal of the enemy forces, however, 
demonstrated their complete desire for independence.24 
One influential individual, however, hoped that the 
British offer would be taken seriously. John Jay of New 
York believed that the English ministry genuinely desired 
a conclusion to the conflict. Moderation on the part of 
the colonies was the best means by which a~ armistice 
could be procured. He feared a ruined England if the two 
countries failed to agree to a truce. "The destruction of 
Old England would hurt me; I wish it well: it afforded my 
ancestors an asylum from persecution." Although Jay 
advocated moderation in all dealings, he was not a Loyalist 
sympathizer. 25 
23Pitkin, Political and Civil History, II, 42. 
24Einhorn, "Reception of the British Offer," P• 193. 
25Henry P. Johnston (ed.), The Correspondence and 
Public Papers of John Jay (New Yor~G. P. Putman's Sons, 
1890), I, 179-'lfU.--:JOhn Jay, during 1778, was Justice of 
the Court of New York. On December 10, 1778, Jay was 
chosen President of the Continental Congress following the 
resignation of Henry Laurens, Ibid., P• 184. 
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With increasingly firm knowledge of the eventual 
arrival of a conciliatory committee, American Loyalists 
also began to gather forces. A letter in the Pennsylvania 
Evening Post April 20 expressed concern over further 
disjunctions within the colonies. It claimed that the 
colonists were weary of the continuous blood-letting.26 
On May 4, the same paper expressed a firm wish for 
beneficial discussions. The paper stated that the English 
proposals answered .America's request for an end to taxation. 
The editorial exclaimed in harsh terms that "Congress ~ 
thought ~ to declare that America shall have no peace, 
that she, shall not accept the ~ conditions originally 
proposed by herself ••• , that the hopes of ~very family 
shall be dragged into the fieldtt to be slaughtered. 27 
Issuing inflammatory statements, the Loyalists 
proceeded to put further doubts into the minds of their. 
countrymen. Some less vehement Loyalists had never 
expressed feelings too unfriendly toward the American 
cause. The more moderate Loyalist merchants in New York 
City, for example, feared exposing themselves or their 
businesses to abuse from the colonials by advocating British 
26The Pennsylvania Evening Post (Philadelphia), 
April 20,-U78. 
27The Pennsylvania Evening ~, May 4, 1778. 
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domination of America. With the British, however, seemingly 
willing to conclude hostilities, even the less vehement 
Loyalists, wishing to enhance their own position with 
England, began to adhere more to the sentiments of their 
28 ardent compatriots. 
The Loyalists, eager to gain more support from 
dissatisfied colonials, spread propaganda throughout the 
cclonies. This material presented England as a beneficent 
mother country under which the colonials generally had 
freedom of worship and those men who owned fifty acres 
had the right to vote. Officials elected by the colonials 
collected the taxes. The New York Gazette proclaimed on 
Nay 11 that America had abundant wealth, commerce, and 
freedom under the former regime. The arti~le concluded 
with a final plea to the militia. To continue hostilities 
was to weaken any chance to return to the former liberties 
29 
under a benevolent king. 
Congress, however, remained confident that the 
Tories could not undermine the .American position by appealing 
to dissatisfied colonists. The delegates awaited eagerly 
28John Frederick Schroeder, Life and Times of 
Washington: Containing a Particular--XCCoUiit of NatIOnal 
Principles and Events, ind of Illustrious Men ~ the 
Revolution (New York: Johnson, Fry, and Company, IDB), I, 
688-89; Stevens, FacBimiles, XII, Nos. 1212 and 1226. 
29The New York Gazette and the Weekly Mercury, 
May 11, lm.- -
the arrival of Simeon Deane and the French treaties. 
Confirmation of complete French aid, they felt, would be 
the one factor to best counteract Loyalist propaganda. 
But even before the arrival of the Franco-American 
agreements, the delegates had endorsed a position against 
the mother country's propositions. As a result, many 
colonials praised Congress for not wavering during this 
period of uncertainty. 30 
On May 2, the delegates at York received the first 
31 copies of the treaties from Deane. As expected, they 
contained a compact for uamity and connnerce" and an agree-
ment for an "alliance." Under the alliance clause America 
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was to aid France if England ever declared war on America's 
ally. 32 France guaranteed to uphold American liberty and 
33 
not take advantage of its position. In the words of the 
treaty, the purpose of the alliance was "to maintain 
effectually the liberty, Sovereignty, and independence 
30sparks, Life ~ Gouverneur Morris, I, 184. 
31rbid. 
32The Virginia Gazette (Williamsburg, Virginia), 
May 8, 1778. In fact, some people in England believed 
war was inevitable. To Arthur Lee war between England and 
France seemed certain. As early as March 19, 1778, Lee 
had written to Henry Laurens proclaiming the inevitability 
of war. Richard Henry Lee, Life of Arthur Lee (Boston: 
Wells and Libby, Cou:t Street, 18!9°), II, 1'!9"=40. 
33The Virginia Gazette, May, 1778. 
absolute and unlimited of the said united States, as· 
well in matters of Gouvernement as of Commerce." If war 
were to cotmnence between France and England, "his Majesty 
and the said united States" were to make it "a common 
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cause, and aid each other mutually with their good offices • 
• • , and their forces, ••• as becomes good and faithful 
allies.n34 
Louis XVI, in fact, claimed that his nation pledged 
itself to "protect and defend all Vessels and the Effects 
belonging to the Subjects, People or Inhabitants of the 
said United States." Louis promised to "restore to the 
right owners, their agents or attornies all such Vessels 
and Effects," seized within "his Jurisdiction.rr Other 
benefits within the treaty included the right of both 
countries to trade with belligerents without fear of 
harassment. 35 The Treaty of Amity and Cormnerce, moreover, 
contained a clause stating France's disinclination toward 
36 
a monopolizing of American commerce. 
Under both the Treaty of Alliance and the Treaty of 
34G. Chinard (ed.), The Treaties£?!. 1778 and Allied 
Documents (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, l~), P• 52. 
35chinard, Treaties £!. !Zl§., PP• 27 and 40-41. 
36Frank Moore, The Diary: of the American Revolution, 
from NewspaKers and oriiina Documents (New York: Charles 
Scribner, l 58),-YY, 99. 
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.Amity and Commerce, France and America had mutual obliga-
tions. America agreed to aid France if England and France 
opened hostilities. If war began, America and France 
were to provide mutual assistance in developing tactical 
and strategical plans. Neither the French nor the 
Americans were to make a separate truce or peace treaty 
with England without consent of the other. Laying down 
arms would be by mutual consent. The allies agreed to 
acknowledge the boundaries and sovereignty of each others 
possessions and territories. Within the Treaty of .Amity 
and Commerce, France and America could open commercial 
ties with belligerents.37 
Having endorsed the Franco-American treaties, 
Richard Henry Lee, in a letter to Thomas Jefferson May 3, 
1778, maintained that two solutions remained to the British. 
England could acknowledge American independence and 
negotiate a treaty of connnerce with the colonies. Following 
the other alternative, Britain might allow the French to 
continue a close commercial relationship with .America to 
avoid a conflict between the two countries. If Britain 
followed the latter course, he believed that .America would 
alone be confronted with the task of expelling the British 
37Bemis, Diplomacy of £!!.!. American Revolution, 
PP• 62-64. 
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forces from North America. In this case, if France proved 
/ 
unable to grant substantial materiel and funds, .America 
would be ruined. 38 
The arrival of the treaties generated more Loyalist 
condemnations of Congress, France, and the war. Congress 
received blame for attempting to "pacify the popular 
alarm" by a colonial endorsement of the Bourbon agreements. 
The Loyalists reiterated that the legislative body had no 
legal right to prod Americans into associating with the 
avowed enemy of Protestantism. .Americans ran the risk 
under the alliance policy of becoming slaves "under the 
treacherous title of independence." Loyalists argued that 
this was another of the means Congress used "to overturn 
the Protestant religion, and extinguish every spark, both 
of civil and religious freedom.n39 
In the Royal Gazette James Rivington declared that 
Congress was the cause of all the bloodshed and suffering. 
Under North's plan England rescinded its claim of taxation, 
yielding to the colonial demands. An ungrateful America, 
however, wanted more. The article ended with a challenge 
to the inhabitants of North America: resist the demands for 
38James Curtis Ballagh (ed.), ~Letters .2£. Richard 
~G~ry Lee (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1912), I, 395-
39 Moore, Dia!}' ~f American Revolution, II, 46·48. 
more forces and supplies requested by the revoluntionary 
legislature.40 
Congressional delegates tolerated such Loyalist 
criticism. They found it much easier to endure this 
castigation than to coerce the opposition and grant the 
Loyalists further ammunition to launch more intensive 
verbal barrages.41 
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By means of letters, newspapers, and congressional 
reports, the ant~·British colonials also provided information 
of their own to minimize the efforts of their adversaries. 
A cormnittee of Gouverneur Morris, Samuel Chase, and Richard 
Henry Lee praised the consistent endurance of the war weary 
Americans. To insure a colonial victory, the people had 
42 to be true to themselves and to their pledges. The 
independent-minded inhabitants also used newspapers and 
private letters as propaganda vehicles. Any item which 
damaged the British cause was printed and circulated and 
reprinted again• The Virginia Gazette proclaimed that 
Burgoyne's defeat undermined the British morally as well 
as physically• Once the conquest of General Howe was 
complete, the British would be compelled to "acknowledge 
James 
40Royal Gazette, (New York City), June 3, 1778. 
Rivington was the publisher of this newspaper. 
4lsparks, Life ~ Gouverneur Morris, I, 185. 
42~. 
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our independence without a boggle. ,,43 The._colonial 
newspapers, however, admitted their difficulties in ousting 
the British. A single "manly" effort by the colonials 
was necessary. Newspaper articles guaranteed that all 
mankind would ultimately acknowledge that the eviction 
of tyranny was worth the cost.44 
The anti-British propagandists argued consistently 
that France, as an ally, was legally and morally obligated 
to defend .America from encroachment by the "connnon foe.u 
If the French were slow in responding, then not only would 
America be ruined but France as well. To permit England 
to retain her former possessions would lead, therefore, 
to the eventual destruction of Louis' nation. 45 
Many Americans believed that this propaganda--from 
both sides--impafred chances of success not only for the 
Carlisle Commission but for peace itself. Congress wanted 
the mission members to understand the colonial desire for 
peace. If the envoys would come with a proclamation of 
independence, acceptance clearly was guaranteed. Other-
wise, the British offer would be for nought. Although, 
independence was the American prerequisite for peace, 
43The Virginia Gazette, May 1, 1778. 
44The Boston Gazette and Country Journal, May 4, 1778. - -
45!.h.! Virginia Gazette, May 8, 1778. 
Congress yet acknowledged the importance of negotiations. 
Congress, therefore, as a show of its willingness 
for peace, issued the following resolution April 30: 
90 
Resolved - That notwithstanding the Unmerited 
Injurious and Cruel Treatment the United States of 
America have received from the hands of Great Britain, 
they are ever desirous to put an end to the Calamities 
of war; and not averse from entering into a Treaty for 
peace and Conmerce between the two Countries for the 
mutual Interest and Benefit of both, upon Terms not 
Inconsistent with Freedom, Sovereignty and Independence 
of these States, or with any Treaties that are or shall 
be made with any fl~her Sovereign power, before such 
Treaty be formed. 
Once Congress had made its opinions officially 
known, preparations for the Carlisle Commission seemed 
complete. Congress wanted peace but not at the cost of 
submission. The Loyalists, however, listened eagerly to 
any British offer which might end their sufferings. Waiting 
with words of encouragement, they optimistically believed 
that the commissioners' arrival would offset the influence 
of the French-American treaties. 
Yet the reception of the terms of the British offer 
already foretold that the congressional reception of the 
commission itself would not be warmhearted and sympathetic. 
Peace, Congress believed, required British acknowledgement 
of American independence. Congress reasoned that the only 
purpose of the North proposal and the coming of the envoys 
46Burnett, Letters .Qf. Members, III, 207. 
was to seduce the inhabitants into returning to the fold. 
A wide range of emotions awaited to engulf the Carlisle 




THE JUNE NEGOTIATIONS 
At the time of the arrival of Lord North's Concil-
iatory Plan in America on April 14, the Carlisle commission 
members were concluding preparations for their voyage to 
the colonies. The commissioners--Lord Carlisle, William 
Eden, and George Johnstone--hoped that the North proposal 
had established a firm basis upon which to construct work-
able negotiations. On their arrival in the colonies, the 
envoys planned to correspond with Congress and General 
Washington. Under King George's instructions of April 12, 
the commissioners had the authority to meet with repre-
sentatives of the colonies only if Congress completely 
refused the British overtures.1 
Lord Carlisle, who would dominate the mission, 
lGreat Britain. Collection, King George to 
Connnissioners, April 12, 1778, Evans Bibliography, 15825, 
18. 
especially hoped that Britain's offer to end taxation, 
repeal all acts of Parliament since 1763 pertaining to the 
colonies, renew con:mercial ties, and provide pardons would 
win back Congress. 2 To make the purpose of the mission 
entirely clear to Congress, Carlisle summarized the 
member's views. 
To off er Peace to America upon terms honourable 
and beneficial for her to embrace; to stay the hand 
of slaughter and desolation; to apply effectual remedy 
to every grievance, to quiet all anxiety upon such as 
exist only in jealousy, prejudice, and apprehension; 
to fix the happiness, security, and future welfare 
of G. B. and her Colonies upon a firmer basis ••• ; 
to cover again this extent of ocean with the united 
commerce of both nations. • • • has induced our 
country to invest us with powers too extensive to be 
intrusted to individuals, but for the sacred purpose 
of restoxing tranquility and stopping the effusion 
of human blood.~ 
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After weeks of planning and with best wishes from 
}lorton Eden, William Eden's brother, for a fruitful voyage, 
the Carlisle Peace Commission sailed from England aboard 
the Trident on April 16.4 Also aboard were William Eden's 
wife, Eleanor, Dr. Adam Ferguson--the commission's 
secretary--and Lord Cornwallis. Ferguson, a close friend 
2carlisle minutes, June 1, 1778 and King George 
to Commissioners, April 12, 1778, Carlisle MSS, pp. 326, 
330-32, and 339. 
3Carlisle minutes, June l, 1778, Carlisle~' P• 339. 
'*Morton Eden to William Eden, April 8, 1778, Stevens, 
Facsimiles, IV, No. 429. 
of George Johnstone, was professor of moral philosophy at 
Edinburgh University. Cornwallis, having been on leave 
in London, was returning as Clinton's second in conunand. 5 
The voyage went by quickly with time spent in 
playing cards, writing notes to friends and family, and 
discussing the forthcoming negotiations. Writing to his 
wife on April 28, Lord Carlisle expressed confidence that 
their stay in America would be no longer than one year. 
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If the mission failed, there was no reason to remain longer. 
Even if the envoys were successful, it was "too unreasonable 
a request to wish us to remain to arrange every possible 
6 difficulty that may grow out of such a business.tr 
Nothing of significance occurred during the first 
five weeks of the voyage. on May 2 7, ·however 1 the Trident 
encountered a British man~of-war and the report that Lord 
Howe and Sir Henry Clinton were in Philadelphia. 7 Under 
orders of March 21, 1778 from George Germain, Clinton had 
been instructed to abandon Philadelphia and move his forces 
8 to New York City. The British ministry had failed to 
inform the commissioners about the evacuation. Believing 
5van Doren, Secret History, P• 84. 
6carlisle MSS, p. 334. 
7Carlisle to Lady Carlisle, May 27, 1778, Carlisle 
MSS, P• 335. 
Bsupra, pp. 52-53. 
that the army in Philadelphia would provide a better 
bargaining position, the British envoys ordered the 
Trident's commander, Commodore John Elliot, to sail to 
Philadelphia. 9 
When the connnissioners arrived in the Pennsylvania 
city June 6, Clinton was in the midst of preparations to 
abandon the city. Eden especially maintained that the 
garrison in the city would be an inducement to Congress 
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to deal more favorably with the connnission. 10 George 
Germain and Lord North's failure to entrust the agents with 
information on military strategy brought ridicule upon 
themselves and lessened the effectiveness of England's 
plenipotentiaries. Lord Carlisle expressed his own reason 
for the ministry's uninformative manner. If Germain had 
confided to the commissioners concerning the evacuation, 
Carlisle believed that the envoys would not even have 
11 
gone on the mission due to loss of military support. 
Now the remoteness of Clinton's troops would place the 
British in a weaker bargaining position. Eden and his 
colleagues thus became less confident even before the 
9Ritcheson, British Politics, P• 272; Van Doren, 
Secret History, pp. 84-85. 
lOEden's minutes, June 8, 1778, Stevens, Facsimiles, 
V, No. 496. 
llcarlisle to Lady Carlisle, June 14, 1778, Carlisle, 
MSS, p. 341. 
talks began.12 
Supporting the commissioners' condemnation of 
ministerial policy were General Clinton and the Loyalist, 
Joseph Galloway. Clinton expressed anger at having to 
abandon the city to the enemy. Like the commissioners, 
Clinton believed the mission's purpose was negated by 
removal of the troops. 13 The most bitterly disappointed, 
however, were the Loyalists like Galloway. If possible 
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the Loyalists were to vacate their homes and move to New 
York with the army. The commissioners and Galloway disliked 
leaving many who could not make the voyage. Like Clinton 
and the envoys, Galloway considered abandoning Philadelphia 
a tactical blunder. He believed giving up the city would 
only prolong the war. 14 
The commission members were further galled to learn 
that Washington had known of the evacuation prior to them-
selves. As early as May 19, 1778, General Washington had 
suspected that Clinton was contemplating a transfer of 
forces to New York City. To Washington, moreover, it 
12Ritcheson, British Politics, pp. 272-73. 
13w111cox, Portrait .2£.. ~ General, p. 226. 
14Julian P. Boyd, Anglo-American Union, Jose£h 
Galloway's Plans to Preserve The British Empire 177 -1788 
(Philadelphia: Un!Verslty of Pennsylvania Press,~1r:;-­
P• 70; Van Doren, Secret History, p. 93; Van Alstyne, 
Empire and Independence, P• 155. 
appeared that many of the families in the city were pre-
paring to leave with the army. 15 
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To the commissioners the problems confronting their 
mission seemed immense. After accumulating all the data, 
Carlisle sunnnarized these difficulties. In addition to 
evacuating Philadelphia, Carlisle reasoned that the Franco-
American treaties would be a hindrance. The evacuation of 
the Chesapeake Bay by all British vessels would weaken 
Britain's position by allowing contraband goods to reach 
the colonies that nruch easier. 16 The loss of Lord Richard 
Howe, due to 111 health, hindered the commission.17 Lad 
Howe, however, agreed to aid his countrymen as long as he 
18 remained in the colonies. 
Even with all these difficulties, the envoys commenced 
negotiations. On June 7, George Johnstone, in violation 
of ministerial orders secretly discussed with Joseph 
Galloway the possibility of an imperial constitution. 
15washington to Jeremiah Powell, President of the 
Council of Massachusetts, Nay 19, 1778, Jared Sparks, The 
Writings of George Washington; bding his correspondence, 
addresses-;-~1essages, Selected an PUblIShed from the 
Original Manuscri ts; with a Ll:Xe of the Aut:IiO'r; Notes, and 
Illustrations Boston:lffiSselr;odI'Ome,-and Metcalf, and-
Hillard, Gray and Company, 1834), V, 376. 
16carlisle to Lord Gower, June, 1778, Carlisle, ~' 
p. 342. 
17Lord Howe to connnissioners, June 7, 1778, Stevens, 
Facsimiles, XI, No. 1099. 
18van Doren, Secret History, P• 93. 
98 
Johnstone claimed that England was willing to dispatch two 
representatives to each of the colonial assemblies. America, 
in turn, was to provide one delegate to Parliament from each 
colony. The coI?mlissioner agreed to the abolishment of 
taxation. Parliament, however, would claim legislative 
authority over all other issues. A federal union of states 
would be the outcome. Galloway dismissed the suggestion 
of a federal union as being almost an acknowledgement of 
colonial freedom. 19 
George Johnstone was to violate the commission's 
instructions on several other occasions. 20 Under North's 
plan the envoys were not to discuss Britain's offers with 
any individuals until negotiations with Congress had been 
concluded. Johnstone undertook private discussions to 
accelerate negotiations and possibly to bring the war to 
an early conclusion.21 
At the opening of legitimate negotiations, Carlisle 
and Eden were as unsuccessful as their colleague, Mr. 
Johnstone. On June 9, the envoys provided Dr. Adam Fergusoq 
secretary to the commission, with a revised version of the 
North Conciliatory Plan. Without changing the plan, the 
19Boyd, Anglo-American Union, P• 80. 
20rnfra,pp. 105-109. 
2lvan Doren, Secret History, P• 73. 
commissioners had incorporated within the proposal their 
own hope for a rapid conclusion to the conflict. The 
commissioners' message opened with an expression of hope 
for the stoppage of "further Effusion of the Blood and 
the Calamities of War." It continued by claiming that 
99 
the British envoys "assure you Congress of our most 
earnest desire to Reestablish on the Basis of equal Freedom 
and mutual Safety the tranquility of this once happy 
Emp1re.n22 
Concerning colonial taxation, the envoys were quite 
explicit. They acknowledged that taxation by Parliament 
for the purpose of raising revenues within America had 
proven unsatisfactory. Under the peace proposal, the 
only funds collected would be from the regulation of 
commerce. These funds, moreover, would eventually be 
returned for use in the colonies for internal improve-
ments. 23 Britain's representatives also agreed, as 
instructed, in an end to all hostilities. No military 
forces would be allowed to remain on American soil without 
the consent of Congress. Parliament would retain the right 
to grant Americans a voice in British govermnent, depending 
22commissioners to Henry Laurens, June 9, 1778, 
Stevens, Facsimiles, XI, No. 1104. Author's brackets. 
23commissioners to Henry Laurens, June 10, 1778, 
Evans Bibliography, 15825, 9-10. 
on the outcome of discussions. 24 
The commissioners also expressed concern over the 
Bourbon treaties. Carlisle urged Congress to reject the 
Treaty of Alliance. The agents' letter to President 
Laurens acclaimed the similarities in blood, religion, 
100 
and language between England and her wayward child.25 
France had made its of.fer in order to continue the war and 
prevent a reconciliation. 
But we trust that the inhabitants of North America, 
connected with us by the nearest ties of consanguinity, 
speaking the same language, interested in the pre-
servation of similar institutions, remembering the 
former happy intercourse of good offices, and for-
getting recent animosities, will shrink from the 
thought of becoming an assecion of force to our late 
mutual enemies, and will prefer a firm, free, and 
perpetual coalition with the Parent State~ 6to an insincere and unnatural foreign alliance. 
This appeal, the Englishmen believed, played on the 
emotions and sympathies of the .American people. In the 
thinking of the agents, this maneuver was indispensable. 
An appeal to the heart was of greater value than an entreaty 
to the mind or political interest. Within the whole 
manifesto, there was not a single hint that the conuuissioners 
24conuuissioners to Henry Laurens, June 9, 1778, 
Stevens, Facsimiles, XI, No. 1104. 
25Notes on letter of Commissioners to Congress, 
June 9, 1778, Stevens, Facsimiles, V, No. 497. 
26Great Britain. Collection, Commissioners to 
Congress, June 9, 1778, Evans B1.hliography, 15825, 4. 
upheld independence. To the British govermnent and its 
1778 Commission an independent America was inconceivable. 
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The final words of the dispatch presented an attempt 
at exonerating the British from any future troubles. 
If after the time that May be necessary to consider 
this communication, and transmit your answer, the horrors 
and devastations of war should continue, we call God 
and the world to witness, that the evils which must 
follow are not to imputed to Great Britain; and we 
cannot without the most real sorrow, anticipate the 
prospect of calamiz~es which we feel the most ardent 
desire to prevent. 
The commissioners, in their dispatch to Congress, 
explained to the delegates that either Philadelphia, New 
York, or York was a suitable spot for a meeting. After 
British evacuation of Philadelphia, the commissioners 
favored the New York site. They felt more s~cure away 
from the vicinity of Washington's forces. The Americans 
promised to provide safe conduct passes for those attending 
such a gathering. 28 
Washington, however, would not provide Dr. Ferguson 
with a pass to travel to York. Ferguson, therefore, left 
29 . 
the British proposals at Radnor on June 10. Washington 
27Great Britain. 
Congress, June 9, 1778, 
28_!lli., 4. 
Collection, Commissioners to 
Evans Bibliography, 15825, 4-5. 
29Henry Laurens to Horatio Gates, June 13, 1778, 
Burnett, Letters ££Members, III, 289. 
- ' ' 
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considered the proposals unacceptable to a majority of the 
American people and believed that without consent of 
Congress he lacked authority to provide Ferguson with a 
30 safe conduct pass. 
The general forwarded the propositions to York on 
June 13.
31 
Henry Laurens read the dispatches to Congress 
on the same day, despite the objections of Gouverneur 
Morris, who opposed a reading because of English condem-
nations of the French and their king. 32 nue to this 
opposition, Congress did postpone discussion of the envoys' 
dispatch, first, until the fifteenth and then until the 
sixteenth. 33 
While Congress prepared to consider and criticize 
the offer of the Carlisle Commission, evacuation of 
Philadelphia temporarily ceased. 34 The British wanted to 
know the outcome of the congressional discussions on the 
North plan before leaving the city. While waiting in 
30Douglas Southall Freeman, George Washington: ~ 
Biography (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1952), V, 6. 
31Henry Laurens to Haratio Gates, June 13, 1778, 
Burnett, Letters 2f. Members, III, 289. 
32swiggett, Extraordinary ~· Morris, P• 55; Ford, 
Journals of Congress, XI, 606. 
33Burnett, Letters £.£.Members, III, 295. 
34washington to General Horatio Gates, June 12, 
1778, Fitzpatrick, Writings .2!, Washington, XII, 51. 
Philadelphia for the congressional response, Carlisle, 
Eden, and Johnstone spent much time in correspondence to 
acquaintances in America and to the British ministry. 
The commissioners explained, for instance, in a letter to 
George Germain on June 15, the costly mistake of leaving 
Philadelphia. The English troops were healthy and well 
prepared for battle. Yet, the troops were to vacate the 
city. The forced evacuation required the hastening of 
correspondence between the English representatives and 
Congress. Even prior to the .Tune 15 letter, Eden had 
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urged Clinton to delay long enough for congressional 
reaction. When Eden learned that Clinton's orders allowed 
no lengthy delay, he admitted the futility of the mission. 35 
On June 16, Congress chose Samuel Adams of 
Massachusetts, Richard Henry Lee of Virginia, William 
Henry Drayton of South Carolina, Gouverneur Morr.is of New 
York, and John Witherspoon of New Jersey to receive the 
British offer. 36 Both Witherspoon and Richard Henry Lee 
drafted answers to the English during the meeting of the 
committee. Witherspoon urged Congress to remain loyal to 
the French and reject all English pleadings for an end to 
35Eden minutes, June 8, 1778 and Eden to Alexander 
Wedderburn, June 18, 1778, Stevens, Facsimiles, XI, V, 
Nos. 1109, 496 and 500. 
36 Supra, pp. 78-79. 
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the Treaty of Alliance. Lee upheld Witherspoon's views 
and claimed that the legislature was always ready to discuss 
a peaceful settlement once America obtained independence.37 
Richard Henry Lee, writing to Jefferson on June 16, main-
tained that the English offer was a combination of "fraud, 
falsehood, insidious offers, and abuse of France." The 
committee members as a whole generally regarded the issue 
highly offensive and encouraged congressional delegates 
to disavow the British offers as totally inadequate. 38 
Congress, on June 17, readily agreed with its 
committee that peace would come only when George III 
demonstrated a sincere desire to end hostilities. "The 
only solid proof of this disposition will be an acknowledge-
ment of the independence of these states, or the with-
dr_awing (of J his fleets and armies. n Henry Laurens 
reiterated that the only reason for reading the British 
plans was to stem the neffusion of human blood.u39 
The commissioners, however, agreed not to allow 
this news to stifle their efforts. While these gentlemen 
37John Witherspoon proposed letter to commissioners, 
June 16, 1778, and Richard Henry Lee draft of letter to 
commissioners, June 16, 1778, Burnett, Letters of Members, 
III, liv, lxii, lx, lvii, lvi, and 296-97. 
38Ballagh, Letters of Richard Henry ~' I, 412 and 
415. 
39Henry Laurens to commissi?ners, June 17, 1778, 
Evans Bibliography, 15825, 5-6. Author's brackets. 
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awaited aboard the Trident in the Delaware River for the 
evacuation of British troops from Philadelphia, Dr. Ferguson 
issued a letter on behalf of the envoys. The dispatch 
called "upon those who have suffered • • • seriously to 
consider the original cause of the present hostilities, 
with the propositions we have made to remove them, and to 
obviate all further disputes." This was an impassioned 
appeal to all Americans who were tired of war. 40 
The envoys, despite instructions to negotiate only 
with the whole Congress at first, were not above making 
private overtures to influential colonials. George Johnstone 
became the most prolific commissioner engaged in such 
41 
personal negotiations. He sought discussions during June 
with Joseph Reed, a member of Congress from Pennsylvania 
and former adjutant general in the Continental army. 
Before the envoys had left England, Johnstone had also 
written Dennis DeBerdt, Reed's brother-in-law, in America. 
Anxious to heal the breach, Johnstone used DeBerdt to full 
advantage. DeBerdt's letter to Reed, for example, intro-
duced Johnstone as a man of peace working for the colonial 
cause in Parliament. When Johnstone reached Philadelphia, 
40creat Britain. Collection, Commissioners to 
American people, June, 1778, Evans Bibliography, 15825, 
6-8. 
41supra, pp. 97-98. 
he wrote to Reed on June 9 hinting of a reward if he 
cooperated with the envoys. Reed received the letter at 
Valley Forge and revealed its contents to Washington. 
Johnstone never received Reed's answer after the commis-
sioners boarded the Trident for New York on June 16. But 
Reed's correspondence gave no hope of continued communi-
cations on the subject of reconciliation anyway. He 
suggested rather that England rescind her "visionary 
schemes for conquest" and enjoy the benefits derived from 
a free America.42 
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Reed was not the only delegate contacted by Mr~ 
Johnstone. Robert Morris, Henry Laurens, and Francis Dana 
received similar lettP.rs from the British envoy. Johnstone 
chose Morris of Pennsylvania, chairman of the Congressional 
Committee on Finance, because he had voted against the 
Declaration of Independence in 1776. He believed Morris 
43 was a moderate in his viewpoints. On June 16, the 
emissary hinted to the Pennsylvanian that the one who aided 
in the restoration of good feeling deserved every favor 
afforded to him. Honor would be granted those who found 
"the vessel in the storm and brought her safely to port." 
42John F. Roche, Jose~h Reed, A Moderate in the 
American Revolution {New Yor : Columbia University Press, 
1957), PP• 133-36. 
43van Doren, Secret History, P• 98. 
Morris ignored his supplication.44 
President Laurens, unlike Morris, was quick to 
rebuke Mr. Johnstone's letter of June 10.45 His June 
14 reply observed that the true interest of England lay 
in confirmation of America's independence. Congress, 
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he believed, would never rescind its demand for a free and 
46 
independent nation. In private correspondence to General 
Horatio Gates on June 17, Laurens admitted that the agent's 
demands, if "tendered some time ago, ••• there can be no 
doubt but that the people of America would joyfully have 
embraced" them. 47 
In Johnstonets June 10 letter to Francis Dana, the 
connnissioner claimed that Benjamin Franklin supported 
several undisclosed points within the North proposal. 
Although this was a misrepresentation of the facts, Johnstone 
hoped that Franklin's name would lend prestige to his offer. 48 
Since Johnstone could not and did not offer inde• 
pendence, his June correspondence to the congressional 
44wharton, Revolutionary Correspondence, II, 616-17. 
45President Laurens to George Johnstone, June 14, 
1778, Carlisle MSS, P• 343. 
46Burnett, Letters .2f. Members, III, 292-93. 
47commager and Morris, Spirit~ 'Seventy-fil:!, PP• 
697-98. 
48wharton, Revolutionary Correspondence, II, 811. 
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delegates proved worthless. On June 17, Congress delib• 
erated upon the motion that all delegates place their 
correspondence from the British envoys before Congress. 
President Laurens objected, fearing increased congres-
sional authority over individual freedom. The motion was 
never brought to a vote due mainly to President Laurens' 
objection. Laurens, however, did agree to provide William 
Henry Drayton with Johnstone•s letters and a copy of his 
own reply for safekeeping. The legislature then allowed 
Drayton to collect all the Johnstone letters and to preserve 
them. 49 
Failing to obtain any encouraging information from 
Morris, Laurens, and Dana, Mr. Johnstone contacted Mrs. 
Elizabeth Graeme Ferguson, wife of Hugh Ferguson, the 
British commissary of prisoners. He met Mrs. Ferguson, a 
relation of Secretary Adam Ferguson by marriage, at Charles 
Stedman's home in Philadelphia on June 16. On the day of 
his departure, the British agent persuaded Mrs. Ferguson 
to enlist Reed's support. Mrs. Ferguson, an American, was 
sympathetic to the American cause but agreed to send a 
letter to Reed at Lancaster, Pennsylvania. She had told 
Johnstone, moreover* that she might travel to Lancaster 
49Henry Laurens to George Washington, June 18, 
1778, Burnett, Letters££ Members, III, 302. 
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to plead her husband's cause before the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Executive Council. If she travelled to Lancaster, 
Johnstone urged her to visit Joseph Reed. Due to her 
husband's pro-British beliefs, the council had summoned 
him on the charge of treason. He was a British subject, 
however, and could not be legally tried by the .Americans 
on that charge. Hugh Ferguson escaped the wrath of the 
Americans by travelling to New York with Clinton's 
forces. 50 
~lrs. Ferguson succeeded in her mission by having 
Reed meet her at Stedman's home on June 22. Reed seemed 
to be the correct choice to discuss a reconciliation. He 
treasured American and British unity and prior to the war 
counseled for moderation. Mrs. Ferguson explained that 
~Ir. Johnstone knew of Reed's past sentiments for an end to 
the hostilit!es. 51 If he were to exert his influence in 
hopes of ending the dispute, then a reward of t 10,000 and 
an office in the colonies were his. Reed claimed he was 
unworthy of such awards. 52 
Reluctant to harm the lady's reputation, Reed failed 
50Roche, Joselh ~, p. 138; Einhorn, "Reception of 
the British Peace Of er, 11 p. 206; Van Doren, Secret Historx;, 
P• 100. 
51Roche, Joseph ~' PP• 138 and vii. 
700. 
52commager and Morris, Spirit££ 'Sevent)'•Six, II, 
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to turn this information over to Congress until after the 
Battle of Monrnouth. 53 While Reed was at Monmouth, the 
congressional delegates requested that all letters received 
by the delegates from the commissioners b~ placed before 
Congress. Robert Morris and Francis Dana responded on 
July 9 and 16 respectively. Mr. Reed presented his letters 
to Congress, meeting at Philadelphia July 18, but without 
54 mention of Mrs. Ferguson. Congress, on August 11, 
declared that the connnissioners' letters and discussions 
with Reed and other congressmen were an endeavor to bribe 
the delegates and resolved never to acknowledge the corre-
55 
spondence of George Johnstone. 
While Johnstone's intrigues continued, the envoys 
boarded the Trident on June 16. Since the Trident did not 
sail from the Delaware River until June 28, Eden and Carlisle 
passed the time by writing observations of their two week 
56 stay in the colonies. Carlisle, in not~s to his wife, 
claimed that the evacuation of the army doomed the mission 
53washington attacked Clinton on the latter's way to 
New York on June 28. No advantage was gained by either 
side. Approximately three hundred were killed in both 
armies. Allen, History~ Revolution, II, 183. 
54Roche, Joseph~, p. 138; Van Doren, Secret 
History, P• 102. 
55Ford, Jarnals of Congress, XI, 678. 
56stevens, Facsimiles, IV, No. 372. 
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from the beginning. Clinton's forces, he thought, were 
better trained than those of his adversary. The British 
army, while in Philadelphia, gave to the npeople of 
property" a feeling of security. The offers of the British 
agents, believed Carlisle, satisfied these less independent-
minded Americans. The loss of the army, however, forced 
the representatives to expose all their offers at once. 
In another letter Carlisle further reviewed the June 
situation. 
Our situation permitted none of the protracting 
arts of negotiation; it was too nice and critical to 
attempt any experiment, and we were all convinced 
that we had no other part to take but at once to 
display every concession and every inducement which 
our country had empo~'red us with, to establish the 
general tranquility. 
William Eden, like Carlisle, ridiculed the ministry 
for its duplicity. The ministry openly had offered complete 
support to the commission, while it secretly undermined 
the envoys' position in America by not informing them of 
the evacuation~ ."It is ••• cruel ••• to have been so 
ill-used by those in whom I placed the most implicit 
confidence.n He expressed hope for better results in New 
York but feared that they would return home unsuccessfu1. 58 
57Carlisle to Lady Carlisle, June 21 to July 7, 
1778 and Carlisle to Rev. Ekins, October, 1778, Carlisle 
MSS, PP• 345 and 381-82. 
58william Eden to Alexander Wedderburn, June 18, 
1778, Stevens, Facsimiles, V, No. 500. 
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While the representatives from England continued 
their denunciations of the ministry in such correspondence, 
American congressional delegates expressed their views of 
the situation. Delegate Thomas NcKean of Delaware, on 
June 17, advised the President of the Council of Delaware, 
Caesar Rodney, not to be enticed by the commissioners' 
offers. "Be upon your guard with regard to Letters from 
the Enemy; they intend to seduce, corrupt and bribe by 
59 every method possible." Oliver Wolcott, delegate from 
Connecticut, wrote to his close friend, George Wyllys, 
advising him not to be persuaded by the British demands. 
The purpose of the overtures were to prevent America's 
ratification of the "French Treatyn and to divide colonial 
thinking. 60 
Praise for the French and the Treaty of Alliance, 
interspersed with criticism of England, filled many of the 
letters written by friends of the revolution. Governor 
Patrick Henry of Virginia expressed America's gratitude 
for the French intervention. His June 18 letter to Richard 
59The governor of a colony was usually restricted 
by an executive council or council of state whf.ch was 
appointed by the legislature. Barck and Lefler, Colonial 
America, p. 581; Burnett, Letters ££ Members, III, J00-301. 
60oliver Wolcott to George Wyllys, June20, 1778, 
Collections of the Connecticut Historical Societx, Vol. 
XXIII: The WYilXS-Papers, ~orrespondence and Documents 
Chiefly of Descendants ~ QQ.y. George Wxltyi ££ Connecticut 
(Hartford, Connecticut: Published by the Society, 1924), 
PP• 460-61. 
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Henry Lee conveyed hope for the def eat and ruin of 
England.
61 
The French, he believed were the only people 
powerful enough to save the American cau~e. France brought 
62 new hope into the "unequal conflict." 
Like Patrick Henry, Richard Henry Lee believed in 
the necessity of a foreign war. A French and Spanish 
threat to the British West Indies and North America was 
inevitable. A British war with all the Bourbon family 
opened wide the opportunity for America to secure "peace 
63 
for a century." 
Richard Henry Lee was not mistaken in expressing 
his expectation of French intervention in the West Indies 
and off the North .Ame~ican coast. Unknown to either the 
~Jnericans or the British agents, the French fleet under 
Admiral d'Estaing sailed from Toulon, France on April 13. 
This fleet arrived off the coast of America on July 8, 
with France's ambassador to America, Conrad Alexander 
61H. R. Mcilwaine (ed.), Official Letters of the 
Governors of the State .2£, Virgin~a, Vol. I: The Letters 
of Patrick ~6)ry (Richmond, Virginia; Virginia State 
tibrary, 19 , pp. 291-92. 
62william Wirt Henry, Patrick Hen~: ~' 
Correspondence and Speeches (New York: C arles Scribner's 
Sons, 1891), I,--:sb3. 
63Richard Henry Lee to Washington, June 24, 1778, 
Richard Henry Lee, Grandson, Memoir of the 1!f! of Richard 
Henry ~' .!!!£ His Correspondence with the Most Distinguished 
Men in America and Europe, Illustrative-or tlieir Characters, 
and 0£ the Even~of the American Revolution (Philadelphia: 
H:-c:-carey and 1.L'ea;-1825), I, 21. 
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G~rard. 64 Carlisle later admitted that leaving the Delaware 
River on June 28 enabled the commissioners to escape the 
blockade of d'Estaing. That, to him, was the only good 
which came from British evacuation of Philadelphia. 65 
After landing in New York on June 30, 1778, the 
British emissaries found themselves in a worse position than 
before their arrival in America. A hostile French fleet 
now sailed off the coast. A belligerent Congress continued 
its denun~iations of the British mission. Support from 
American Loyalists and the British ministry alike had been 
negligible. Leaving Philadelphia, moreover., would not 
result in prosperity for the commission during the remaining 
summer months. These months, in fact, would witness t..~e 
loss of one commissioner and the further decline in optimism 
by the others. 
64!>1ahon, History .2f England, VI, 250. 
65Carlisle to Rev. Ekins, October, 1778, Carlisle 
MSS, P• 382. 
CHAPTER VI 
THE SlWJ.J.ER NEGOTIATIONS: A DISAPPOINTMENT 
The Carlisle Commission's efforts during June had 
achieved nothing. The American Congress enjoyed a further 
advantage over the British envoys with the arrival of the 
Franco-American treaties. The commissioners, in a letter 
to George Germain on July 5, 1778, wrote that the Treaty 
of Alliance and the evacuation of Philadelphia together 
"have so Elated the persons in Authority through the 
Revolted Colonies" that peace remained further than ever 
from realization. 1 But to counteract these misfortunes 
the conmissioners planned to utilize every diplomatic 
means at their disposal. Carlisle claimed that the 
emissaries were not ready to resign but would remain in 
America with hope for success. 2 
lstevens, Facsimiles, XI, No. 1115. 
2carlisle to Lord Gower (Lady Carlisle's father), 
July 17, 1778, Carlisle£!§.§, P• 349. 
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The connnissioners' peace moves failed to intimidate 
America's July 4 celebration. In fact the festivities 
seemed more impressive than ever. Craters attacked compro-
mise and proclaimed independence. One such American, David 
Ramsay of South Carolina, claimed that the effect of 
colonial freedom was to remove one quarter of the globe 
from tyranny and oppression. 3 America's struggle, he 
believed, "attracted the attention of all Europe to the 
nature of civil liberty, and the right::1 of people." There 
existed no "shadow of liberty • • • when the single NO of 
a king, 3,000 miles distant, was sufficient to repeal any 
4 
of our laws." Another South Carolinian, William Henry 
Drayton, also magnified British fears. On July 9, 1278 
he chastised the-envoys' offers, claiming that each British 
suggestion was a ruse to seduce the American people. 5 
Not all colonials, however, were as direct as 
Drayton and Ramsay. Samuel Adams, writing under the name 
of "An American," was more subtle in his approach. In a 
3navidson, "Whig Propagandists," P• 50. 
4Niles, Principles and Acts of the Revolution, 
pp. 69-70. David l\.amsay, aI'ine orater and enthusiastic 
patriot, later became an historian of the American 
Revoiution. See his A Histor~ of the American Revolution, 
2 vols. (London: Richard Grif in-aiiCrCompany), 1855. 
5The Pennsylvania Packett 2,! ~ General Advertiser 
(Philaaerpliia), July 9, 1'7&. 
I 
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letter to the British agents, he wonered whether England 
was serious about wishing to end hostilities, 6 England 
intended to monopolize the colonies' commerce. Yet 
America's interests, he believed, lay in trading with all 
the world. He sarcastically rebuked England for offering 
America a place in Parliament. America was appreciative 
of the kind off er made to grant the colonies 
a share in your sovereign; but really, gentlemen, 
we have not the least inclination to accept of it. 
He is not to our taste. • • • The blood of the 
innocent is upon your, [England's] hands, and all 
the waters of the ocean will not wash it away.I 
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Even after these latest displays of hostility, the 
commissioners remained alert for any colonial peace over-
tures. Reaching New York June 30, they found time to pen a 
reply to the congressional letter of June 17.8 The letter 
from Congress stated, in part, that the delegates were 
ready to entertain discussions for a peace treaty when the 
king of England demonstrated a sincere desire for peace. 
England, moreover, was to remove all its forces and to 
grant independence.9 The connnissioners' answer of July 11 
6uAn American" to commissioners, July 16, 1778, 
Harry Alonzo Cushing (ed.), The Writings of Samuel Adams 
(New York: G. P. Putnam's Soii'S; 1908), IV~25. 
7~., pp. 25, 28, 30, and 38. Author's brackets. 
Bsupra, p. 104. 
9congress to commissioners, June 17, 1778, Ford, 
Journals of Congress, XI, 701. 
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reiterated Britain's acknowledgement of the colonials' 
freedom, with certain reservations. The letter insisted 
that the commissioners had "no doubt of his M.:ij.esty' s 
disposition to remove every subject of uneasiness from the 
colonies." Yet there were 11 circ'lllllstances of precaution 
against our ancient enemies" which necessitated the 
continuation of armed force in .America. The envoys rejected 
the right of Congress to enter into foreign alliances with-
out the consent of each colonial legislature. The agents 
concluded their message by threatening to take the issues 
directly to the people.10 
By mid-July, negotiations had not resolved American 
and British differences. The British envoys continued to 
increase colonial wrath by doubting the authority of Congres. 
The commissioners' threat to appeal to all the people not 
only alienated Congress but also admitted the mission's 
failure in normal negotiation. The envoys did irreparable 
harm to their mission by attempting to intimidate Congress. 
Any congressional sympathy for the mission was lost. 
On July 18, Congress discussed the British note and 
considered the following resolutions proposed by Gouverneur 
Morris. 
lOGreat Britain. Collection, Commissioners to 
Congress, July 11, 1778, Evans Bibliography, 15825, 23-25. 
Resolved that neither of the Commissioners • • ~ 
appear to be duly impowered either as an Ambassador, 
11inister Plenipotentiary Resident or otherwise to 
represent the King of Great Britain to these united 
States. 
Resolved that Congress can by no means hold any 
Treaty with or answer any Proposition which may be 
made by the Said Commissioners or either of them. 
The Congress upheld Morris and agreed not to answer the 
11 British envoys' letter. 
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Several delegates also expressed disapproval of the 
commissioners and their offers in letters to friends and in 
editorials. Josiah Bartlett, writing to William Whipple 
July 20, 1778, claimed that the British expressed no desire 
for an end to hostilities. Richard Henry Lee of Virginia 
and John Penn of North Carolina expressed similar views in 
letters to Thomas Jefferson and Governor Richard Caswell of 
12 North Carolina, respectively. 
Samuel Adams, writing in the Pennsylvania Evening 
E.f?!!, insisted that Congress cared little whether England 
acknowledged American liberty. America was a free land. 
The British feared French dominance of the colonies and 
llareat Britain. Collection, In Congress, July 18, 
1778, Evans Bibliography, 15825, 25; Burnett, Letters of 
Members, III, 337-38; Ford, Journals of Congress, XI, 20!. 
12Josiah Bartlett was a delegate to Congress from 
New Hampshire. William Whipple, also of New Hampshire, 
became a delegate in November, 1778. Richard Henry Lee to 
Thomas Jefferson, July 20, 1778 and John Penn to Richard 
Caswell, July 21, 1778, Burnett, Letters of Members, III, 
340-42, 346, liv, and lv. 
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therefore quartered troops in the colonies. If France were 
to invade England, he believed the latter's forces in 
America would be of no value. A second reason for England's 
remaining in the colonies was to protect the Loyalists. 
But Adams contended that England need not worry about her 
American allies. The less important Loyalists would receive 
pardons, while the leaders would be tried. This writer 
insisted that the mother country had also found it almost 
impossible to protect her commissioners. He terminated 
the article with a final criticism of the attempted bribes. 
"But know, that those who have withstood your flattery, and 
refused your bribes, despise your menaces. Farwell. When 
you come with better principles, and on a better errand, 
13 
we shall be glad to meet you." 
The commissioners, especially Mr. J 0hnstone, were 
ridiculed further in an article written July 27 but appearing 
in the Providence Gazette of August 22. The article claimed 
that the attempted bribe of Joseph Reed was offensive enough 
to make a "blush in hell." It claimed that Johnstone's 
fiasco decreased the opportunity for further negotiations.14 
While Carlisle, Eden, and Johnstone, awaited a 
13The Pennsylvania Evening Post, July 23, 1778. 
14The Providence Gazette and Country Journal, 
August 22-;--1778. 
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response to their letter of July 11, they divided their 
time between writing notes to friends and family in England 
and recording their impressions for later ref ~rence. 
Carlisle and Eden expressed concern over the blockading of 
15 New York harbor by Count Estaing's fleet. Carlisle, in 
a private note to his wife, expressed frustration and 
futility in remaining since Generals Washington and Gates 
were near White Plains, New York. Besides, the French 
fleet was outside the harbor. Carlisle, however, acknowl-
edged that since his opinion was but one among many, he 
16 
agreed to remain. 
The military situation mentioned by Carlisle involved 
cooperation of French and .American forces. Washington 
reported to General John Sullivan on July 17 the purpose 
of Estaing's new operations. The French fleet, which 
arrived off Sandy Hook--gateway to New York harbor--July 
13, was to cooperate with the American armies in the 
execution of plans against the British. The total number 
of French vessels off Sandy Hook was twelve ships and four 
frigates. Although Estaing planned to enter New York 
harbor and attack the British ships, the entrance proved 
15william Eden to Alexander Wedderburn, July 19, 
1778, Stevens, Facsimiles, V, No. 504. 
16carlisle to Lady Carlisle, July 21, 1778, 
Carlisle MSS, P• 357. 
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too shallow for the larger French vessels. Washington and 
Estaing agreed, instead, to send the Gallic ships on an 
expedition to Rhode Islanct. 17 
The British situation improved slightly with the 
sailing of Estaing's vessels from the mouth of New York 
harbor on July 22, although Eden still eA'Pressed concern 
that Clinton was to dispatch eight thousand of his troops 
to the West Indies and Florida. The success of the peace 
mission, he believed, depended upon the correct use of 
British forces, and he wondered if troops for the Carribean 
were necessary. 18 
The 8,000 troops to be sent south were a portion of 
the 25,997 available to Clinton in the sunnner of 1778. 
Washington opposed Clinton with 16,000 and an additional 
12,000. 19 Due to the French fleet's control of the sea 
along the North I'\merican coast, Clinton had been afraid 
to dispatch the 8,000 troops without support from the 
blockaded British fleet in New York. 20 
17washington to Major General Sullivan, July 17, 
1778 and Washington to President of Congress, July 22, 1778, 
Sparks, Writings £f Washington, VI, 6 and 9-10. 
18carlisle to Lady Carlisle, July 25, 1778, Carlisle 
MSS, p. 358, William Eden Minutes, July 29, 1778, Stevens, 
Faesimiles, V, No. 508. 
19General Haratio Gates had 7,000 at White Plains, 
while General John Sullivan's forces included 5,000 in Rhode 
Island. Sir Henry Clinton's Dispatch, July 27, 1778, 
Fortescue, Correspondence of George III, IV, No. 2397. 
20rbid. 
The sailing of the French fleet to Rhode Island, 
therefore, allowed Clinton time to prepare 8,000 of his 
army for the voyage south. Major General Jarr.es Grant 
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was to embark for St. Lucia with 5,000, while General 
Archibald Campbell was to leave for Georgia and East 
Florida with the remaining 3,ooo.21 Prior to this Clinton 
had been unable to follow Lord Germain's instructions of 
March 21--to irmnediately dispatch 8,000 troops south--
22 
since he had lacked the vessels. With Estaing's arrival 
off New York's coast in July, 1778, General Clinton had 
postponed troop departure. On November 4, 1778, the 
5,000 under General Grant would embark for St. Lucia. 23 
With Estaing's fleet off Rhode Island, Lord Richard 
Howe could finally take the offensive. Word came to Lord 
Howe, on July 30, that Admiral John Byron's British fleet 
was nearing New York. 24 Admiral Byron's fleet provided 
England with temporary control of the sea off North 
America. This maneuver, however, weakened England's 
position in the English Channel, since no large fleet 
2lwillcox, American Rebellion, pp. 105-106. 
22supra, pp. 52-53. 
23willcox, "British Strategy," pp. 118-19. 
24Ibid., p. 114. Admiral Byron was Carlisle's 
nephew and good friend of Chaxles James Fox. Willcox, 
Portrait of~ General, p.221. 
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remained off the English coast. 25 Admiral Howe could not 
wait for Byron's arrival for fear of losing Estaing's fleet. 
Howe failed, however, to attack the French vessels due to 
a severe storm which scattered both fleets. 26 
During the summer the British seemed as ineffective 
in military endeavors as in negotiation. On sea and land 
the British had achieved nothing. Estaing•s vessels not 
only had kept Lord Howe at bay but also had forced Clinton 
to wait months before shipping his troops to the West 
Indies. This lack of troops hindered British plans for 
early victory in the West Indies. If one French fleet 
could cause so much havoc with British strategy, the 
Americans wondered what total French involvement could 
achieve. The Americans, moreover, noticed Britain's 
inability to provide complete security for its commission. 
The colonials reasoned that if England could not protect 
its own commissioners how could it defend a whole continent. 
With Admiral Byron's vessels nearing the coast, the 
commissioners felt a little more secure. They resumed their 
entreaties for a settlement of the issues. Adam Ferguson, 
directed by the commission members, sent a note to Henry 
25Julian P. Boyd (ed.), The Papers~ Thomas 
Jefferson (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press, 1950), II, 214. 
26w111cox, Portrait of a General, p. 244; Barck and 
Lefler, Colonial America, p:-6!2. 
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Laurens requesting the release of General Burgoyne's forces. 
Under the Saratoga Convention all troops of Burgoyne were 
to be allowed to return to England. The commissioners 
demanded that the agreement signed by Burgoyne and General 
Gates be upheld. 27 In a letter to the President of South 
Carolina, Rawlins Lowndes, Laurens expressed his sentiments. 
He disapproved release of the British army without 
Parliament's ratification of the Saratoga Convention. 
Laurens knew well that such acceptance would be almost 
acknowledgement of American liberty.28 
This rebuttal only increased the envoys' fervor. 
On August 26, they asked Congress, once more, to release 
the troops. 29 Congress, following Laurens' advice, made 
it clear on September 4 that the troops were not to be 
released until Parliament ratified the agreement. Failing 
to obtain any progress, Clinton made a final plea on 
September 19. The reply of Congress, signed by Secretary 
Charles Thomson, closed the issue with the statement that 
"the Congress of the united states of .America make no 
27Great Britain. Collection, Adam Ferguson on 
behalf of commissioners to Henry Laurens, August 7, 1778, 
Evans Bibliography, 15825, 26-27. The Saratoga Convention 
was dated October 17, 1778. Barck and Lefler, Colonial 
America, p. 626. 
28Henry Laurens to Rawlins Lowndes, August 11, 1778, 
Burnett, Letters .2.E, Members, III, 368-70. 
29Ford, Journals of Congress, XII, 882. 
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answer to insolent letters. n30 
The sunmer months permitted no respite from colonial 
castigations. Henry Laurens admitted to Washington that 
he had penned notes to friends to convince them of the 
corruptness of the commissioners. As early as July 31, 
1778, he believed that the English ministry would soon 
acknowledge failure and recall the Carlisle Commission.31 
Like Henry Laurens, Philip Freneau, the poet, 
concluded that the envoys must leave America and "pass their 
days in poverty and pain." 
O'er Britain's isle a thousand woes impend, 
Too weak to conquer, govern, or defend, 
To liberty she holds pretended claim-----
The substance we enjoy, and they the name •• • • 
Freneau extolled the Americans to rise up and right the 
wrongs. 
Americans! revenge your country's wrongs; 
To you the honour of this deed belongs, 
Your arms did once this sinking land sustain, 
And saved those climes where Freedom yet must 
reign-----
Your bleeding soil this ardent task demands, 
Expel yon' thieves from these polluted lands32 Expect no peace till haughty Britain yields. 
30creat Britain. Collection, Congress, Resolution, 
September 4, 1778, Evans Bibliography, 15825, 38-40. 
31Henry Laurens to Washington, July 31, 1778, 
Burnett, b_etter~ .2£ Members, III, 355-56. 
32The title of the poem, written in August, 1778, is 
"'America Independent' and Her Everlasting Deliverance from 
British Tyranny and Oppression." Fred Lewis Pattee (ed.), 
The Poems of Philip Freneau, Poet of the American Revolution 
(Princeton-;-New Jersey: The University Library, 1902), I, 21 
and 280-82. Freneau spent time in the West Indies serving as 
the mate aboard a Captain Hanson's frigate, returning to 
America in July, 1778. The poet remained in America until 
1779 writing patriotic poems. ~., xxvi-xxviii. 
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Freneau•s poem was an impassioned appeal to the heart 
rather than to the intellect. It was to produce an over-
flow of emotion--hatred, sorrow, and anger--directed at 
Britain and her commissioners. If a contemptuous attitude 
toward the commission could be maintained, the poem would 
have served its purpose. 
George Johnstone remained the central figure receiving 
much of the criticism from the Americans. On August 11, 
Congress began its final discussions on the conduct of the 
former governor of West Florida. 33 Congress studied the 
letters of Johnstone to Joseph Reed and Richard Morris 
written during the spring of 1778. Once more Reed reviewed 
his discussions with "a lady" in Philadelphia. He mentioned 
the bribe offered by this lady on behalf of Johnstone. 34 
After several hours of deliberation, Cong~ess reached 
a decision on August 11. In the opinion of the delegates, 
Johnstonets attempted bribe was a direct means '1to corrupt 
and bribe the Congress of these united states of America." 
The congress, furthermore, resolved: 
That it is incompatable with the honour of Congress 
to hold any manner of correspondence or intercourse 
with said George Johnstone, Esq; especially to 
negotiate with him upon affairs, 3~ which the cause of 
liberty and virtue is interested. 
33Ford, Journals .Qf. Congress, XI, 770. 
34supra, pp.109-ID; Great Britain. Collection, 
Congress, Minutes on August 11, 1778, Evans Bibliography, 
15825, 29-30. 
35~., 15825, 31. 
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Of the members attending, sixteen voted against and eleven 
voted in favor of the declaration. The vote to bar further 
discussions with Johnstone was indeed close, with influential 
men like Elbridge Gerry and Francis Dana of Massachusetts 
and Gouverneur Morris of New York voting against the 
resolution. 36 The close vote seemed to verify that 
numerous delegates wished not to of fend the English ministry 
by outright condemnation of one of its representatives. 
When the commissioners received news of the congres-
sional action, Carlisle, Eden, and Clinton penned a joint 
reply on August 26. They claimed no knowledge of Mr. 
Johnstone's activities until the information appeared in 
37 the July 21 issue of the Pennsylvania Packett. Their 
August 26 dispatch to Congress, however, was not a vindi• 
cation of their colleague, who they felt needed no support. 
In this dispatch to Congress, the remaining commissioners 
stated Johnstone's opinions on reconciliation. Paraphrasing 
Johnstone, the envoys claimed 
that the offers of great Britain were obviously 
adopted to promote and establish the liberties, peace, 
opulence, increase security and permanent happiness of 
the inhabitants of this continent, and that those 
blessings in an eq\lal degree were not to be expected 
from ~ny other connexion or mode of government what-
ever. 38 
36Ford, Journals of Congress, XI, 773-74. 
37carlisle MSS, p. 361; Roche, Joseph Reed, P• 141. 
38Great Britain. Qollection, Declaration by 
commissioners, August 26, 1778, Evans Bibliography, 15825, 35. 
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Johnstone, however, needed no support from his 
colleagues. On August 26, he personally answered his 
congressional critics with sarcasm and ridicule. He claimed 
not to be offended by the charges. It was a "mark of 
distinction" to which he was "by no means entitled." His 
intention had always been to promote reconciliation and to cb 
nothing to hinder it. In keeping with that aim, he decided 
to resign from the Carlisle Connnission and not to enter into 
further negotiations.39 
The resignation of Johnstone caused little interest 
in Congress. The Pennsylvania Packett even praised the 
former governor for relinquishing his position. In so 
doing, the editors believed that he had improved his good 
name. 40 But, in reality, Nr. Johnstone had caused more 
mischief than good as a negotiator. Because he incessantly 
advocated a reconciliation, his illicit negotiations did not 
trouble him. Since his secret discussions had achieved 
nothing, the only effect of his resignation was to lessen 
further the commission's prestige. To have an emissary 
resign during negotiations was not advantageous. 
39creat Britain. Collection, Johnstone•s answer to 
Congress, August 26, 1778, Evans Bibliography, 15825, 32-
33; Johnstone's answer to Congress, August 26, 1778, 
Stevens Facsimiles, XI, No. 1132. 
40The Pennsylvania Packett, September 17, 1778. 
At the time of George Johnstone•s resignation, a 
diplomatic scheme engaged the other commissioners. In 
August John Berkenhout and John Temple reached New York 
from England. Berkenhout, a physician and friend of 
Arthur Lee, was an agent for the Carlisle Commission. 41 
He assumed the guise of a British agent to Congress, 
friendly to the American cause. His associate, John 
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Temple--an American--had lived in England during much of 
the war. A Whig in political beliefs, he had volunteered 
to aid the commissioners in America. Fearing recognition, 
Temple travelled to Boston and remained in seclusion for 
42 the duration of the Carlisle Commission's stay. 
While Temple prepared to depart New York, his 
colleague, John-Berkenhout, remained active. Agent 
Berkenhout received t 300 from the army's secret service 
43 funds for expenses. Writing to Carlisle on August 20, 
1778, Eden could not see any advantage in sending Berkenhout 
to Philadelphia. He believed it would hinder rather than 
41Arthur Lee was a "militia diplomat" in Europe and 
the brother of Richard Henry Lee. 
42John Temple professed, in a letter to Samuel Adams 
on August 23, his amity for America and desire to remain in 
the colonies. Congress, however, suspected Temple of being 
a British ~gent. He appeared before Congress during December 
to defend himself on the charge of being a British agent. 
After three weeks of discussions with Congress, Temple left 
for England on December 20, 1778. Van Doren, Secret 
History, pp. 78-79, 106, and 115-16. 
43van Doren, Secret History, P• 106. 
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aid the commissioners.44 Yet Eden•s reservations did 
not dissuade Mr. Berkenhout. After obtaining a safe 
conduct pass from American General William Maxwell, the 
British agent reached Philadelphia on August 27. Due to 
his friendship with Arthur Lee and alleged support for 
America, Richard Henry Lee cordially greeted him. 
Berkenhout•s information from the British ministry included 
instructions on discovering the beliefs of colonials like 
Richard Henry Lee. He failed in this endeavor. Berkenhout 
continued in his sympath~tic role by promising to return to 
England to present America's cause to Parliament. 45 
Congress discovered Berkenhout's true purpose as 
an agent of the Carlisle Commission and brought him before 
the Supreme Executive Council of Pennsylvania on September 
3. Congress had learned through a London newspaper that 
Berkenhout was an agent. Imprisoned by the council, he 
was parolled on September 14, and reached New York five 
46 
days later. 
A diary kept by Berkenhout provided a clue to his 
beliefs and indicated the high cost of reconciliation. He 
assumed that bribery was one means of obtaining support 
44carlisle MSS, p. 360. -
45van Doren, Secret History, PP• 106-107. 
46rbid., pp.106-109. 
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for his cause. He also believed a well trained, provincial 
army could easily destroy Washington's band of thieves 
and vagrants. His resentment of the American cause, the 
Franco-American treaties, and Congress added additional 
encumbrances to an already overburdened mission. 47 
Carlisle and Eden had become further discouraged 
during August and September with the continuing indifferent 
attitude of the British ministry. George Germain reminded 
the envoys to be careful not to make any concessions contrary 
to those in their instructions. 48 King George concluded 
from the mission's early reports that negotiations seemed 
useless, even a ttjoke." To George III an evacuation of 
all the colonies seemed imminent unless there was a con-
centrated British attack upon French forces. With the 
defeat of France, all resources then could be arr.ayed against 
America. 49 
George III, with more enthusiasm, however, invoked 
the British agents on August 15 not to abandon the mission. 
Any just settlement by the emissaries, which he believed 
unlikely, would be confirmed completely by Parliament.so 
47Roche, Joseph Reed, p. 141; Van Doren, Secret 
History, PP• 109-10. 
48George Germain to commissioners, August 5, 1778, 
Stevens, Facsimiles, XI, No. 1124. 
49King George to Lord North, August 12, 1778, Donne, 
Correspondence of King George, II, 207. 
50Lucas, Lord North, I, 285. 
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Writing to Carlisle and Eden on September 2, Germain summed 
up the opinions of King George and the ministry. He urged 
Carlisle and Eden to continue their present course. The 
mission was to remain in the colonies until .. it exhausted 
every means for peace.51 
Ardent support came from mercantile interests in 
New York City. During August, several merchants penned a 
letter to the commissioners expressing their hope for a 
successful mission. The motive for their interest lay in 
the repeal of the Prohibitory Act of 1775-76. This act had 
f orbad cormnercial relations between the rebellious colonies 
and the British Empire. Under its provisions, the British 
captured colonial vessels and confiscated their cargoes. 
The act held the promise of open trade if any colony, town, 
or port demonstrated its loyalty to England. 52 The New 
York merchants claimed allegiance to England and promised 
to trade only articles not needed by the British armed 
forces. 53 
Carlisle and Eden replied to the merchants on August 
51stevens, Facsimiles, XI, No. 1142. 
52Barck and Lefler, Colonial America, p. 590. 
53The merchants' list of goods included tobacco, 
indigo, bees wax, flax seed, potash, lumber, dyewoods, 
furs, and oils. Great Britain. Collection, Letter written 
by merchants to commissioners, n. d., Evans Bibliography, 
15825, 41-42. 
29. 54 They assured the Americans of their desire for 
peace and an end to the embargo. The commissioners 
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promised to restore trade at the conclusion of hostilities. 55 
After more such promises of good faith, however, 
Carlisle, Eden, and Clinton, in a declaration to the 
merchants, agreed to suspend the Prohibitory Act for New 
York harbor. After September 26, New York merchants could 
trade with England, Ireland, Newfoundland, Quebec, the 
Floridas, and the British West Indies.56 The British 
emissaries deemed it advisable--both as a political overture 
and an economic measure--to remove valuable New York 
merchandise into the mercantile circulation of the British 
Empire. Although the envoys failed to obtain a commercial 
plan based upon more liberal principles, Carlisle and Eden 
believed this limited change in policy necessary and 
beneficial. The new policy was to be enforced for three 
months or tmtil the commissioners revoked it. 57 
54stevens, Facsimiles, XI, No. 1137. 
55Great Britain. Collection, Commissioners to New 
York merchants, August 29, 1778, Evans Bibliography, 15825, 43. 
56Great Britain. Collection, Commissioners' 
Declaration, September 17, 1778, Evans Bibliography, 15825, 45. 
57commissioners to George Germain, October 15, 1778 
and Commissioners concerning trade of New York, September 26, 
1778, Stevens, Facsimiles, XII and V, Nos. 1179 and 527. · 
Under this declaration, Andrew Elliott, Superintendent of 
the Port cf New York, had the authority to license any 
merchant, previously pardoned by the commissioners, to leave 
New York and transport commerce to the aforementioned 
colonies of the British Empire. Commissioners to Andrew 
Elliot, September 26, 1778, Stevens, Facsimiles, XI, No. 1166. 
During formulation of their September declaration, 
the commissioners also reported to the ministry. Their 
correspondence mentioned little hope for completion of 
their mission. But even if diplomacy foundered, they 
urged that England not relinquish its struggle. Only the 
French would gain from England's evacuation of the 
colonies. 58 The commissioners concluded with a final 
defense of Mr. Johnstone's actions. His sincere desire 
for a settlement had induced him to proceed on his own to 
aid the mission in achieving peace.59 Mr. Johnstone had 
left New York September 24 expressing hope for America's 
return to the mother country. 60 
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Eden and Carlisle concluded their September letters 
wit:h a criticism of Britain's military endeavors. The French 
fleet, as of September 21, was secure from British harass-
ment. The British fleets of Admiral Byron and Admiral 
Gambier were content to allow the French to remain in 
Boston harbor. 61 Eden and Carlisle contended that a British 
58Ritcheson, British Politics, PP• 281-82. 
59commissioners to George Germain, S~ptember 5, 1778, 
Stevens, Facsimiles, ZI, No. 1146. 
60George Johnstone to Carlisle, September 24, 1778, 
Carlisle ~' p. 369. 
61Admir~l Gambier had become commander of Admiral 
Howe's squadron on September 12, 1778. Carlisle to Rev. 
Ekin, October, 1778, Garlisle MSS, P• 386. 
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defeat of Estaing would be a double victory. The Americans 
would discover the inability of the French to remove the 
British menace, and the French would receive a loss in 
prestige. The English, however, allowed the Gallic forces 
to remain intact. 62 The commissioners believed a defeat 
of the French would serve to renew the loss of prestige by 
their mission. The Englishmen grasped any prospect that 
would improve their position. 
The failings of British naval and land forces and 
of the British ministry to bolster its mission led Carlisle 
to admit the inevitability of collapse of his mission. He 
confided in his diary late in September that an English 
victory lay only in the military humiliation of America. 
Since America did not wish to return to the British Empire 
peacefully, then the colonies must be made to suffer 
destruction. Due to the colonial agreements with France, 
America must be further confronted with pain and hardship.63 
Lack of success had obviously frustrated Carlisle 
and Eden. During the latter part of the sun:nner, their 
correspondence contained increasing bitterness. One of 
the commissioners had been disgraced, the French fleet and 
62Ibid.; commissioners to George Gennain, September 
21, 1778, Carlisle £!.§..§., p. 386. 
63carlisle Ninutes, September 29, 1778, Stevens, 
Facsimiles, V, No. 529. 
American forces were still active, and the prestige of 
Congress continued to increase at the expense of the 
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Carlisle Commission. Yet the envoys had one last alternative--
their October Nanif esto. 
CHAPTER VII 
PRESENTATION AND REJECTION OF THE 
OCTOBER MANIFESTO, 1778 
The summer of 1778 had failed to witness successful 
peace negotiations or alleviation of the commission's 
difficulties. Secret negotiations by Mr. Johnstone, the 
ineffective activity of Loyalists, and the lethargic 
attitude of the British ministry handicapped the mission. 
Neither a cessation of hostilities nor a signed concil· 
iatory agreement existed between the adversaries. But even 
with the October Manifesto, a new and final peace overture, 
the Carlisle Commission's ·problems increased. 
Letters from North and Germain irritated the envoys 
with increased criticisms of the mission. Added to this 
was the lack of Loyalist support for the emissaries. The 
evacuation of Philadelphia, arrests of numerous British 
sympathizers, and inability of the commissioners to aid 
Loyalists negated their trust in the mission. For example, 
Joseph Galloway, an avowed Loyalist, requested the release 
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of several colleagues confined in a dungeon "by the usurped 
Powers of Pennsylvania for High Treason." Yet this October 
2 request that the British emissaries intercede in behalf 
of John Roberts, James Stevens, and Abraham Carlisle 
1 
failed. The peace commissioners, Galloway believed, had 
only raised futile hopes. Carlisle and Eden were not to 
be trusted; they talked only "political nonesense.n Never-
theless, Galloway continued advocating compromise with 
hopeless persistence. The British agents in America had 
failed him, but Galloway embarked for England in October, 
1778, still anxious for reconciliation.2 
While other Americans assailed the mission as a 
means to overthrow the colonial government, the Marquis 
de Lafayette took it as a personal insult. As early as 
September 24, 1778, Lafayette had related to Washington 
3 that French honor was at stake. Still the most prominent 
Frenchman in America, Lafayette challenged Carlisle to an 
October duel. Washington reported to Estaing, on October 
2, that the Marquis' challenge was a nfresh instance of 
his sensibility for the honor of his Nation.n Like Estaing 
Washington cautioned the Frenchman to save himself for 
1stevens, Facsimiles, XI, No. 1170. 
2Boyd, Anglo-American Union, P• 71. 




Carlisle, however, refused to accept the duel and 
claimed. that he was not responsible to any individual for 
his statements. Lafayette had challenged him chiefly 
because his name appeared at the head of the commission. 5 
Carlisle claimed that he was "solely answerablen to his 
country and king. 6 Lafayette later admitted that Carlisle 
was right but believed he would have gained prestige by 
risking his life fo~ the honor of France. 7 
Following this brief diversion from official peace 
efforts, the Carlisle Connnission tried nto head off a 
humiliating failure for their mission" by issuing its final 
appeal oo. October 3. 8 The purpose of the "Manifesto and 
Proclamation" was to restate and clarify some of the points 
previously mentioned. The declaration warned the colonists 
of further troubles if they continued to condone the war. 
"i\nd we once more remind the members of the Congress that 
they are responsible to their countrymen, to the world, and 
41.Jashington to Lafayette, October 4, 1778, Fitzpatrick, 
Writings of Washington, XIII, 9, 12, and 19-20. 
5charlemagne Tower, The Marquis de la Fayette in the 
American Revolution with Some Account Of tne Attitude or--
France toward the Ware;! Y!i.dependence (Philadelphia: J:-B. 
Lippincott company-;-I'92'i>), II, 35. 
6carl1sle to Lafayette, October 11, 1778, Stevens, 
Fac&imiles, XI, No. 1175. 
7Tower, Harguis de la Fayette, II, 35. 
8Einhorn, "Reception of the British Peace C0tmnission," 
p. 2.09. 
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to God, for the continuance of this war, and for all the 
miseries with which it must be attended." Carlisle claimed 
Congress had no authority to reject the proposal for an 
end to taxation without the colonial assemblies' approval. 9 
The only taxation would be for the regulation of commerce. 
and the duties obtained would be used by the colonies for 
internal improvements. 10 This was meant to emphasize and 
clarify the tax portion of the North Conciliatory Plan. 11 
Since Congress had refused to cooperate, the envoys 
believed an open appeal was the only alternative. Although 
the emissaries maintained that England denounced all attempts 
at dividing the American people, the commissioners still 
encouraged any person, including the military, to condemn 
12 the war and return to the fold. The offer of pardon 
excluded judges and "officers of civil justice" who had 
9Great Britain. Collection, Commissioners' 
Proclamation, October 3, 1778, Evans Bibliography, 15825, 
49; Stevens, Facsimiles, XI, No. 1172. 
lOGreat Britain. Draught of a Bill for declaring the 
intentions of the Parliament of Great Brrtain; concerning---
the exercise-ot"the righf of liiiposing taxes wicliin his 
ma-est ts colonies;' Prov nces, and Plantations in North-
America Pniladelphia: Macdonalcrind Cameron, 1718), Evans 
Bibliography, 15828. 
llsupra, pp. 26-27. 
12commissioners' Proclamation, October 3, 1778, 
Stevens, Facsimiles, XI, No. 1172. 
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executed persons loyal to England.13 
If neither the Congress nor the people adhered to 
these offers, "laws of self-preservation" would prescribe 
British retaliation. If the Americans rejected the proposals, 
Britain would not be held responsible for the events to 
14 . 
follow. After France entered the affair, the struggle 
had become more than just a ttfamily quarrel." Now, Britain 
warned, America must suffer the consequences of such a~ 
alliance.15 
The manifesto closed with a request that all civil 
and military personnel aid nus in the execution of this 
our Manifesto and Proclamation and of all the matters herein 
contained." The commission promised to send copies, written 
in English and German, to all the colonial assemblies and 
to Congress. This direct offer to the American people took 
on the aspect of an ultimatum. The offer of October 3 w~st 
16 be accepted by November 11, 1778. 
13others included were prisoners at the time of the 
October Manifesto, and those who became prisoners after the 
issuance of the document. Great Britain. Collection, 
Commissioners' Proclamation, October 3, 1778, Evans 
Bibliography, 15825, 50 and 53-54. 
14Great Britain. Collection, Conmiissioners' 
Proclamation, October 3, 1778, Evans Bibliography, 15825, 
51-52. 
15arown, Empire .2! Independence, PP• 284-85. 
16Great Britain. Collection, Commissioners' 
Proclamation, October 3, 1778, Evans Bibliography, 15825, 
54-55. 
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Before that time agents of the commissioners would 
circulate copies of the proclamation under flags of truce. 
Congress, however, considered this a violation of colonial 
law and recommended that the agents be seized.17 Admiral 
Gambier, the new commander-in-chief of British naval forces 
in North America, nevertheless appointed vessels to carry 
the documents and the agents to the various colonies. 18 
The American response to this latest endeavor was 
not long in coming. William H. Drayton of South Carolina 
renewed previous colonial arguments. The offers of England, 
compared to France, were nil. England had better "look at 
home" before accusing France of any wrongdoing. 19 Another 
colonial citizen called the commissioners' attempt na 
Begging performance.n20 The Pennsxlvania Evening~ 
paralleled the Packett in its views. The latest issuance 
demonstrated the contempt which England maintained for 
America. 21 
Such adverse newspaper reactions, however, failed to 
discourage the commissioners. For the first time in many 
17Pitkin, Political and Civil Historx, II, 58-59. 
18commissioners to Admiral Gambier, October 3, 1778, 
Stevens, Facsimiles, XI, No. 1173. 
19~ Virginia Gazette, October 9, 1778. 
20The Pennsylvania Packett, Octber 15, 1778. 
21The Pennsylvania Evening f.2!!, October 16, 1778. 
weeks, the envoys expressed cautious optimism in their 
October 15 letter to George Germain. With a pardon for 
treasonable acts, the Americans had the opportunity to 
return to the favor of England. Another purpose of the 
proclamation was to end the insults and to disavow any 
further expectations for concessions. It would also 
leave in the colonies "an Impression • • • of the 
Benevolence" and good will of Great Britain. The time 
seemed most appropriate for this public appeal due to the 
increasing disgust between France and America.22 
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Almost before the British envoys concluded their 
letter to Germain, a congressional committee reported its 
action on the latest British offer. This committee, composed 
of Gouverneur Morris, William Duer, John Mathews, Richard 
Henry Lee, and Elbridge Gerry, repeated that Congress, on 
April 22, 1778, had already resolved that any persons who 
made any agreement with the commissioners nought to be 
considered Enemies of the United States." The purpose of 
the October declaration was merely to revive animosities 
and encourage rebellion among the colonials. Congress, 
22stevens, Facsimiles, XII, No. 1178. Among reasons 
for increased distrust between the allies was a recent 
incident between General Sullivan and Count Estaing. 
Sullivan blamed Estaing for failing to support him in an 
attack on Newport, Rhode Island in August, 1778. The 
attack never occurred due to Estaing's having to flee for 
fear of capture by Howe's fleet. Barck and Lefler, Colonial 
.t\merica, p. 632. 
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therefore, would never honor the flags of truce*23 
Despite these early colonial reactions, the 
commission dispatched several agents with copies of the 
"Manifesto and Proclamation." On October 17, Governor 
Patrick Henry of Virginia received the information from 
Major Thomas Mathews, commander of Fort Henry. The latter 
reported that a British officer had arrived at the fort 
with copies of the proclamation for the speaker of the 
legislature, several officers in Virginia, and ministers 
24 
of the gospel. British officer John Hay learned, however, 
that the Virginia response regarded the dispatches as 
"calculated to divide and mislead the good People of this 
country.rr25 The Virginia legislature resolved that Governor 
Henry inform Mathews to order the British officer to leave 
Virginia. 26 
Some agents were not as fortunate as Hay. Pilot 
Welbank's sloop wrecked, and he found himself confined 
23Ford, Journals of Congtess, XII, 1013 and 1015; 
Congress Resolutions, October lb, 1778, Stevens, Facsimiles, 
XII, No. 1186. William Duer was a delegate from New York; 
John Mathews was delegate from South Carolina; and Elbridge 
Gerry was a delegate from Massachusetts. Burnett, Letters 
.££.Members. III, lvi, lxi, and liv. 
24Henry, Patrick Henry, I, 567. 
25Report of John Hay, October 29, 1778, Stevens, 
Facsimiles, XII, No. 1198. 
26Henry, Patrick Henry, I, 567. 
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to a prison in Philadelphia. Under a flag of truce Welbank 
was to have travelled to Delaware to deliver a copy of the 
manifesto to the assembly. Another agent failed to reach 
Annapolis, Maryland. Adam Ferguson then had to personally 
send a copy to Governor Thomas Johnson.27 
The physical difficulties encountered by British 
agents and the rejection of the declaration provided anti• 
British propagandists with more ammunition. Thomas Paine, 
in an October 20 letter to the commissioners, denounced the 
offer as a "stupidity which conceals you from yourselves" 
and "exposes you to ••• contempt." He believed Britain's 
attitude toward the Franco-American agreement was ridiculous. 
France had provided America with a generous and noble treaty. 
"In France, we have found an affectionate friend and faithful 
ally: in Britain nothing but tyranny, cruelty and infidelity." 
Thomas Paine mentioned England's rejection of America's 
petitions, her unjust laws, and her advocacy for war. 
Britain disdained to offer independence as a means to peace. 
Yet if England were to remain in existence, she had best now 
ask for sustenance. Paine completely summed up the colonial 
philosophy in one sentence. 11We now stand on higher ground, 
and offer her peace; and the time will come when sh~, perhaps 
27Adam Ferguson to Henry Laurens, October 26, 1778, 
James Dick (Connnissar of Naval Prisoners) to John Beatty, 
October 27, 1778, Stevens, Facsimiles, XII, Nos. 1193 and 
1194. 
in vain, will ask it from us.n28 
In a more sarcastic article on November 21, 1778, 
Paine ridiculed the emissaries for not following their 
instructions from England. Their original commission had 
authorized them to conduct a peaceful settlement. He 
claimed that they had disavowed their instructions by 
threatening America with total destruction. Therefore, 
147 
to disobey the rules of their mission was treason. It was 
useless for the mother country to lay waste to the colonies 
in order to harm France, for that would insure America's 
/ need for further materiel and military aid from France. 
"In short, had you cast about for a plan on purpose to enrich 
your enemies you could not have hit upon a better.n29 
Paine was too harsh in his condemnation of the British 
manifesto. The cormnissioners only threatened retaliation 
and not total destruction if America rejected the October 
Manifesto and continued receiving aid from France. 
William Henry Drayton and David Ramsay, both of 
South Carolina, were not above using propaganda. Through 
newspaper articles and speeches they helped to supplement 
the writings of the more prolific propagandists like Pane. 
28ncrisis :/f:IV," in Political Writings of Paine, 
157-59, 161, and 164. 
29ncrisis 1foVIl," in Political Writings .2f Paine, 
r~ 183-84. 
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The essays of Drayton, under the title of "An American," 
in the Pennsylvania Packett were well received. Drayton 
addressed his October essay to General Clinton, accusing 
the British of fraud in their dealings with the colonials. 
Britain's recent tactics caused the colonials to denounce 
as never before authority of England over America.30 
Ramsay believed that the insincerity of the emissaries had 
led to their failure. The ineffectiveness of all British 
proposals actually aided in creating a more complete unity 
between France and America.31 
In addition to these enthusiastic spokesmen, other 
leaders of colonial independence ridiculed Britain's latest 
endeavor. Washington, in a letter to his brother Samuel 
claimed that the British declaration more than implied the 
lack of human feelings within the commissioners. In another 
dispatch, Washington warned President Laurens that the 
British effort was meant to awaken the worst fears of the 
colonials. The envoys needed no aid from America to 
accelerate their certain "political death. 0 The general 
informed Count Estaing that he believed the emissaries' 
30philip Davidson, Propaganda and The American 
Revolution 1763-1783 (Chapel Hill, North 'Carolina: 
University o~ Nortfi'"""Carolina Press, 1941), p. 351; 
Pennsylvania Packett, October, 1778. 
31Ramsay, History of Revolution, I, 80. 
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declaration would be their last. 32 Like his fellow 
Virginian, Richard Henry Lee was very vehement in his 
criticism of the latest proposal. Lee recommended that 
all agents of the commissioners be seized and imprisoned 
for so vile a mission. He believed also that the flags of 
truce must be ignored.33 
Josiah Bartlett presented a more moderate estimate 
of the situation than Richard Henry Lee. The delegate 
from New Hampshire claimed that as long as the mother 
country had hope for an American submission the war would 
continue. England had to realize that the colonies 
endorsed the Franco-American alliance and the rejection 
of the Carlisle Commission's proposals. Bartlett thus 
urged each colonial legislature to pass resolutions approving 
the aforementioned points. To demonstrate the colonies' 
loyalty to Congress, an acknowledgement of its power to 
make alliances, treaties, peace, and war was necessary. 
Once the British realized this situation, England would 
be in the position to rectify the differences of opinion.34 
32washington to Samuel Washington, October 22, 1778, 
Washington to President Laurens, October 23, 1778, and 
Washington to Count Estaing, October 27, 1778, Fitzpatrick, 
Writings .Qf Washington, XIII, 129-33 and 169-70. 
33Richard Henry Lee to John Adams, Octber 29, 1778, 
Ballagh, Letters of Richard Henry~' I, 447. 
34Josiah Bartlett to John Langdon, October 27, 1778, 
Burnett, Letters of Members, III, 466-67. 
Writing in the Virginia Gazette, one of Bartlett's 
colleagues in Congress was vehement in his accusations. 
"Americanus,n as he entitled himself, maintained that the 
":t-lanifesto and Proclamationrr was the connnissioners' last, 
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dying attempt. He dismissed its denunciations of Congress 
as an effort to improve the English position. The manifesto 
stated that Congress lacked authority·in signing treaties. 
"Americanus" disagreed by claiming that the still to be 
ratified Articles of Confederation granted this power only 
to Congress. He was astonished by the envoys' approval 
of a more brutal war, if America continued to refuse 
England's declarations. After three years of cruelty 
America was to experience an even harsher conflict. To 
expect the colonies to support the British at this time 
was ridiculous. He further claimed that .Americe not only 
had withstood England's armies but also had the power to 
oppose her "artifices." The writer insisted that if 
England granted independence, harmony would reign.35 
On October 30, 1778, Congress echoed the sentiments 
of "Americanus." The delegates unanimously condemned the 
proclamation for having attempted to seduce the American 
. 
people. The delegates appealed to individuals to join 
35~ Virginia Gazette, October 30, 1778. "Americanusn 
was either Gouverneur Morris or Samuel Adams according to 
Sparks, ~ of Gouverneur t·1orris, I, 188. 
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Congress against England. If too few responded, then 
devestation of the colonies was inevitable.36 Since 
England had failed in military subjugation of the colonials, 
she had resorted to bribery and deceit. If England per-
sisted in this endeavor, Congress promised "such exemplary 
vengeance as" to "deter others from a like conduct.n37 
Having anticipated disappointing results from their 
final proclamation, Eden and Carlisle spent the few remaining 
days of their mission completing preparations for departure. 
Carlisle and Eden sent a note to Germain seeking explanations 
for recent poor conmrunications with the ministry. Their 
September 21 letter had requested authority to embark for 
England if nothing of consequence occurred to detain them.38 
Due to the commissioners' continued, unprofitable venture, 
they requested Admiral Gambier to book passage for them on 
the Roebuck. If there was no change in America reactions 
by the end of November, England's peace envoys would say 
39 
farewell to America. 
36Niles, Principles and Acts of Revolution, pp. 476-77. 
37congress Manifesto, October 30, 1778, Stevens, 
Facsimiles, XII, No. 1199. 
38unknown to them at the time, Germain's reply had 
already left that decision to them. Germain to commissioners, 
November 4, 1778, Stevens, Facsimiles, XII, No. 1206. 
39carlisle and Eden to Germain, November 15, 1778, 
!!?.!.£., No. 1213. 
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With preparations completed, the envoys brought 
their correspondence to a close. Their final dispatch 
to Germain included an account of their October Manifesto. 
They reported that a few to'tvns, like Hartford, Connecticut, 
had printed the decree but with little favorable response. 
Officials in New Jersey, Virginia, Maryland, and Delaware. 
ridiculed the copies. No reports reached the commissioners 
from Hassachusetts Bay, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, New 
York, Georgia, and the Carolinas. The emissaries believed 
that there were many people who condoned the British more 
than the French, but fearing retaliation by othex colonials 
they had not come forward. Former governor of New Jersey, 
40 
William Franklin, reported this news to his friend Eden. 
The commissioners took some comfort in this. They feared 
that a free America might demand payment for losses and 
expenses incurred during the war. Not even independence, 
they warned, would mean an end to Great Britain's 
41 
dilemmas. 
The emissaries concluded their final correspondence 
to Germain with an account of their appointment of General 
40william Franklin was held by the Americano and 
having been exchanged for John NcKinley, colonial president 
of Delaware, returned to New York in October, 1778. Van 
Doren, Secret Historx, p. 114. 
41 
Commissioners to Germain, November 16, 1778, 
Stevens, Facsimiles, XII, No. 1215. 
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Archibald Campbell as a governor and commander-in-chief. 
In the first usage of such power granted to the commission 
by the Bx·itish ministry, they had ordered Campbell to 
quell the rebellion in Georgia, and if successful, to march 
into South Carolina. He was in command of that part of 
General Clinton's forces assigned to the West Indies and 
h h 1 . 42 t.e sout em co onies. 
Seeing Congress without the necessary strength to 
protect them, the people of Georgia would denounce the 
American rebellion. If the inhabitants failed to respond 
and disregarded Campbell's authority, the commissioners 
ordered him to abandon his mission. This was a final exper-
iment to gain support within the colonies. If the plan 
succeeded in one section of the colonies, it had the 
possibility of extending into other colonies. Admitting 
that it was a gamble, the envoys were not surprised when 
Campbell's mission achieved only limited success. 43 
After this failure to gain the support of any large 
section of the population, there remained only one group 
which openly sympathized with the emissaries. The New 
42supra, p. 53 ; Willcox, American Rebellion, pp. 
105-06. 
43commissioners to Archibald Campbell, November, 
1778, Commissioners to Campbell, November 3, 1778, and 
Commissioners to Germain, November 16, 1778, Stevens, 
Facsimiles, XII, Nos. 1202, 1205, and 1216. 
York City merchants and traders expressed regre~ at the 
departure of Carlisle and William Eden. The sincerity of 
their position was based upon what the British were able 
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to do for them. In a petition to Carlisle and Eden, the 
merchants' spokesman, William Walton, eA'Pressed gratitude 
for allowing loyal New Yorkers commercial privileges.44 
Since September 26, 1778, more than t one million worth 
of materiel had passed through the port. The merchants 
now asked for a renewal of the act and for complete impor-
tation of goods from all British ports. On November 18, 
the British agents granted the extension. Any vessel with 
licenses and legal clearance from any British port. had the 
right to sail to New York and Rhode Island. The envoys, 
moreover, suspended the Prohibitory Act of 1775-1776 for 
the port of New York. Once the merchants obtained their 
goals, they expressed hope that the unnatural alliance 
with France would eventually unite the empire in an attempt 
to nrender abortive a confederacy that threatens ruin to 
the civil and religious llberty of mankind.11 45 
44supra, pp. 133-34. 
45Merchants and Traders of New York (by Wm. Walton) 
to Commission Commissioners, November 14, 1778, Answer and 
Proclamation of Commissioners, November 18, 1778, and 
Inhabitants of New York to Commissioners, November 23, 
177&, Stevens, Facsimiles, XII, Nos. 1212 and 1226. 
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Yet the hopelessness of their situation finally 
forced the emissaries to embark for England. They realized 
that Britain's offers for a settlement had failed to entice 
the Congress or any large portion of the population. 
Instead of weakening Congress, the envoys' six month 
stay had enhanced its role and reputation. 46 On November 
27, 1778, Carlisle and Eden embarked upon the Roebuck, 
unsure of the effects of turmoil in Parliament caused by 
their mission. 47 
During November and December, Parliament spent 
much of its time discussion Mr. Johnstone and the October 
Manifesto. On Johnstone's return to England, he appeared 
before the House of Commons to def end his actions in America. 
He denied to the legislators on November 26 that he ever 
attempted to bribe Joseph Reed. He believed rather that 
the failure of Congress to have Reed reveal Mrs. Ferguson's 
name further incriminated Reed and helped clear his own 
48 
reputation. 
When Johnstone's speech reached America, Mrs. 
46willcox, Portrait of ~ General, p. 112. 
47carlisle to Lady Carlisle, November 17, 1778, 
Carlisle, l•iSS, p. 390; Van Doren, Secret History, p. 114; 
Ritcheson,~itish Politics, p. 283. 
48Roche, Joseph Reed, p. 142; Pitkin, Political and 
Civil History, P• 56. 
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Ferguson published her own account of the discussions in 
February, 1779. Furthermore, Reed vindicated himself by 
publishing, in September, 1779, all the documents involved 
in the issue. 49 The publication of all this material 
failed to taint the repurtations of either Reed or Johnstone. 
Mrs. Ferguson seemed the only one harmed by the publicity, 
for her property was subsequently confiscated. The .American 
leaders, however, decided that she was merely indiscreet 
rather than guilty of wrong doing.so 
Mr. Johnstone, meanwhile, became a rabid supporter 
of the Tory faction in Commons. The Virginia Gazette 
reported that Johnstone favored a complete military effort 
by all British forces to gain a victory in .America. 51 
Johnstone, who had never connnanded a vessel, was made 
commodore of a squadron off the Portuguese coast in May, 
1779. 52 
George Johnstone's appearance before Parliament 
was a small matter compared to the discussions ensuing 
between the factions over the commissioners failure. His 
troubles, however, brought the plight of the mission into 
49Pitkin, Political and Civil Historx, p. 56. 
50van Doren, Secret Historx, P• 104. 
51The Virginia Gazette, February 12, 1779. 
52van Doren, Secret Historx, p. 114. 
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clearer perspective. Charles James Fox expressed in 
Commons the feelings of numerous Whigs by conderrning 
Britain's actions toward America. To Fox the failure in 
war as well as in diplomacy seemed complete. 53 He insisted 
that it was best to withdraw troops from North America and 
laun.ch an extensive attack against France. To destroy 
France would be the best means of detaching America from 
54 her ally. 
Discussions among the various factions became more 
intense with the presentation of the commissioners' "Manifesto 
and Proclamation" of October 3. Lord Rockingham raised 
objections to this declaration on December 7, 1778. He 
claimed such a paper was too distasteful to be condoned. 
It was "totally repugnant to every principle of christianity, 
morality, and good policy." Because of America's ties with 
France and failure of reconciliation, England was now asked 
to wage a savage war against her colonies. To sanction a 
harsh retaliation, as the manifesto urged, was barbaric. 
The October Manifesto proved that all thoughts of affiliation 
between the two countries was past. Like Rockingham, 
Richmond and the Earl of Shelburne agreed that the procla-
mation seemed to limit further opportunity for reunification 
199. 
53Hammond, Charles James Fox, pp. 213-14. 
54Russell, Memorials and Correspondence of Fox, I, 
of England and America. Shelburne insisted that the 
American Congress was correct in condemning the final 
offers. 55 
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There were those, however, who supported the October 
off er of peace by threat of retaliation. The Earl of 
Suf~olk felt Rockingham had misjudged the purpose of the 
proclamation. It only pointed out what the colonies might 
expect if they persisted in tttheir unnatural alliance with 
France." Suffolk insisted that the motive behind this offer 
was for self-preservation and not revenge. The Earl of 
Abingdon and Lord Chancellor Thurlow also rejected the 
views of those who criticized the declaration. To presume 
that England would even now abandon her former possessions 
with a number of its inhabitants supporting the British 
56 
crown was unthinkable. 
Moreover, Carlisle, Eden, and Clinton received much 
personal criticism for their actions. Shelburne complained 
that lack of success was due to generals, ministry, and 
"ambassadors." Yet Earl· Gower, Carlisle's father-in•law, 
claimed that no man was more willing to end the cruelties 
and hostilities than his son-in-law. The commissioners' 
declaration held out a return to "tranquility." It only 
55Hansard, Parliamentary History, XX, 1-2, 4-5, 7, 
17, and 30-32. 
56Ibid., pp. 8, 12, and 36-37. 
pointed out the risks the inhabitants ran if they failed 
to heed England's pleadings.57 
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Even statements from family and close friends were 
not abundant. One Tory supporter, calling himself 
"Philarethes," maintained that the envoys deserved the 
highest praise. He believed the envoys were honorable in 
all their dealings. Congress was to blame for the continued 
war. The emissaries had proposed every conciliatory offer 
available to them. 58 But the envoys received only token 
acclaim from Lord North and King George. North only 
connnended the envoys for their personal sacrifices. Both 
expressed regret at the failure of the mission and voiced 
pleasure at the safe return of their countrymen.59 
Carlisle and Eden were clearly disappointed by 
British debate on failure of the mission and the cool 
reception upon their return to England. Neither Eden nor 
Carlisle were in good spirits when they arrived at Plymouth 
December 20, 1778. Eden was seasick and ill-tempered nruch 
of the voyage. Carlisle.remained depressed. The subsequent 
rewards offered to Carlisle and Eden even failed to ease 
57rbid., pp. 31 and 15-16. 
58Moore, Diary of Revolution, II, 98-100. 
59From the General Advertiser and :Morning Intelligencer, 
November 27, 1778, arrived at Philadelphia, February 6, 1779, 
Evans Bibliography, 15836; Lucas, Lord North, II, 63. 
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their distress. The latter refused to return to Commons in 
February, not wishing to face an interrogation by his 
former colleagues. He requested rather that his wife be 
appointed to an off ice at court and receive a pension of 
t 600 a year. Lord North and King George agreed. The 
British government in 1779 appointed Carlisle president of 
the Board of Trade. A year later he became Lord Lieutenant 
of Ireland with Eden his chief secretary.60 
These promised rewards, however, did not lessen the 
commissioners' resentment. Carlisle and Eden threatened to 
reveal to the Brit.ish people the situation in America at 
61 the time of their arrival. They focused the blame for 
failure of the mission on Germain and North. 62 The two 
envoys insisted that they had adequately discharged their 
duties. They expected a lack of support from the Americans, 
but not from the English ministry. Realizing the intensity 
of their resentment, North alked Eden not to publish the 
commission's findings. Although an.investigation would 
surely embarrass the ministry and vindicate them, Carlisle 
and Eden reluctantly agreed. But it was many months before 
60van Doren, Secret History, pp. 114-115; Lucas, 
.!&.!!! North, II, 64. 
61Brown, Empire .2,!: Independence, pp. 289·90. 
62Namier and Btm>ke, History of Parliament, II, 376. 
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the envoys' bitterness subsided. 63 
Even the co11llllission's last resort, an open appeal 
to the American people, had garnered little support. By 
autumn, 1778, a majority of the colonials, like Congress, 
had condemned the cormnissioners' proposals for not offering 
independence. The Loyalists were either too frightened of 
their adversaries or too discouraged to respond to the final 
British pleadings. Unable to persuade Congress to accept 
their offers, the British envoys likewise had failed to 
intimidate the anti-British colonials. The Carlisle 
Cormnission's return and reception in England ended six 
months of frustration and disappointment in America. 
63Brown, Empire or Independence, pp. 289-90; 
Brown, "British Peace Otter," P• 259. 
CONCLUSION 
The British ministry's interest in reconciliation 
was genuine. For three years the British had waged an 
ineffective war in America. With defeat of General 
Burgoyne and an eventual Franc~-American treaty, some in 
the ministry were finally aroused from their lethargy and 
began to condone the possibility of reconciliation~ 
Dreading a Franco-American military and commercial treaty, 
Lord Treasurer North commenced work on a plan to off set 
such an alliance. 
The initial interest in conciliation led Lord North 
to present his plan to Parliament, believing it was the 
only logical means for ending the war. For a conservative 
ministry, the plan was most liberal. In offering freedom 
from taxation, pardons for treasonous acts, and just 
commercial ties, the ministry and George III advocated a 
discontinuance of Britain's coercive policy. Although 
America had always been subject to England's complete 
demands, by 1778 the British ministry realized that 
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negotiations, King George and his ministers had undermined 
the mission. The British envoys always believed that 
military force enhanced their bargaining position. The 
evacuation of troops from Philadelphia, however, demon-
strated to the colonials the weakness of England's position 
:i.n ~\merica. In order to provide troops for the West Indies, 
the British undermined the Carlisle Connnission and its 
position in America. To strengthen one strategic area at 
the expense of another was a poor tactic. 
The British government defended its action by reason 
of military strategy and security. But the defense is less 
than convincing. Alan S. Brown adequately summed up reasons 
for English failure by stating that "only human shortsight-
edness can explain why the absurdity of trying to conciliate 
while retreating" did not penetrate the minds of the 
l ministry. The commissioners expected a lack of support 
from the Americans, but not from the English ministry. The 
order to evacuate Philadelphia, for which Carlisle and Eden 
never forgave the ministry, diminished the chance for a 
successful mission. 
Failure to inform the commissioners of evacuation 
was only a part of the reason for the commission's unproductive 
endeavor. Connnissioner George Johnstone's secret discussions 
larown> TTBritish Peace Offer, 0 P• 259. 
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and bribe attempt engendered colonial contempt for the 
mission. Colonial distrust for the commission also hampered 
the presentation of the British October Manifesto. This 
direct appeal to the people failed to discredit Congress. 
Instead of weakening Congress, the commissioners'. six 
month sojourn had enhanced its role and reputation. 
Furthermore, the lethargic attitude and lack of a unified 
spirit within the English government hindered negotiations 
by injecting pessimistic beliefs into the thinking of the 
emissaries. Even Lord North can be blamed for some of the 
confusion surrounding the conciliatory plan. Although he 
advocated and developed a policy of reconciliation, North 
doubted success and failed to provide enthusiastic support 
for the commissioners. Concern over his inability to 
achieve a workable colonial policy had impeded his work as 
Lord Treasurer. In fact, he had offered to resign. 2 
After taking into consideration the previous mentioned 
points, the principal reason for the conciliatory plan's 
ineffectiveness still lay in the ministry's reluctance to 
offer independence. Failing to understand the basic issue 
of the war, the English ministry doomed the North Concil-
iatory Plan cf 1778 from its inception. 
2Fortescue, Correspondence of George Ill, IV, Nos. 
2179 and 2247. 
APPENDIX A 
GREAT BRITAIN. COLLECTION OF PAPERS, THAT 
HAVE BEEN PUBLISHED AT DIFFERENT TiliES, 
RELATING TO THE PROCEEDINGS OF HIS 
MAJESTY'S C0?-1MISSIONERS, ETC., 
ETC., ETC. 
George III by the grace of God, Great-Britain, 
France and Ireland, King, Defender, the Faith, to our 
right trufty and right well-beloved coufin and counfellor, 
Frederick, Earl of Carlisle, Knight of the moft ancient 
Order of the Thitfle; our right trufty and well-beloved 
Counfellor, Richard, Earl Vifcount Howe, of our Kingdom 
of Ireland; our trufty and well-beloved Sir William Howe, 
Knight of the moft honourable Order of the Bath, Lieutenant 
feveral of our forces, feveral and Commander in Chief of 
all and f ingular our forces employed or to be employed 
within our colonies in North America, lying upon the 
Atlantic Ocean, from Nova-Scotia on the North, to West 
Florida on the South, both inclufive; William Eden, Efq. 
one of our Commiffioners for Trade and Plantations, and 
George Johnstone, Efquire, Captain in our Royal Navy. 
Greetings: 
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Whereas in and by our Commiffion and Letters Patent 
under Our Great Seal of Great-Britain, bearing date on or 
abot1t the fifth day of May, in the fixteenth year of our 
reign, We did, out of our eameft defire, to deliver all 
our fubjects and every part of the dominions belonging 
to our crown, from the calamities of war, and to reftore 
them to our protection and peace, nominate and oppoint our 
right trufty and well-beloved coufin and counfellor, 
Richard Lord Vifcount Howe, your Kingdom of Ireland, and 
our trufty and well-beloved William Howe, Efq; now Sir 
William Howe, Knight of the Bath, Major General of our 
forces, and General of our forces in North America only, 
and each of them jointly and feverally, to be our commif-
fioner and commiffioners, in that behalf to perform and 
execute all the powers and authorities, in and by the said 
connniffion and letter patent entrufted and committed to 
them, and each of them, according to the tenor of fuch 
letters patent, and of fuch further inftructions, as they 
should from time to time receive, under our fignet and fign 
manual, to have, hold, execute, and enjoy, the faid office 
and place, offices and places, of our commissioner and 
Commissioners, as therein mentioned with all rights, 
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members and oppurtenances, thereunto belonging; together 
with all and fingular the powers and authorities thereby 
granting unto them, the f aid Lord Vif count Howe and General 
William Howe, and each of them, for and during our will 
and pleafure, and no longer in fuch manner and form, as 
in and by our faid recited commiffion and letters patent, 
relation being thereunto had, may, among divers other 
things therein contained, more fully and at large appear. 
And whereas, for the quieting and extinguifhing of divers 
jealouf ies and apprehenf ions of danger to their liberties 
and rights, which have alarmed many of our fubjects in 
the colonies, provinces, and plantations of New Hampfhire, 
Maffachufets Bay, Rhode Ifland, Connecticut, New York, 
New Jerfey, Pennfylvania, with the three lower counties 
on Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South 
Carolina, and Georgia; and for the fuller manifeftation 
of our juft and gracious purpofes, and thofe of our 
Parliament, to maintain and fecure all our fubjects in the 
clear and perfect enjoyment of their liberties and rights: 
It is in and by a certain act, made and paffed in this 
prefent feffion of Parliament intituled, "an act to enable 
his Majefty to appoint commiffioners, with fufficient powers 
to treat, confult, and agree upon the means of quieting 
the diforders now fubfifting in certain of the colonies, 
plantations and provinces of North America," among other 
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things enacted that it phace and may be lawful for his 
Majefty, from time to time, by letters patent, under the 
Great Feal of Great Britain to authorife and empower five 
able fufficient persons, or any three of them, to do, and 
perform fuch acts and things, and to ufe and exercife fuch 
authorities and powers, as in the faid act a r e for that 
purpose mentioned, provided and created. And whereas, we 
are eamef tly def irous to carry into full and perf ectiori 
execution the feveral juf t and gracious purpofes above 
mentioned: 
Now know ye, that we have revoked and determined; 
and by thef e prefents do revoke and determine our faid 
recited connniffion and letters patent, and all and every 
power, authority, claufe, article, and thing therein 
contained. And further know ye, that we repofing efpecial 
truft and confidence in your wifdom, loyalty diligence, 
and circumfpection in the management of the affairs to 
be hereby committed to your charge, have nominated and 
appointed, conftituted and affigned, and by their prefents 
do nominate, appoint, conftitute and affign yo\l the £aid 
Frederick, Earl of Carlifle, Richard Vifcount Howe, Sir 
William Howe, William Eden, and George Johnstone, or any 
three of you to be our commiffioners in that behalf, to 
ufe and exercife all, and every the powers and authorities, 
hereby intrufted and connnitted to you the faid Frederick 
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Earl of carlifle, Richard Vifcount Howe, Sir William Howe, 
William Eden, George Johnftone, or any three of you, and 
to so perform and execute all other matter and things 
hereby enjoyned, and committed to your care, during our 
will and pleasure, and no longer, according to the tenors 
these our letters patent and of such further inftructions, 
as you fhall from time to time receive under our fignet 
or fign manual. 
And it is our Royal Will and Pleafure, and we do 
hereby authorife, empower, and require you the faid Frederick 
Earl of Carlifle, Richard Vifcount Howe, Sir William Howe, 
Sir William Eden, George Johnftone, or any three of you, 
to treat, confult and agree with fuch body or bodies 
politick and corporate or with fuch affembly or affemblies 
of men, or with fuch perfon or perfons, as you the faid 
Frederick Earl of Carlisle, kichard Vifcount Howe, Sir 
William Howe, William Eden, George Johnftone, or any three 
of you, fhall think fhall meet and fuff icient for that 
purpofe, of, and concerning any grievances or complaints 
of grievancies exif ting, or fuppofed to exif t in the 
government of any of the colonies, provinces, or plantations 
abovementioned refpectively, or in the laws and ftatutes 
of this realm, refpecting them or any of them, or of and 
concerning any aids or contributions to be furnif hed by 
any of the faid colonies, provinces, or plantations 
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refspectively, for the common defence of this realm, and 
the cominions there unto belonging; and of and concerning 
any other regulations, provifions, matters and things, 
neceffary or convenient for the honor of us, and our 
parliament, and for the common good of all our fubjects. 
And it is our further will and pleafure, that every 
regulation, provifion, matter or things, which fhall have 
been agreed upon between you the faid Frederick Earl of 
Carlifle, Richard Vifcount Howe, Sir William Howe, William 
Eden, George Johnftone, or any three of you, and fuch 
perfons, or bodies politick as aforefaid, whom you or any 
three of you fhall have judged fuff icient to enter into 
fuch agreement, £hall be fully and diftinctly fet forth 
in writing, and authenticated by the hands and feals of 
you, or any three of you on one fide, and by fuch feals 
and other fignatures on the other, as the occafion may 
require, and as may be fuitable to the character and 
authority of the body politic, or other perfon fo agreeing; 
and fuch inftruments, fo authenticated, fhall be by you, or 
any three of you, tranfmitted to one of our principal 
Secretaries of State, in order to be laid before our 
parliament, for the further and more perfect ratification 
thereof, and until fuch ratification, no fuch regulation, 
provif ion, matter or thing shall have any other force or 
effect, or be carried further into execution, than is 
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b.ereaf ter mentioned. And we do hereby further authorife 
and empower you the faid Frederick Earl of Carlifle, 
Richard Vifcount Howe, Sir William Howe, William Eden, and 
George Johnstone, or any three of you, from time to time, 
as you, or any three of you £hall judge convenient, to order 
and proclaim a ceffation of hoftilities on the part of 
our forces by fea or land for fuch time and under fuch 
conditions, reftrictions, or other qualifications as in 
your defcretion might be thought requifite, and fuch order 
and proclamation to revoke and annue in the fame manner 
and form, and it is our further will and pleafure, and 
we do hereby require and connnand all our officers and 
minifters, civil and military, and all other our loving 
fubjects wh~tfoever, to obferve and obey all fuch 
proclamations refpectively. And we do hereby in furth 
purfuance of the faid Act of Parliament, and of the 
provif ions therein contained, authorife and empower you the 
faid Frederick Earl of Carlifle, Richard V'ifcount Howe, 
Sir William Howe, William Eden, George Johnstone, or any 
three of you, by proclamation under your refpective hands 
and feals, from time to time as you fhall fee convenient to 
fufpend the operation and effect of a certain act of 
Parliament, made and paff ed in the fixteenth year of our 
reign, for prohibiting ell trade and intercourfe with 
certain colonies and plantations therein named, and for the 
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other purpofes therein alfo mentioned, or any of the 
provifions or reftrictions therein contained, and therein 
to fpecify, at what time and places refpectively, and with 
what exceptions and reftrictions, and under what paffes and 
clearances in lieu of thofe heretofore directed, by any 
act or acts of Parliament, for regulating the trade, the 
colonies and plantations, and faid fufpenfion £hall take 
effect, and the faid fufpenfion and proclamation, in the 
fame manner and form, to annul and revoke. 
And we do hereby further authorif e and empower you 
the faid Frederick Earl of Carlifle, Richard Vifcount Howe, 
Sir William Howe, William Eden, and George Johnstone, or 
any three of you, from time to time, as you fhall judge 
convenient to .. fufpend in any places, and for any time 
during the continuance of the faid firft recited act, the 
operation and effect of any act, or acts of parliament, 
which have paffed fince the tenth day of February, one 
thoufand feven hundred and fixty•three, and which relate to 
any of our Colonies, provinces, or plantations, above-
mentioned, in North America, fo far as the fame relate to 
them or any of them, or the operation or effect of any 
provif ion or other matter in fuch acts contained, fo far 
as fuch claufes, provifions, or matters relate to any of 
the faid colonies, provinces, or plantations. And we do 
hereby further authorif e and empower you the f aid Frederick 
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Earl of Carlifle, Richard Vifcount Howe, Sir William Howe, 
William Eden, and George Johnftone, or any three of you, 
to grant a pardon or pardons to any number of def cription 
of perfons within the faid colonies, provinces, or planta• 
tions: and we do hereby further authorife and empower you 
the faid Frederick Earl of Carlifle, Richard Vifcount Howe, 
Sir William Howe, William Eden, and George Johnftone, or 
any three of you, in any of our colonies, provinces or 
plantations, aforefaid, refpectively, wherein we have 
ufually heretofore nominated and appointed a Governor to 
nominate and appoint, from time to time, by any inftrument 
under your hands and feals, or the hands and feals of any 
three of you, a proper perfon to be the Governor and 
Commander in Chief in and for fuch colony, province, or 
plantation refpectively, to have, hold, and exercife the 
f aid off ice of Governor and Commander in Chief in and for 
fuch colony, province or plantation refpectively, with all 
fuch powers and authorities as any Governor of fuch 
province, heretofore appointed by us, might or could have 
exercif ed in as full and ample manner and form, as if fuch 
Governor and Commander in Chief had been nominated and 
appointed by our letters patent or commiff ion, and for 
that purpofe, if need be, to revoke, annul, and make 
void any commif f ion or letters patent heretofore granted 
for appointing any fuch Governor and Commander in Chief: 
whereas by certain letters patent under our Great Seal, 
bearing date on the twenty-ninth day of April, in the 
fixteenth year of our reign, we have conftituted and 
appointed you the faid Sir William Howe, to be General 
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and Commander in Chief of all and f ingular our forces 
employed, or to be e mployed within our colonies in North 
America, lying upon the Atlantic Ocean from Nova Scotia 
on the North to Weft Florida on the South, both inclufive, 
to have, hold exercife, and enjoy the faid office during 
our will and pleafure, and in cafe you the faid Sir 
William Howe, fhould by death or any other manner be 
difabled from ~~ercif ing the faid command, it is our will 
and pleafure therein expreffed, that the fame, with all 
authorities, ,rights and privileges contained in that our 
faid commiffion, fhall devolve on fuch officer bearing 
our commiff ion, as fhould be next in rank to you the faid 
Sir William Howe: and whereas our trufty and well beloved 
Sir Henry Clinton, Knight of the Mof t honourable Order 
of the Bath, Lieutenant General of our forces, and General 
of our force in our army in America only, now actually 
bears our commiff ion, and is next in rank to you the faid 
Sir William Howe: Know it is our further will and pleafure, 
and we do hereby ordain and appoint that whenever the f aid 
command in the faid letters mentioned, fhall, in purfuance 
theraf devolve upon the faid Sir Henry Clinton, all and 
every the powers and authorities hereby entrufted and 
commanded to you the faid Sir William Howe, fhall forth 
and determine, and the faid powers and authorities, and 
every of them, fhall from thenceforth, be entrufted and 
committed, and are hereby entrufted and committed to the 
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f aid Sir Henry Clinton, to ufe and excerife the fame powers 
and authorities, and to do, perform, and execute all other 
the matters and things as aforef aid, in as full and ample 
extent and form, and no other, as you the faid Sir William 
Howe are hereby authorifed to ufe and exercife, do perform 
and execute the fame. 
And we do hereby require and command all officers, 
civil and military, and all others, our loving fubjects, 
whatfoever, to be aiding and affifting unto you the faid 
Frederick Earl of Carlifle, Richard Vifcount Howe, Sir 
William Howe, William Eden, and George Johnftone, in the 
execution of this our commiffion, and, of the powers and 
authorities herein contained: Provided always, and we do 
hereby declare and ordain, that the feveral offices, 
powers and authorities, hereby granted, fhall ceafe, 
determine and become utterly null and void, on the firft 
day of June, which fhall be in the year of our Lord one 
thoufand feven hundred and feventy-nine; although we 
fhall not otherwif e in the mean time have revoked and 
determined the fame. In witness whereof we have caufed 
thefe our letters to be made patent. Witnefs ourfelf, 
at Weftminifter, this thirteenth day of April, in the 
eighteenth year of our reign. 
By the KING Himself. l 
YORK 
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1Great Britain. Collection £.£ Papers, that have ~ 
ublished at different times, relating £Q !h! troceecII'ngs of 
is ma est-;;rs commissioners, etc., etc., etc. New York: 
Jiiiies Rivington, 1 B , George III's instructions to commis-
sioners, April 12, 1778, Evans Bibliography, 15825, pp. 15-22. 
SIGNIFICANT DATES 
December 7, 1777 - William Eden's conciliatory offer presented 
to Lord North. 
December 17, 1777 - Count de Vergennes promised to commence 
treaty discussions with Benjamin Franklin. 
January 18, 1778 - British agent Edward Bancroft learned 
Vergennes had received rough draft of Franco-At.\merican 
alliance. 
February 4, 1778 - British ministry received General Howe's 
resignation. 
February 6, 1778 - Franco-~.IIlerican alliance signed. 
February 17, 1778 - North Conciliatory Plan of 1778 presented 
to House of Commons. 
February 20 - 1778 - Cop~es of North conciliatory legislation 
sent to .America. 
February 22, 1778 • Lord Carlisle accepted position on 
commission. 
Narch 5, 1778 - William Eden accepted position on commission. 
l-iarch 5, 1778 - Commons ratified North proposal. 
March 11, 1778 - King George, after Lords approval, signed 
the conciliatory legislation into law. 
March 13, 1778 - French Ambassador Noailles presented to 
Lord Weymouth copy of Franco-American alliance. 
March 21, 1778 - King George instructions to General 
Clinton. 
April 2, 1778 - George Johnstone accepted position on 
commission. 
April 12, 177& - King George instructions to commissioners. 
April 14, 1778 - .Arrival of North proposal in lunerica. 
April 16, 1778 - British commissioners leave England. 
April 22, 1778 - Congress condemned North's proposal for 
peace. 
May 2, 1778 - Simeon Deane, with copies of Franco-1\merican 
alliance, reached New York City. 
June 6, 1778 - Commissioners arrived in Philadelphia. 
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June 7, 1778 - Commissioner George Johnstone secret discussion 
with Loyalist Joseph Galloway. 
June 13, 1778 - Commissioners' copy of the peace proposal 
reached Congress. 
June 16, 1778 - George Johnstone met with Nrs. Ferguson. 
June 17, 1778 
offer. 
' - Congress refused to accept the commissioners' 
June 22, 1778 - Joseph Reed met with l>irs. Ferguson. 
June 28 - June 30, 1778 - Commissioners leave Delaware River 
and reach New York City. 
July 8, 1778 - Count Estaing's French fleet arrived off 
.r:Uiierican coast. 
J'uly 22, 1778 - Estaing's fleet abandoned blockade of New York 
harbor. 
August 26, 1778 - George Johnstone resigned from commission. 
October 3, 1778 - Conunissioners offered their hanifesto and 
Proclamation. 
October 30, 1778 - Congress refused to accept the Manifesto 
and Proclamation. 
November 27, 1778 - Coxmnissioners embark for England. 
December 20, 1778 • Commissioners reached England. 
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